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INSTITUTES OF EDUCATION 



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INSTITUTES OF EDUCATION 



COMPRISING AN 



INTRODUCTION TO RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 



DESIGNED {PARTLY) AS A TEXT-BOOK FOR 
UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES 



^y 



BY 



S. S. LAUKIE, M.A., LL.D. 

PROFESSOR OF THE INSTITUTES AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION 
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 




MACMILLAN AND CO. 

AND LONDON 

1892 

All rights reserved 






L 6/057 
.L3 



Copyright, 1892, 
Br MACMILLAN" AND CO. 



Typography by J. S. Cushing & Co., Boston, U.S.A. 
Presswork by Berwick & Smith, Boston, U.S.A. 



PREFACE. 



I began this book as a Handbook for the students 
of my own class. It grew in the course of production. 
I felt that I could be of most service to students, and 
perhaps also to Lecturers on Education, if I printed in 
full the more abstract portions of my argument — 
those, namely, which dealt with the philosophy of 
method. The result is that the volume is more than 
a Handbook and less than a Treatise. 

I have used the term on the title-page, "rational 
psychology," to distinguish my point of view. Doubt- 
less it might be maintained that no one should in these 
days attempt any philosophy of mind until empirical 
psychology has completed its microscopic task, and 
psycho-physics has said its last word. This would be 
to strike dumb all but the devotees of physical experi- 
mentation, while they themselves do not hesitate to 
travel outside their peculiar field, and commit them- 
selves to speculative opinions (e.g. freedom of the 
Will) which contain implicit in them a whole meta- 
physical system. It will be granted that the uncor- 
rected phenomena of consciousness, which empirical 
psychology offers us, cannot in itself yield a theory of 
knowledge, much less a philosophy of life. There 
must be some principle, idea (call it what you will), 
which correlates and unifies. And until that princi- 
ple emerges out of the laboratory (if that is to be its 
birthplace), we may be allowed our own thoughts as 



vi Preface. 

to its probable whereabouts. In any case a writer on 
the theory of Education is really writing at once a 
theory of life and a treatise De emendatione intelkctus, 
and he cannot dispense with a rational and rationalised 
scheme of mind, be it right or wrong. He will be 
thankful for all that physiology and physics can give 
him; but meanwhile, and until better advised, he must 
follow his own course. What I have to say is a 
practical application of my books on Metaphysics and 
Ethics. 

After all, psycho-physics can never be more than 
physics, though it may throw some light on the char- 
acteristics, as well as the conditions, of sensational 
elements. 

The notes at the end of some of the lectures, and 
the whole of the Appendix, are to be omitted by stu- 
dents of Education. They are written chiefly for my 
own satisfaction, to justify and supplement the text; 
but they are not needed for the understanding of it. 
To the general student of philosophy they may be 
interesting. 

It is quite unnecessary, in my opinion, to carry 
students of Education into all the details of Logic, 
Psychology, Ethics, and Physiology. It is necessary, 
however, that the philosophy which they study should 
be seen to be truly the Science of the Art. Accord- 
ingly, students have to get a firm hold, by the help of 
their instructors, of the fundamental principles which 
exhibit the nature and growth of mind. Everything 
which diverts their attention from this is useless, so 
far as the science and art of Education are concerned. 

S. S. LAURIE. 

University or Edinburgh, 
October 1892. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



PAET I. 

THE END, PHYSIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS, MATE- 
RIALS, AND METHOD OF EDUCATION 
GENERALLY. 

PAGE 
INTRODUCTION EDUCATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND POSSI- 
BILITIES, : 

LECTURE 

I. Education and the Ideal in their General and His- 
torical Aspects, . 7 

II. The End of Education. Philosophy as necessary to 

the Formation of a Conscious End or Ideal, . 15 

III. Body in Relation to the Education of Mind, . . 19 

IV. The Supreme End and its Governing Condition, . 22 
V. The Educative Process generally as determined by 

the Supreme End, 31 

VI. Materials in their Relation to the Nutrition of 

Mind, 40 

VII. Materials in their Relation to the Training and Dis- 
cipline of Mind, . 43 

VIII. Methodology and its Scientific Basis, ... 49 



PART II. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLIGENCE AS YIELD- 
ING THE METHODOLOGY OF EDUCATION, . 53 

I. The Animal Mind, 55 

II. The Man-Mind. Will : Percipience. Self-Con- 
sciousness, 75 

III. Concipience and the Sense-Concept of the Indi- 
vidual, 90 

vii 



viii Contents. 



LECTURE PAGE 

IV. Unity of the Kational Mind : in its Educational 

Keference, 99 

V. Summing up and Definitions (thus far), . . . 103 
VI. Application of the preceding Analysis to Educa- 
tional Method, 109 

VII. The General Concept, 128 

VIII. Reasoning or Ratiocination — Mediate Affirmation, 188 

IX. Causal Induction, 156 

X. Survey of the Processes of Reason in order to show- 
that they are each and all Analytico-Synthetic 
in their character, . . . . . .164 

XI. Unfolding of Intelligence ; or Order of Intellectual 

Growth in Time, 165 

XII. Materials and Dynamics of the building-up of Mind 

as a Real, 169 



PART III. 

METHODOLOGY, . . . .179 



PAET IV. 

APPLIED METHODOLOGY, OR THE ART OE 

INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION, . . 193 



PART V. 

ETHICAL EDUCATION— SPECIALLY 

CONSIDERED, . . . .199 

I. Ethical Ideas as the Real, or Substance, of Life, . 201 

II. Brief Analysis of Mind as an Ethical Activity, . 205 

III. Unity of the Intellectual and Ethical in Education, 211 
(Nutrition and Discipline : Real and Formal.) 



Contents. ix 



PAET VI. 

PAGE 

APPLIED METHODOLOGY AS ART OF 

ETHICAL EDUCATION, '. .215 

LECTURE 

I. The Real and the Formal, 217 

(Instruction, Training, and Discipline generally.') 
II. Method of Ethical Education in the Real — In- 
struction, 219 

III. Method of Ethical Education in the Formal — Dis- 

cipline, 224 

IV. Moral Authority and its Characteristics, . . . 227 
V. Characteristics of the Exercise of Moral Authority, 229 

VI. The Moral Sanctions of Authority, . . . .234 
VII. The Material Sanctions of Authority, i.e. the En- 
forcement of Authority, 235 

VIII. Natural Auxiliaries of Authority, .... 236 



PAET VII. 

SCHOOL-MANAGEMENT, ORGANISATION, Etc., 239 



HISTORY OF EDUCATION, . . 246 



APPENDIX ON CERTAIN PHILOSOPHICAL 
QUESTIONS SUGGESTED BY THE PRE- 
CEDING PAGES, . .. . . . .251 

A. Psychological Basis, 253 

B. Dualism, the Unconscious, and Cerebration, . 261 

C. Brief Synthetic Statement, . . . . . 266 
D. Unity of Reason, ....... 269 



PART I. 



THE END, PHYSIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS, 

MATERIALS, AND METHOD OF 

EDUCATION GENERALLY. 



INTRODUCTION. 

EDUCATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES. 

Enthusiasts have spoken as if we could manufac- 
ture men after a certain pattern, if only we proceeded 
wisely. Eeligious and educational reformers have 
often cherished this belief. It is as well to set aside 
such pious dreams at once. Conditions outside our 
activity as educators are too potent. We have to 
reckon with all the forces that make for or against us 
— instincts, passions, custom, connate predispositions, 
and racial characteristics. 

Locke, with all his sobriety of temperament, yet 
held that the difference between one man and another 
lay in their education. Even if we take education in 
its widest sense, as including all the influences at 
work from infancy upwards, Locke's view would be 
incorrect ; if we take it in its narrower sense of the 
conscious and regulated education of the school and 
family, it is altogether untenable. If, however, we 
understand Locke to mean by education the bringing 
up of a human being so as to fit him for ordinary 
citizenship, and make him a respectable member of 
society and a satisfactory representative of the moral 
standard and social consensus of his time, he is un- 
questionably right. We can do even more than this ; 

1 



Institutes of Education. 



for we can train youth to something higher and better 
than the " spirit of the age." 

The question did not escape the attention of the 
ancients. Horace says — 

" Naturam expellas furca tamenusque recurret." 

He is right, for we cannot overpower entirely the 
determinations of nature in each man. But he is also 
right when he says — 

" Nemo adeo f eras est ut non mitescere possit, 
Si modo culturse patientem commodet aurem," 

which amounts to this, that however strong a natural 
disposition to wrong may be, it can be largely modi- 
fied, if not wholly extirpated, by education. Juvenal, 
as becomes his role of truculent satirist, takes a gloomy 
view of human nature and its possibilities. Seneca 
the Stoic, again, thinks that much may be done if we 
begin early, but has no hope of those who are allowed 
to reach maturity with their faults and vices uncor- 
rected. It is then too late. " As the twig is bent, the 
tree is inclined." He also thinks that education never 
wholly eradicates a vice or failing, but only modifies 
it. Plato says that man is the most savage of all 
animals, but that he can be made the gentlest and 
most godlike by education, if there be a good disposi- 
tion in him ; meaning by disposition, I imagine, such 
a general tendency of nature as gives a hopeful field 
for cultivation. Quintilian substantially takes the 
same view ; but he believes more in the power of edu- 
cation, as such, than Plato does. Plato's hope lay not 



Introduction. 



in the school so much as in the whole social organisa- 
tion. Then there is the Greek proverb, which in its 
Latin form seems to be approved by Erasmus, " Non 
quovis ex ligno fit Mercurius," which may be paral- 
leled by the form in which an aged Scotch educa- 
tionalist used to throw the conclusion to which he had 
come in dealing with the vigorous but rough and often 
coarse-grained Scottish youth, "You can never put 
the polish of marble on a bit of sandstone." 

Modern enthusiasts have, as a rule, been much 
more sanguine than the ancient critics of humanity. 
Comenius, for example, had a firm conviction that by 
education all men might be made perfect. Cicero per- 
haps best sums up ancient opinion and the conclusion 
of common sense, " Quae bona sunt fieri meliora pos- 
sunt doctrina, et quae non optima aliquo modo acui 
tamen et corrigi possunt." 

We may safely hold that, save in exceptional cases 
which may be regarded as abnormal products, educa- 
tion wisely directed can form men into good citizens 
if we begin the process of formation early ; that is to 
say, it can guarantee in all, that amount of intelligence 
and virtue and that standard of social intercourse 
which fit them to discharge well the ordinary duties 
of men in all their political, industrial, and personal 
relations. But when we go beyond this and strive to 
bring all men up to an ideal standard, either of intel- 
lectual capacity or moral elevation, we are largely 
dependent on the original and connate potentialities 
of each, and we shall fail or succeed according as we 
have the natural tendency on our side or against us. 



Institutes of Education. 



The greatest genius has defects, both of intelligence 
and character, which education will do much to re- 
move ; but whatever the education, genius will " out " 
in some form or other. The man of moderate genius, 
on the other hand, is almost wholly dependent on 
education for the growth of such powers as he has. 
Still more is this the case with the " average man." 
Those again who are by nature distinctly below the 
average can by education be brought up to the aver- 
age, and help to swell the social current which already 
tends in its main stream to good. The lowest natures, 
finally, — the residuum, — are held in check by those 
above them, and can and must be disciplined, by the 
help of the whip, to obey their betters for the common 
good. 

I am speaking, however, of education in the large 
sense, and as comprehending all the influences of a 
man's environment as he grows from childhood to 
maturity. The most potent of these is the home ; 
next in potency comes the modern school, when its 
function is properly understood. 

The school is the schoolmaster, just as the family 
is the parent. 

As to the School : 

Whatever may be the natural tendencies and capaci- 
ties of each child, all can be made better by education 
than they would otherwise be, and all have, by virtue 
of their possession of reason, a certain ideal of life 
growing in them, which can be further elevated and 
confirmed by the teacher who puts before himself an 



Introduction. 



ideal aim. There is, in every age, a conception of 
ideal manhood ; and to this and for this we all must 
work in the field of education, if we are to work to 
any good purpose. By striving to reach the top, as 
Quintilian says, we get higher up than by sitting down 
despairingly at the bottom of the hill. The aim of 
education is, in truth, always an ideal aim, for it con- 
templates the completion of a man, — the realisation 
in each man of what each has it in him to become. 
If a teacher has not an ideal aim he had better take 
to shopkeeping at once ; he will there, doubtless, find 
an ideal within his capacity. 

In his necessary ignorance of the possibilities of 
each individual, the educator is justified in taking up 
his task on the assumption that every member of the 
human race is, by virtue of his distinctive humanity, 
endowed with the same general capacities and powers, 
and has in him the possibility of a complete develop- 
ment. This is the assumption of his science and art. 
He does not recognise a qualitative difference in human 
beings, but merely a quantitative. No doubt, with all 
men the possible development is " thus far and no 
farther." The limitations as determined by physical 
constitution, by locality, by race, and by heredity, 
must be theoretically admitted; but they may be 
practically ignored. The aim of the educator is 
determined by his conception of the ideal man, 
towards which all may, more or less, be disciplined 
and trained. 

The influences which educate a man (as I have 
already indicated) are both vast and subtle, the na- 



6 Institutes of Education. 

tional tradition, the family life, the unconscious pres- 
sure of law and custom, the solicitations of external 
nature, and all the local circumstances peculiar to the 
environment of each. These, however, are fully ad- 
mitted by the rational educationalist; but he at the 
same time claims to supplement, to regulate and con- 
trol, i:he various and manifold influences at work, so as 
to harmonise the varied experience of the young into a 
rational unity of life and character, and thus get them 
within sight at least of the ideal possible for each. 

The intelligent teacher will also recognise that the 
natural educators are the parents, and that they are 
always the most potent for good or evil. But, as the 
exigencies of modern society have deputed much of 
the parental work to a special order in the State, he 
will also recognise that he, as a member of that order, 
has great responsibilities, and is under obligation to 
study education with a view to the proper discharge 
of these. His function is, probably, the most impor- 
tant of all social functions. 

The duty of a professor of education is, I think, to 
give the students of the subject an ideal and also a 
method; but, above all, to inspire them with a sense 
of the infinite importance and delicacy of their task. 
He has to show them that they are not mere exactors 
of lessons, but trainers of the human spirit ; and also 
how, animated by this larger conception, they may, 
in teaching subjects, educate minds. He will expose 
the popular fallacy that the schoolmaster's work is 
a drudgery, and convince his students that it is a privi- 
lege. 



LECTURE I. 

EDUCATION AND THE IDEAL IN THEIR GENERAL AND 
HISTORICAL ASPECTS. 

The word " Education " does not mean drawing out. 
This is a modern gloss on the true meaning of the 
word — a gloss suggested by psychology. It means 
training up, as vines are trained up poles. The pri- 
mary signification of a word is not always a safe guide 
to its present use, though it is always interesting and 
suggestive. When men first name a thing or process, 
there often, perhaps generally, precedes the naming 
(always a work of unconscious genius) a flash of 
insight into the essential character of the thing or 
process named. The Latin conception of education 
is confirmed by our own early usage of the word, e.g. 
" Train up a child in the way he should go," and by 
the German erziehen. 

Train up, draw up, not draw out — is the meaning of 
the word "educate," and it is a name for the process 
which we cannot, I think, supersede without loss. 

Train up to what ? Evidently to some end or other. 
To what .end ? Looking at the nature of man, we 
answer, To some habit of being and doing which the 
child knows nothing of, but which we, the trainers, 
are supposed to have as our aim, and of which every 
child is held to be capable. 



8 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

What, then, is your aim ? You cannot define it 
closely, nor even describe it, when the question is 
first put to you; but, all the same, there is vaguely 
in your mind some type of manhood or womanhood 
up to which you yourself are striving to live, and to 
which, if you are in earnest, you desire to train the 
young. This type you have more or less consciously 
present to your mind, and you call it your " ideal." 

Now, the mass of men and women, even including 
parents, may be left to an ideal which is floating and 
vague ; but it is the business and the duty of all who 
adopt what is called the "profession" of education, 
to have some clear conception of the ideal up to Avhich 
they train — a conscious end, which they can express 
in words. It is, when you think of it, a very daring 
thing in you to profess to educate a human being. 
Where are your credentials ? It seems to me that 
one who stands before the world and professes to 
educate is guilty of an impertinence, unless he can 
produce a commission, not from an university or a 
college, but from God Himself. It is a grave and 
serious business. In any case, it is surely not too 
much to demand of you that you have some definite 
ideal. Why, a cabinetmaker has his ideal of the com- 
pleted cabinet, as he saws and cuts, planes and joints 
and polishes. You are engaged in forming the finest, 
most complex, most subtle thing known to man, viz. 
a mind ; and do you propose to go on from day to day 
as your fancy prompts, tinkering here and tinkering 
there, and seeing what comes of it ? Surely not. 

Now, I wish next to say that the ideal you have for 



i.] Education and the Ideal. 9 

those whom you educate must be the ideal you have 
for yourself — your own life. You cannot rise above 
yourself, any more than you can carry your head in 
your mouth. This is the true meaning of the saying, 
" As is the teacher, so is the school," to which I beg 
you to add an even more important truth, " As is the 
man, so is the teacher." The prime qualification, 
then, in the teacher who educates, is that he shall 
have an ideal fdr his own life, and shall be educating 
himself up to that : your pupils learn by doing what 
you do. The educator has first of all to look to him- 
self, and the study of education is also the education 
of the student : the ideal and method are for him first, 
and for his pupils next. 

Whatever ideal he may have for himself as a 
human being, and consequently for his pupils, the 
teacher may depend on this, that the young cannot 
form abstract ideals as he does : they look to the 
parent or teacher as the concrete embodiment of that 
which they are to strive to be. You may inculcate 
what you please, but all the time you yourself as a 
personality are doing more than all your inculcations 
can do. This is a common-place. Very few parents 
and teachers have had conscious ideals ; but, as I have 
indicated, there is an unconscious ideal in every man's 
bosom which moulds his character and governs his 
actions, or at least prescribes what ought to govern. 

The early history of education is, like the history 
of other subjects, a history, not of conscious and for- 
mulated ends, ideals, and processes, but of the uncon- 
scious ends pursued by nations as they advanced from 



10 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

barbarism to civilisation, and to the fulfilment of their 
destiny in the world-history. These unconscious ends 
are merely vague feelings of a result to be aimed at 
rather than a distinct knowledge of it, and yet they 
are most potent : they make history. As age suc- 
ceeds age, the ideal becomes gradually more explicit. 
Society begins to propose to itself specific aims, that 
is to say, the development of certain definite faculties 
which it desires to see active in all its citizens. Vigour 
of body, courage, endurance, skill in the use of arms, 
skill in this or that industry, obedience to civil law, 
and so forth : all excellent in their way, but neither 
singly nor in the aggregate an ideal of man as a living 
spirit in a living body — a being of vast and varied 
capacity, of rich possibilities, and whose life and acts 
have infinite issues. Such an ideal as this we first 
have among the Greeks, and thereafter more fully in 
Christianity. Man as man, man for the sake of man, 
not for his skill in doing this or that — this is, since 
the days of Plato and Christ, the aim of the educator. 
Not what man is, but what he may be in all his rela- 
tions, finite and infinite — this is the problem of the 
educational ideal. 

I would, however, beg you not to suppose that edu- 
cation was invented either by the Greek or the Chris- 
tian world. It has always been going on. Every 
child, always, at all times, and in all places, is being 
educated — trained up to something or other which 
constitutes the type for his time, his place, or his 
class. The reflective movement in education, begin- 
ning, perhaps, with Plato, is simply part of the 



i.] Education and the Ideal. 11 

philosophy of man, and therefore is to be justified as 
all philosophy is to be justified. Philosophy in its ulti- 
mate meaning is nothing but persistent thought on 
man, his nature, his capabilities, his purpose, and his 
destiny. And the philosophy of education is simply 
the asking and answering of questions as to the 
ends or ideals of the philosophy of man, criticising 
custom in the light of these, and then studying the 
processes by which true ends can be best reached — 
i.e. Method. 

In all ages of the world man has been educated : 
not only so, but I would say further, that we cannot 
afford to despise the education of early races; at 
least, when men had reached the stage of settled 
agricultural communities. In those primitive days 
you can easily see that the education would be mainly 
what is now called technical; that is to say, such 
instruction as fitted the young as they grew up to 
supply their daily bodily wants. Difficulties of com- 
munication, the rudimentary state of the useful arts, 
the dangers and uncertainties to which individuals 
would be exposed in maintaining intercourse with 
each other, would prevent the division of labour and 
the growth of that industrial interdependence which 
is now an universal characteristic of civilised life. 
This state of things, which gave a narrow horizon to 
each, had its educational compensations ; for each 
man, with the help of his household, would be himself 
master of many, if not of all, necessary arts. From 
childhood upwards he would be in continual training 
to these. We should accordingly err much were we 



12 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

to despise the education of those primitive times. 
We still find it in many parts of the world, and sur- 
vivals of it even in our own land. The family which 
not only milked its own cows, made its own butter 
and cheese, and ground its own corn, but clipped its 
own sheep, cleaned, combed, dyed, and spun the wool, 
and then wove it into cloth and. made it into clothes; 
which prepared its own cow-hides for the feet or the 
target, which made its own rude articles of furniture 
and moulded its own pottery, — had no small skill. 
The faculties were by these occupations trained, and 
popular instruction might be said to be universal and 
domestic. There was more than instruction in those 
prehistoric days, there was " training up " to a certain 
standard of effectiveness in the work of life; and 
there was, besides, provision for a higher life, although 
the literature might be limited to the chanting of a 
few rude ballads, indulgence in rustic mimes, and the 
worship of a god or gods which were merely tribal. 

Were we now, in these modern times, to educate a 
man merely with a view to the adaptation of his powers 
to certain finite uses (industries and the like), we 
should be recurring to the education of primeval 
civilisation without the advantages of our remote 
ancestors. For there is now a minute division of 
labour in industries, and the breadth and variety of 
primitive technical education is gone for ever. If, as 
a substitute for breadth, we were to train a man (as 
in modern times we can do) to a knowledge of those 
principles which should regulate the application of 
his powers to the narrow field of his industrial work, 



i.] Education and the Ideal. 13 

we, while undoubtedly calling into activity his rea- 
son, would yet be doing so with definite and restricted 
reference to mere finite and bodily uses. This would be 
a decided advance on mere training of the practical 
powers in accordance with custom ; but it would not be 
education, but only what we now understand by techni- 
cal instruction. We should be putting brains into a 
man's fingers; but this is not, I repeat, education, 
though it contributes to it. It falls far short even of 
the education of the primitive settler ; it gains in ra- . 
tionality, but it loses in variety and breadth, and in 
its demand on the power of men to meet exigencies. 

When we speak of educating a human being, we 
think of something more than this. We all think of 
more than this when we think of the subject at all. 
There is (as I have before indicated) a presupposi- 
tion underlying our conception of the word education. 
That presupposition will be found to be this — that in 
man, unlike the animals, there are the germs of a 
possible growth to something or other to which we 
cannot set limits ; and this something or other is our 
ideal. So long as we keep this in view we are giving 
a "liberal," as opposed to a "technical" education. 
It is the recognition of this potentiality in man which 
makes us strive to educate youth and to educate our- 
selves. A man is not a mere intelligent tool; he is 
something more. He exists for that something more. 
He is not a means but an end. A material civilisa- 
tion is to be called civilisation only in so far as it 
makes the higher end possible for a community. We 
begin to see, in fact, that the education of man up to 



14 Institutes of Education. [lect. i. 

a certain ideal is itself the very purpose of his exist- 
ence, and that the history of our race is, properly 
viewed, the history of its education. 

Education, however, in this larger sense was not in 
old times possible. For this reason : by education, 
we mean the training of a man with a view to make 
him all that he can become. Now you will at once 
perceive that this very conception was impossible 
until men had thought about themselves. Philosophy 
in brief, though in a non-self-conscious form (I mean 
not explicitly developed), was the necessary precursor 
of the idea of education in its fulness ; and philoso- 
phy was itself the product of religion, or one with it. 
The relations of dependence and awe in which man 
stood to the mysterious power by which he and all 
his works were surrounded, and by which his best- 
laid schemes were so often frustrated, led to thought 
on this universal power and on man's relation to it. 
Life and death and man himself became objects of 
speculation; and as soon as men became capable of 
the tJiougJit of man, they were competent to conceive 
the thought of the growth of man to the full fruition 
of his nature — in other words, the thought of his 
education. But not sooner. 

This thought — the thought of what man truly is 
in his highest expression, which we may call the 
notion of man, we owe, I have said, to the Greeks 
more than to any other race. 



LECTURE II. 

THE END OF EDUCATION. 

PHILOSOPHY AS NECESSARY TO THE FORMATION OF 
A CONSCIOUS END OR IDEAL. 

The education of a human being then has at all 
times and in all circumstances a more or less conscious 
ideal in view. The ideal of successive races of man- 
kind is the measure of their civilisation and their true 
history. 

A conscious ideal is an ideal based on a study of 
man — in short, on the philosoj)hy of man. But phi- 
losophy is not the subject of this Chair, and you must 
therefore be often content to rest satisfied with state- 
ments which cannot be presented to you in their full 
reasoned form, but rather wear a dogmatic aspect. 

The ideal is also the end or purpose. The ideal 
end or purpose of education must manifestly be de- 
termined by the ideal end or purpose of human life 
itself. 

To the question what this end or ideal in education 
may be, various answers have been given. All writers 
have found it necessary to propound some end or 
other, for they have felt the truth of what Jean Paul 
says, " The end desired must be known before the 
way. All means or art of education will be, in the 

15 



16 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

first instance, determined by the ideal or archetype 
we entertain of it." 

Montaigne's aim is summed up in the words, Wis- 
dom and Virtue. Comenius gives as his aim, "Knowl- 
edge, Virtue, Religion." Milton's aim is Likeness to 
God, best attained through Virtue and Faith. Locke's 
aim is Health of Body, Virtue, and Good Manners. 
The Pietists under Spener (died 1705) had for their 
aim the building up of the Kingdom of God in the 
heart of every child. Herbert Spencer's aim is stated 
to be " Complete Living." A common German state- 
ment is, that the end is the harmonious development 
of all the powers. I myself would prefer to say that 
the ideal aim of education is the realisation of the 
ideal of Man by each individual in and for himself. 

All these answers, including my own, are so very 
generalised as to be wholly uninstructive. Nor can 
we find such instruction as to ends and ideals as shall 
at the same time be a guide to us in educating, until, 
among many universally admitted subordinate ends, 
we can find that supreme end which governs all the 
rest. 

And to ascertain this we must first ascertain the 
supreme and governing end of man's life. 

This end is the Ethical Life. 

The supreme end, then, of all education is an ethi- 
cal end. The determination of this end and of the 
conditions of its attainment constitutes the theory 
and methodology of education. 

The standard by which we ultimately judge a man 
is his worth as a man — the outcome in life and con- 



ii.] The End of Education. 17 

duct of all his capacities. " By their fruits ye shall 
know them ; " and the fruit each yields is also the 
seed he sows. All special knowledges are of value 
only in so far as they contribute to the supreme ethi- 
cal result. One man knows more Greek and Mathe- 
matics than another : is he therefore better educated ? 
May it not be that just because one knows so very 
much more than another he is worse educated, — ethi- 
cally a poor result ? The actual outcome in bearing 
and conduct, which is life, is alone the test of our 
having fulfilled life. 

Even in the technical education of a Carpenter or 
weaver, I am fitting him to do his work better than 
he would otherwise do it — that is to say, more effec- 
tively, and therefore more honestly. I am qualifying 
him for industrial citizenship. The most efficient car- 
penter is, qua carpentering, the most moral carpenter. 
True, the most moral carpenter, in the larger sense, 
is not necessarily the most efficient carpenter : but he 
will desire to be the most efficient, because he has a 
moral ideal of manhood and of conduct as one citizen 
co-operating with other citizens for the industrial pur- 
poses of life. I give him technical instruction that 
he may be enabled to give effect in sound honest work- 
manship to his ideal of his own manhood and citizen- 
ship. Even technical instruction, then, has its moral 
purpose : it fits a man to be a true man in the social 
place he occupies. Thus, into everything we do, nay, 
into everything we think, the ethical element enters 
for better or worse. 

But outside the question of man in his specific in- 



18 Institutes of Education. [lect. n. 

dustrial and other relations to his fellow-men, there 
is the question, of his manhood in its larger sense, his 
fulfilment of himself simply as man ; for we believe, 
with the Athenians, that thereby we best fit him for 
all his duties, whether of citizenship, or carpentering, 
or anything else. How am I to ascertain wherein 
man's fulfilment lies — his true life, that which gov- 
erns all his relations ? 

Evidently only by inquiring into the nature of man 
— his mental constitution, and his past history of 
effort and failure. There, if anywhere, we shall find 
what he is intended to be, and how he is intended to 
act. But to do this we should have to deal with 
Ethics in general, and this is not a Chair of Ethics, 
but of Education. This much, however, we may say 
bluntly — The education of a child is the bringing of 
him up in such a way as to secure that when he is a 
man he will fulfil his true life — not merely his life 
as an industrial worker, not merely his life as a citi- 
zen, but his own personal life through his work and 
through his citizenship. 

But this is not all, for we have to consider the con- 
ditions of the attainment of the ethical end of educa- 
tion from the point of view, not only of the growth 
of mind, but of the growth of body ; for, " We have 
not to train up a soul," says Montaigne, "nor yet a 
body, but a man, and we cannot divide him." But 
even the bodily conditions, important as they are, are 
merely the basis of that which is higher. 

Eirst of all, I ask your attention to these physical 
conditions. 



LECTURE III. 

BODY IN RELATION TO THE EDUCATION OF MIND. 

Mind, we have said, is involved in matter or body 
— the " clay cottage/' as Locke calls it. There can 
be no mens sana without corpus sanum. In discussing 
the question of the education of mind, it is assumed 
that healthy bodily conditions are first of all secured. 
Each day must be so arranged as to provide the nec- 
essary time for physical exercise — especially in the 
form of play. Manual instruction in covered sheds, 
apart from its other uses, helps to maintain sound 
physical conditions, and in a climate like ours seems 
to be almost a necessity. 

The physical or physiological conditions of mental 
receptivity and activity have also to be studied by 
the educator in their relation to healthy surroundings, 
to the amount of brain-work to be demanded from 
boys and girls, the length of school lessons, home 
lessons, and differences of power and of temperament. 

TJie following are the heads of a short course of Lec- 
tures on Physical Conditions : — 

(1) The Structure of the Human Body generally. 

(2) The Blood and its Circulation — Waste — Nu- 
trition — Purification. 

19 



20 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

(3) The Nerve-System — Sensory and Motor. The 
Senses. Muscular Activity. 

(4) The Nerve-Apparatus of Eeceptivity and Ac- 
tivity ; Gradual growth of this, and lessons to be 
drawn from the gradual growth. 

(5) Waste of Nerve-Substance. Exhaustion of 
Nerve-Substance. Nutrition of Nerve-Substance. 

(6) Memory and Habit as determined by physio- 
logical conditions. 

(7) Reflex action : Automatic action : Secondarily- 
automatic action, and its educational significance. 

Summary of educational lessons to be drawn from a 
consideration of physical conditions : (a) Nutrition and 
Oxygenation of blood in brain {food and ventilation) ; 
(b) Rest; and variety of brain exercise; (c) Gradual 
growth of the intellectual and moral capacity in connec- 
tion with growth of brain : the consequent limitation of 
the teacher's demands on pupils {length of lessons, etc.); 
{d) Habit of mind in so far as it is merely cerebral 
habit; (e) Gymnastic, with drill; (/) Sanitary condi- 
tions generally of intellectual and moral health and 
activity. 

Books of Reference. — Carpenter's Mental Physi- 
ology ; M'Kendrick's Elements of Physiology ; Professor 
Foster's Primer. These suffice for the student of 
education. 1 



1 A complete course of physiology is not at all necessary for the 
student of education. A general knowledge of the human frame 
and of hygienic and cerebral conditions suffices. A course of four 
or five lectures illustrated by good diagrams will yield all the in- 
formation needed. 



in.] Body in Relation to the Education of Mind. 21 

Perhaps the most important lesson which physi- 
ology teaches in the domain of mind is that mind 
processes wear a kind of channel for themselves, so 
that, with practice, all mind activities, intellectual or 
moral, good or bad, flow more easily. Thus, things 
difficult to do become in the end so easy that the 
doing of them partakes of the character of automatic 
action. This kind of activity is called secondarily- 
automatic. On this point I would direct your atten- 
tion to chap. iv. vol. i. of Professor James' Principles 
of Psychology. 

Many important questions also are suggested by the 
relation of bodily growth to mental growth. 

Under gymnastic, again, we have to compare the 
Greek gymnastic with British games, in respect of 
their recreative and moral influence as well as their 
power of promoting a balanced physical condition. 
Athleticism as opposed to a reasonable, or Greek, 
gymnastic must also receive consideration. 

The recent movement in the direction of manual 
work is really an attempt to counterbalance the too 
exclusive demands which the school makes on intel- 
lect, and ought, in its due place, to be encouraged. 
The bearing of such work in its reflex effect on the 
intellect, as giving a certain firmness and solidity to 
purely intellectual operations, is also worthy of dis- 
cussion. We must leave this whole subject for lec- 
ture-room treatment. 



LECTURE IV. 

THE SUPREME END AND ITS GOVERNING CONDITION. 

Consciousness, generally, is Mind. 

The conscious subject is a one, self-identical mind- 
entity. 1 So far as mere consciousness is concerned, 
man and animals are like one another. 

But man is more than a conscious animal, because 
he has reason, or is a reason. The fundamental form 
of reason makes its appearance with self-conscious- 
ness. 

Man accordingly may be denned as a self-conscious 
rational mind-entity, involved in body. 2 

When the conscious or self-conscious entity has an 
object present to it, we call the former "subject," to 
distinguish it from the "object." 

It appears then that the distinctive characteristic 
or difference of man as contrasted with other conscious 
beings, is Reason. 

Accordingly, man being specifically a being of reason, 
the supreme end of human life, which has an inherent 
title to govern all other minor ends, must be the life of 
reason and in reason. Life is action, and, accordingly, 

1 This lecture is somewhat of the nature of a series of paragraphs 
to be fully expounded orally by the lecturer. 

2 Vid. Note A in the Appendix. 

22 



lect. iv.] Supreme End and Governing Condition. 23 

life in accordance with reason may be more fully ex- 
pressed as a life of activity in the things of reason, 
and conduct in accordance with reason; and this, 
speaking generally, is what we have called the ethical 
life. Let us carry these propositions into more con- 
crete detail. 

Moral and Spiritual Life. — Life in the activity of 
reason, i.e. pure thought and contemplation, might with 
certain beings be the highest ; but for man, since he can 
live at all only through multiform relations to the non- 
rational nature within him and to other things and 
persons, the issue of his life in conduct is the highest: 
that is to say, life in reason through his relations to 
things and persons, or, generally, life in relations as 
these are impregnated and moulded by reason. This 
is the moral life. 

But man, by virtue of this same reason in him, has 
relations with the Infinite. Accordingly, when, in the 
life of thought and contemplation, man rises to the 
notion of God as Being and Thought-universal, and 
sees reason (which is also the truth) in relations, as in 
and through God, who is Beason-universal, — he then 
lives and acts in conscious communion with God as in 
all and through all. He now lives, not only the life 
of reason and in reason, but with Reason as the uni- 
versal One in the many. This is the spiritual life. 

But this spiritual life is only the moral life seen in 
God, and, so, the completion and fulness of the life 
of man. 

The moral life, accordingly, when it has passed into 
the spiritual life, is what I mean by the Ethical Life, 



24 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

Note. — In seeking the end or purpose of a complex organ- 
ism like man, we have to fix on some thought and phrase 
which expresses at once the highest outcome and the specific 
functioning of his nature. He must, of course, first be what 
he does; but to stop at being, with a creature whose life 
consists in his relations to external things, circumstances, 
and, above all, to himself and other spirits like himself, 
would be to stop short of the completion of life, which does 
not consist in being and reverie, but in an activity deter- 
mined by the state of being. We must, therefore, seek for 
some expression (if we are to have only one expression) 
which comprehends the essential activity of his nature, and 
denotes, at the same time, its purpose or end. The expres- 
sion most comprehensive and least misleading is, I think, 
" ethical life." 

Ethical life, then, is the spiritual life as including 
the prior moral life. 

The moral life, as such, is rightly called the vir- 
tuous life. For this, there is manifestly necessary a 
virtuous state of being, and its sequel effective virtue. 
I may be full of virtuous sentiments and principles, 
but have very little effective virtue ; I cannot, how- 
ever, exhibit effective virtue save as the expression of 
a prior state of being. 

Man, in so far as he is animal, has sensations and 
emotions like the animals. These give rise to desires, 
and impel him to do this or that. He differs from the 
animals by virtue of the reason in him, which regu- 
lates and directs these emotions and desires, and pre- 
scribes ends. The relations which these emotions 
and desires bear to each other, and to our fellow-men, 
are ascertained by reason interpreting experience; 



iv.] Supreme End and Governing Condition. 25 

and they get the name of " moral ideas/' because they 
are ideas determining action or conduct. These moral 
ideas, e.g. justice, benevolence, integrity, courage, 
truthfulness, purity, holiness, etc., constitute the 
motives of a man's conduct, if he is moral. They 
are sometimes called moral sentiments or virtues, 
and the man who acts in accordance with them as law 
of his nature, is said to be virtuous. The idea is at 
once end and motive, but he can fulfil the idea only 
through particular acts. 

Man cannot act on these ideas until he possesses 
them as knowledge (more or less distinct). If he 
possesses these ideas and lives in the contemplation 
of them, he may be said to be in a moral or virtuous 
state of being ; but his life is not fulfilled, nor is he 
virtuous, till he gives effect to them in his daily con- 
duct : till then, they are only half-born. This is 
effective virtue — the virtuous or moral life. In edu- 
cation our main object is to train men to a habit of 
effective virtue ; but we desire also to elevate the 
virtuous life, if we can, to the spiritual life, so that 
the ethical life may be fulfilled in its wholeness in 
each man. 

Note. — There are many who keep then eyes so steadily 
fixed on a man's acts, that they are disposed to loos, with 
distrust on the inner growth of feeling and sentiment, or 
what are commonly called moral ideas (and sometimes 
"principles") — those inner motives which are a complex 
of reason and emotion, and precede the possibility of virtue. 
The giving effect to these in conduct is certainly, as effective 
virtue, in advance of the mere state of mind which we call 
" virtuous " ; but as the cause must precede the effect, we 



26 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

cannot afford in education to dispense with the consideration 
of the best way of creating the virtuous state of mind, sim- 
ply as a contemplative state, with a view to the ultimate 
issue in action. 

We shall find in practice, doubtless, that the wisest way 
of creating this virtuous state, is by getting the young (and 
ourselves) to act, i.e. to do the right and good thing, and 
in this way evoking the good emotion or sentiment. In 
other words, the generalised emotion or moral idea and the 
putting of it in practice, should, in training the young, be 
inseparably bound together as far as possible. By doing 
benevolent acts, for example, a child becomes a benevolent 
being, and entertains in consciousness and imagination — 
all ready for use — benevolent emotions. 

At the same time, if we take the whole range of moral 
ideas, this way of procedure is impracticable, and we there- 
fore try to build up in the child and youth a system of moral 
ideas which will constitute a permanent reservoir of motives 
always ready for use, whether in moral judgment or moral 
action . 

Take the various moral ideas which constitute the motives 
of a good-will, viz. benevolence, justice, purity, honesty, 
integrity, truth-speaking, courage, resoluteness, perseverance, 
and so forth, and you will see how the growth of these in 
the mind (as furniture of the mind, so to speak) must be 
premised if we are to secure our result — effective virtue — 
in all conditions and circumstances. 

If we cannot create these generalised feelings or ideas, 
and give them lodgment in the minds of the young by reg- 
ulating all their petty acts, how are we to supplement our 
want of opportunity ? We shall get a full answer to this in 
the sequel ; but meanwhile I would say generally, that we 
supplement the ordinary experiences of life in three ways: — 
1. By authority and precept. 2. By our own example. 3. 
By getting children to contemplate the acts of others, either 
as they see them going on before their eyes, or, through 
imagination, by the help of narratives and poetry. (But 
this is to anticipate the discussion on method.) 



iv.] Supreme End and Governing Condition. 27 

The moral life and the spiritual life (in brief, the 
ethical life) must exist as a system of ideas and mo- 
tives before it is active, and consequently presumes 
for its existence an antecedent activity of reason in 
ascertaining, or accepting, ethical ideas and ends. 
Hence the importance in education of so training 
the intelligence of all that each, though incapable of 
ascertaining for himself the ideas which nourish the 
moral and spiritual nature, may yet acquiesce in them 
with intelligence and personal conviction, make them 
his own, and not be merely the slave of dogma, 
misapprehended or not apprehended at all. Man is 
an ethical being only so far as he is a se£/-regulated 
being. 

Men have, happily, not to depend each on the 
activity of his own reason for the ascertainment of 
the truth of life and conduct — the moral ideas which 
are to constitute his ever-present motives. They in- 
herit the fruit of the labours of past generations. As 
regards its substance generally, indeed, education is 
Tradition — the handing on of intellectual and moral 
possessions by those set apart as competent for the 
task. 

We may now conclude that the supreme end of 
education is the ethical life, and that the main instru- 
ment in training to the substance of this is tradition ; 1 
and that reason in each has to be so trained that the 
young may intelligently acquiesce, and so make the 
transmitted moral and spiritual life their oicn. 

1 " There is a history in all men's minds 

Figuring the nature of the times deceased." — 2 Henry IV.iii. 



28 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

The transmitters of this tradition are primarily the 
parent and schoolmaster. 

But, further, the ethical life is not only the Good, 
but the Law for man, because it comprehends the 
ideas of his relations to things and persons — the truth 
for life and conduct. By the fulfilment of this law 
alone, can a man fulfil or realise himself ; and, accord- 
ingly, he owes duty to the law. 

The reason of man is by its very nature always 
seeking for law, and we consequently meet its neces- 
sities by bringing him under a sense of the law which 
is inherent in the truth of his relations ; and we accus- 
tom him, when young, to obey the law though he can- 
not yet see the truth of it for himself. Thus we 
strengthen the connate perception of law in him, and 
habituate him to act in accordance with certain ideas 
or truths as law, and because of the duty he owes to 
law. 

When a youth perceives the truth of the moral 
ideas which ought to determine conduct, and has 
acquired a habit of duty to them, he is educated 
morally. The spiritual education may accompany or 
follow this ; and then there is realised the full ethical 
life in him, i.e. activity of reason or intelligence 
whereby he perceives the truth and obeys the law, 
and leads the life of law in God. The ethical life in 
a man then (to sum up) is a habit of action in accord- 
ance with moral ideas as the divine order, under a 
sense of duty to the law inherent in them as spiritual 
or divine law. 

This may seem all very general ; but, in very truth, 



iv.] Supreme End and Governing Conditio?!. 29 

the significance of all we teach and of every lesson 
we give is ethical — always ethical, or it is, in its 
edncational reference, wholly insignificant or rather 
non-significant. True, we have to educate experts in 
the various departments of human activity in order 
that the torch of learning and of civilisation may be 
held high and handed on. But the education of a 
nation does not aim at this, but at something much 
greater. A school accordingly is not to be judged 
as an educational institution by the number of its 
" scholars/' but by its ethical results, including, as 
the precondition of such results, bodily vigour. 



Our constant aim in studying the science of educa- 
tion must be to bring all philosophic discussions and 
conclusions to a practical issue. We have to deduce 
rules for our guidance. 

The supreme end is always, it is presumed, with 
us, and is daily and hourly influencing us in what we 
teach or deliberately omit to teach ; but, besides exer- 
cising this governing function, it yields a principle of 
method which helps us in our teaching. For the end 
contemplated is a practical end ; it is the issue of in- 
tellect and of moral and spiritual ideas in a habit of 
action ; it is a turning to use — the use of life, of all 
the furniture and trained activity of mind. 

Principle of Method. — Turn to use. 

Accordingly, this principle should be constantly 
applied in every subject we teach and in every lesson 
in every subject. We see the rule illustrated by a 



30 Institutes of Education. [lect. iv. 

good teacher of mathematics, who knows that his busi- 
ness is not to make mathematical experts, but to use 
mathematics in so far as it contributes to the general 
education of the human mind. Every theorem under- 
stood has its consequences. The practical relations of 
geometry to mensuration and geometrical drawing, 
and the deduction of riders to be worked out inde- 
pendently by the pupils, are never omitted from his 
course. He is indifferent to the amount of Euclid 
"gone over"; his business is to pause and to make 
sure by means of deductions that the intellectual dis- 
cipline and the practical application are insured. In 
brief, at every stage he " turns to use." 

So with the good teacher of language: he turns 
everything to use from the first lesson onwards. 

The ultimate and sole effective test of all knowledge 
in every department is — Can the pupil use it ? 



LECTURE V. 

THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS GENERALLY AS DETER- 
MINED BY THE SUPREME END. 

The spiritual life is not achieved except through 
the habit of virtuous activity, and in like manner the 
virtuous life is not fulfilled until it passes into the 
spiritual life. The ethical life, accordingly, is not a 
state of being solely, but a continued series of ethical 
acts bound together by an ideal of life. If this be so, 
and if the ethical life be the supreme end of educa- 
tion, the analysis of the elements (moments or steps) 
of an ethical act ought to yield to us the Educative 
Process generally. 

I find that the ethical act, as a final willing of the 
good, contains the following elements : — 

1. Eight judgment as to the facts before us and 
their relations : a process of reason. (Substance of 
knowledge and power of discrimination.) 

2. A moral idea (at the heart of which there is 
always an emotion) following on the clear perception 
of the facts ; which idea incites or attracts us to act 
in accordance with itself : and this we call our motive 
of action (at once end and motive). (Substance of 
morality.) 

3. Willing or action in accordance with the said 
motive-idea under a sense of duty to it as Law — a 

31 



32 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

sense of imperative obligation (itself by itself also a 
motive). (Moral discipline.) 

4. The perception of the idea as in God and of the 
law as Divine. (Religion.) 

If I will in accordance with the idea (taking it into 
myself, and making it part of my character for the 
occasion), I have a resultant sense of harmony, non- 
contradiction, or peace, which is always the inner 
guarantee of the attainment of ethical completeness. 

Note 1. — Let me repeat that when I say that the end of 
the education of the young is effective virtue resting on a 
virtuous state of being, in other words, the habit of virtue, 
I do not use these words in a vague sense. The virtuous 
life is not a life of contemplation, but of action ; it is not an 
abstract, but a concrete made up of a series of daily and 
hourly virtuous acts. We do not wish to rear citizens who 
talk about the virtuous life, and walk about displaying moral 
placards, but citizens who quietly do their duty as a matter 
of course, and are ever watchful over themselves in all the 
details of business and of social and family intercourse. A 
large part of the virtuous life must always consist in the 
efficient doing of the work for which we get wages, whether 
that work be carrying bricks or guiding the State. To be 
always virtuous is so difficult that there is no energy left for 
ostentatiously talking about it. 

Note 2. — The educator must always keep chiefly in view 
the primary demands that may be legitimately made on all 
men — a virtuous state of being and effective virtue. The 
spiritual, which is the essence of all religion, will accompany 
or follow. When we have trained to the ethical life in its 
completeness we have built the temple. The activity of 
reason in things of reason, the enjoyment of the beautiful 
in nature and art, and the graces and courtesies of manner 
and intercourse {evKocr/XLa), all go, doubtless, to the ideal 
fulfilment of a man. But our business is with the temple, 



v.] Educative Process Generally. 33 

before we concern ourselves with its decoration. The rational 
and the aesthetic for their own sake will always receive the 
attention of the educator, especially in their ethical relations ; 
but we cannot afford to think of them save as accessory to 
the ethical life. 

The Educational End, as I conceive it, might now 
be stated thus : — 

Right Judgment and a Habit of good Action 
under a sense of duty, accompanied by a 
comprehension of the spiritual signifi- 
CANCE of Nature and Man. 

The Educative Process, as that is revealed by the 
analysis of the ethical act, is, speaking generally, a 
process of Instruction and of Discipline. 

A. — Instruction (Knowledge). 

(1) Instruction in our relations to things and per- 

sons, commonly called intellectual instruc- 
tion. 

(2) Instruction in moral ideas, commonly called 

moral instruction (the virtues). (The 
Good.) 

(3) Instruction in the spiritual, i.e. the religious 

idea. (God.) 

B. — Training and Discipline (Faculty). 

(1) Training and discipline to the habit of intelli- 
gent or rational activity. 



34 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

(2) Training and discipline to the habit of virtuous 

willing, i.e. good action under a sense of 
duty. 

(3) Training to the spiritual habit of mind. 

The educative process, as so conceived, gives us a 
systematic view of the whole field of education, out- 
side the presupposed physical conditions. 

A. — Instruction. 

The Realistic and the Humanistic. 

To give the materials of right judgment we have to 
instruct the young. It has been usual to oppose to 
one another real (realistic) instruction and human- 
istic — the former being instruction in those things 
that concern a man's wa£we-environnient ; the latter, 
instruction in the relations of men to each other, and 
in the creations of man as a being of reason, i.e. liter- 
ature, art, and all thought on that which is specifically 
human. The humanistic has also been identified with 
Greek and Latin literature, because at the time of 
the Renaissance the best literature was to be found in 
those languages. A little thought suffices to show 
that there is hopeless confusion in such distinctions. 
Literature and the things of thought are in a much 
truer sense realities than the things of sense, and 
all literature and art, ancient or modern, is equally 
humanistic. The best division of subjects is into the 
Real and the Formal or Abstract, corresponding to 
the two demands of instruction and discipline ; and 



v.] Educative Process Generally. 35 

these again have each to be divided into Naturalistic 
and Humanistic ; thus : 

I. — The Real (with a view chiefly to Nutrition of Mind), 
(a) The Real- Naturalistic : 

(1) Knowledge of the world of nature by which the 

pupil is surrounded. (In its initial stages 
this includes lessons in colour, form, measure, 
weight, number, sound, and object-lessons 
generally : in later stages, a knowledge of 
animals, plants, and manufactured products.) 

(2) Knowledge of that part of nature nearest to 

the pupil himself, viz. his own body, with 
special relation to the laws of health. 

(3) The distribution of men and nations, with the 

physical conditions of their lives and their 
related industrial and commercial character- 
istics. This, with topography, constitutes 
school geography. 

(4) Physiography. 

(5) The Real- Humanistic : 

(1) Language, i.e. 

(a) The vernacular language as the expression 
of the thought of others. Literature. 

(&) The vernacular language as the expression 
of one's own thought, a synthetic exer- 
cise. (Imitative composition, with a 
view to the correct use of language.) 

(2) Foreign languages as literature. 



36 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

(3) Economics. 

(4) History, with civil relations. 

(5) Moral instruction [including minor morals]. 

(6) Spiritual ideas, including religious truth. 

Subsidiary Subjects : 
Art. 

(a) Music. 

(6) Appreciation of the arts of painting, 
sculpture, and architecture. 

B. — Training and Discipline. 

II. — The Formal or Abstract (with a view chiefly 
to Discipline of Mind). 

(a) Naturalistic, (b) Humanistic. 

Drawing. Grammar. 

Arithmetic. Ehetoric. 1 

Mathematics. Logic. 1 

The formal or abstract chiefly discipline the mind 
and give power; the real feed the mind and give 
nutrition. 

To give adequate instruction in all these studies to 
all is impossible; but the instruction of all should be 
on these lines, carried as far as time permits, and 
given in such a way as will lead to the further volun- 
tary prosecution of them. 

1 Rhetoric and Logic are not to be formally taught till the pupil 
has reached the university stage. 



v.] Educative Process Generally. 37 

Beading and writing, as instruments whereby we 
receive the thoughts of others and convey our own, 
are, of course, primary elements in all education ; but, 
were it not that they are necessary as instruments for 
bringing the mind into contact with the naturalistic, 
humanistic, and the formal in knowledge, we should 
not think of wasting time over them. 

The above are our materials of instruction — the 
food we give ; and they are also the subjects by which 
we discipline and train the intelligence and moral 
nature of the young to an ethical result. There are, 
within the range of school life, up to the end of the 
secondary period (the eighteenth year), no other 
subjects having equal claims. 

Liberal and Technical Education. — All the above 
studies enter into a "liberal" education. Here again 
we have to define. A liberal education is the educa- 
tion of a man for the sake of his manhood, and up to 
an ideal of manhood, without regard to any specific 
use to which he may turn his knowledge and powers. 
Doubtless, there is a sense in which all education is 
for use — the uses of life and living ; but by the 
"useful" is usually understood the materially useful, 
that which enables a man to earn his living. Hence 
the term to be opposed to "liberal" in education is 
" technical," that is to say, instruction and training 
with reference to certain industrial uses and material 
results. "Professional" education is thus so far 
technical, and is to be distinguished from industrial 
technical education only in so far as it rests on more 
advanced, and on liberal, studies. 



38 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

All thinkers on education of any importance con- 
tend for a liberal education — the education of the 
man ; believing that thereby they best fit all men for 
the work of the world generally, no less than for the 
specific function each has to discharge as a member 
of a co-operative community. 

Whatever we teach for its own sake, with a view 
to the ideal of man solely, is an element of liberal 
education. Even manual instruction, not to speak of 
the elements of science, falls under this designation. 
All depends on the purpose we have in view, whether 
it be general or special. 

The Athenians held that the best men — simply as 
men — made the best citizens ; the Spartans, though 
Hellenic in their general conceptions of education, 
had a more restricted view. Their ideal of man was 
the soldier, and their training was, in truth, technical 
in the gymnastic and military sense ; and, so far, it 
was a debased Greek form. 

Culture is a vague term ; but when we speak of a 
" man of culture," we certainly mean a man of liberal 
education. And if our definition of a liberal educa- 
tion be correct, a man may be a man of culture though 
destitute of Latin and Greek. On the other hand, in- 
asmuch as a liberal education has regard to the ideal 
of ''man," it follows (and is a fact admitted by all) 
that the humanistic or man-subjects promote a liberal 
education, and consequent culture, in a sense which 
realistic studies do not. A man trained solely on the 
latter cannot be liberally educated ; a man trained 
solely on the former can, on the contrary, be liberally 



v.] Educative Process G-enerally. 39 

educated. In short, what is called " culture " is not 
within reach of the man trained solely on the real- 
naturalistic, but it is attainable by the man trained 
solely on the real-humanistic. At the same time, 
naturalistic subjects, I admit, might be so taught as 
to be humanised, and thus come within the sphere of 
the humanistic. 



LECTURE VI. 

MATERIALS IN THEIR RELATION TO THE NUTRITION 
OF MIND. 

We have now to consider the real elements of 
education, naturalistic and humanistic, one after the 
other, and ascertain what is the precise significance 
of each for man, and in what sense they contribute to 
his nutrition. Always limiting our range of view 
to the termination of what is called the period of 
" secondary " instruction, — the age of seventeen 
complete, — we have to ascertain how much of each 
subject ought to be acquired within that period with 
a view to the regulation of life — right judgment and 
good action. 

Two governing considerations must accompany us 
in this inquiry, and be assumed throughout. 

1. Whatever subjects we teach, each should be so 
taught from the beginning, that at whatever age social 
necessities may interrupt the course of instruction, 
the pupil shall have received all the benefit from it 
which his age admits of. 

2. Inasmuch as the supreme end is always ethical, 
instruction in every subject, and at every stage of 
that subject, should be dominated by this end as re- 
gards its quantity, quality, and method. 

40 



lect. vi.] Materials as Nutrition. 41 

[Here follows a consideration of real subjects in 
detail and their educational values, — considered as 
materials or substance of knowledge. The discussion 
extends over five or six lectures, which would too 
much encumber this book.] 

Note. — Though it is to anticipate, let me here say a word 
as to the Instruction-Plan. There has been much writing 
on the question of the organisation of schools — primary, 
secondary, and so forth. The organisation of a school is an 
external matter, and sums itself up in the time-table. 

A far more important question is the organisation of the 
instruction; and the first difficulty here is the selection of 
subjects which we think boys and girls ought to have stud- 
ied by the time they reach the age of seventeen complete, 
and how much of each. 

Then, we have to determine the amount and nature of the 
instruction in each subject at the different stages of mental 
growth. Every age has its own studies. The knowledge of 
each and every subject taught must grow with the growth of 
the mind we are educating, and not anticipate it. If it an- 
ticipate it, the result of the instruction is not knowledge, but 
rote-information . 

The organisation of instruction is a difficult task. It is 
not at all necessary for educational purposes that boys and 
girls of seventeen should know much of anything, but it is 
essential that they know thoroughly, according to a sound method, 
what they profess to know, and that, when they leave school, 
they find themselves, through the skill and devotedness of 
their teachers, in a rational attitude to all knowledge. 1 I 
shall illustrate the quantity of knowledge to be conveyed, 
and its gradation, when I speak in detail of applied method. 
The amount, however, is of little value compared with the 

1 1 am well aware that with some hoys and girls such results are 
unattainable ; none the less do they constitute the teacher's aim and 
ideal. 



42 Institutes of Education. [lect. vi. 

result in respect of intellectual exactness, intellectual interest, 
and intellectual power. 



We have now before us the Ethical End in its full 
statement. We have also laid down the Educative 
Process in general; and dealt with the first part of 
the process, viz. Eight Judgment, in so far as this is 
dependent on mere knowledge. We have further 
surveyed the materials of this knowledge — the sub- 
jects 'which a youth of seventeen ought to have 
studied, distinguishing those which are essential and 
those which, though only accessory, are yet important. 
However much more a youth may know, these things 
(pp. 34, 35, 36) he ought to know, if he is to be fitly 
educated for the work of life and his ethical function 
in life. The youth of active mind will extend his 
knowledge far beyond any limits which we might 
think it reasonable to set ; but all extension beyond 
these limits has to do with the elevation of the plane 
of intellectual and ethical life and the reach of the 
mental horizon, rather than with that knowledge which 
is imperative for all. 



LECTURE VII. 

MATERIALS IN THEIR RELATION TO THE TRAINING AND 
DISCIPLINE OF MIND. 

To Right Judgment is necessary, not only knowl- 
edge, but an active, vigorous, and discriminating in- 
telligence. The saying, "Knowledge is power," is 
only a half-truth ; for, without an active and vigorous 
intellect, it may be a burden and an obstruction. 
When we consider that the mere experience of life, 
apart from books and schools, may give man almost 
all he wants for the moral guidance of his life in all 
ordinary matters, if only he can bring to bear on that 
experience a perspicacious, penetrating, and interpret- 
ing intellect, we feel that power alone is power, and 
that knowledge — the accumulated results of experi- 
ence — must take a second place in the education of a 
human being. At the same time, it is scarcely correct 
to say that training and discipline are of more impor- 
tance than knowledge. Mathematics, for example, 
disciplines the intelligence; and we can easily con- 
ceive a mind admirably disciplined by mathematics, 
but conspicuously faulty in judgment because of its 
ignorance of the real and concrete relations of things 
into which moral and aesthetic elements always largely 
enter. So with all pure discipline as such. Accord- 



44 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

ingly, the substance of knowledge acquired — the food 
or nutrition of mind, is of more importance than some 
educationalists are disposed to think. Let us say- 
that instruction and discipline are, in fact, of equal 
moment. Instruction, however, naturally first engages 
our attention when we have a mind to educate. There 
is a void before us which we have to fill. 

Now we can instruct, in a sense, without giving any 
appreciable training and discipline to the intelligence. 
For our instruction may be merely information — facts 
which the pupil commits to memory ; the reducing of 
these to rational cohesion being left to the chapter 
of accidents. The acquiring of information, simply as 
information and as an exercise of memory, is what is 
meant by rote-instruction. Among other evils attend- 
ing such a mode of conveying knowledge is this, that 
it cannot possibly interest and attract the intellect, or 
the moral and spiritual nature, of a human being ; and 
thus, a distaste for learning and a silent antagonism 
to the teacher, and also to authority generally, are 
generated. Accordingly, it has been found necessary 
to inflict physical chastisement, and to appeal to fear 
in various other forms, in order to compel the majority 
of boys to do the work of rote-acquisition. In truth, 
this way of instructing is always necessarily accom- 
panied with severity of discipline ; and hence, the 
teacher or magister has been popularly known through 
all the ages as pedant, dominie, castigator puerorum, 
plagosus, and so forth. 

Again, we may instruct intelligently, but with a 
view to discipline alone. In that case, we equally fail 



vii.] Training and Discipline. 45 

to interest the young mind, and so to achieve our ulti- 
mate intellectual purpose, which is the placing of the 
mind in an attitude of rational activity to all knowl- 
edge. Such an attitude can exist only when there is 
interest as well as discipline. The growing body can- 
not be fed by a series of difficult exercises in digest- 
ing, but only by food which it can readily assimilate 
and digest. So with the mind : it demands feeding, 
and the food must be of a kind that it can digest and 
assimilate if it is to grow either in knowledge or in 
power, and above all, in intellectual interest. 

These considerations place us, as students of the 
science and art of education, in a critical position. 
Are the questions of assimilation of knowledge and 
of discipline to power different questions which yield 
us answers involving mutual contradiction ? If so, 
our case as educationalists would be a bad one ; for 
we should have to follow two different methods in 
order to attain the two different ends — nutrition and 
discipline. Fortunately it is not so ; the best method 
of instructing with a view to assimilation, is also the 
best method of training and disciplining with a view 
to power, as we shall see. The educational problem 
is thus simplified. 

In the preceding paragraph I have assumed that 
there is such a thing as Method : and a method may 
be good, better, or best. Indeed, the etymology of the 
word " instruction " would of itself suggest to us that 
there is method, for it implies the building of one 



46 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

course on another in a certain order with a view to 
the completing of a structure. 

All will admit that there must be some method of 
instructing: and further, that the best method must 
be that which follows the way in which the fabric of 
mind builds itself up. This, indeed, is the ultimate 
form in which the question of educational method 
must be put. This is also, let it be noted, the ultimate 
question of all psychology (and to a large extent of 
metaphysics also), so closely are the philosophy of 
mind and the education of mind connected. The 
answer to the one question is the answer to the other. 
But the student of education asks the question always 
with a practical purpose, and especially with distinct 
reference to the building up or growing of mind. He 
does not, in a mere abstract interest, analyse the com- 
plex result before him — the adult mind ; but mind 
in its process of gradual formation: and even this 
abstract question he investigates with a view to a 
further question, viz. " What can I wisely do to help 
mind to grow so that it may reach a certain ideal 
standard of knowledge and power?" All the tradi- 
tionary words that have to do with the bringing up of 
the young point etymologically to this, as that which 
underlies all the particular problems of the family 
and the school, e.g. "education," "training," "in- 
struction," " discipline." 

The best method of instruction, I have said, is also 
happily, the best method of disciplining. We may fix 
our attention, then, on the method of instructing, since 
we shall find that the method of discipline is therein 



vil] Training and Discipline. 47 



also contained. By a sound method of instruction we 
shall find that we best train and discipline the mind, 
and by a sound method of training and discipline we 
shall find that we best instruct it. This will appear 
more clearly as we go along. In the meantime, as we 
have already defined the term "instruct," let us now 
endeavour, before going further, to find whether there 
is any distinction between "training" and "disciplin- 
ing" — two words which I have generally used to- 
gether, as if in their combination they expressed one 
notion. 

" Training " and " disciplining " are essentially the 
same process ; but there is a distinction. 

To train the intelligence, is to carry it, or lead it, 
through the various steps which end in the knowledge 
of anything, e.g. I lead a boy, step by step, through 
the processes which end in his adequate comprehension 
of the demonstration of a geometrical theorem, and I 
thus train his intelligence, inasmuch as I guide him 
through intelligent processes ; and in so far as I ac- 
custom him to such processes. He reconstructs in his 
own mind, by my help and imitatively, the thought of 
the original mathematician, and the thinking process 
in him is thereby trained. Now, to discipline is the 
same as to train, with this difference, that I call on 
the boy to initiate for himself, and carry through for 
himself without my help, the processes which end in 
the demonstration of a theorem or problem ; as, for 
example, when I set a rider. To do this a boy has to 
think more closely, to apply himself more intensely, 



48 Institutes of Education. [lect. to, 

and in finding out the steps of proof for himself 
he approaches more closely thought in itself, — the 
processes of reason as such, and the conditions of its 
satisfaction. 

Discipline of intelligence, accordingly, is the self- 
initiated activity of intelligence with a view to an end. 
Approximately, it is the abstract exercise of intelli- 
gence. Thus it is that formal or abstract studies 
discipline much more surely and effectively than 
real studies do : they demand self-sustained and self- 
directed application. 

Every mental act which involves self-conscious un- 
aided effort is of the nature of discipline. 

Training and discipline are thus constantly, in prac- 
tice, passing into each other. 

Let it now be admitted that if a master, when in- 
structing in a subject, does so in such a icay as to train 
and discipline the intelligence by means of the subject, 
he will thereby not only best accomplish this impor- 
tant part of his educational task, but, at the same 
time, best give instruction. A " war " is a " method,' 7 
and we are now brought face to face with Metho- 
dology — i.e. the way of best instructing, that so we may 
best train and discipline, the intelligence. 

[I postpone the question of the Training and Dis- 
cipline of the moral and spiritual nature.] 



LECTURE VIII. 

METHODOLOGY AND ITS SCIENTIFIC BASIS. 

It now appears that we best instruct if we pursue 
the method of instruction which best trains and dis- 
ciplines, and that we best train and discipline if we 
pursue the best method of instruction. 

Now, the way or method of instruction is, in brief, 
the way or method of knowing, or learning. To teach 
with perfect success, the teacher must put himself in 
the position and attitude of the pupil who, being igno- 
rant, desires to know. 

It is beyond all question that we can say nothing 
rationally of the method of knowing without analys- 
ing the process whereby mind as a matter of fact 
knows ; that is to say, appropriates and makes use of 
the raw materials presented to it with a view to the 
building up of the fabric of knowledge. Doubtless 
we might collect together the results of such an 
analysis, as propounded by some well-known writer 
on philosophy, and give them to you as a dogmatic 
system, under the name of " Rules of Procedure, or 
Methods." We might then apply these rules, one by 
one, under the head of "Applied Method," to instruc- 
tion in this, that, or the other subject, and show how 

49 



50 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

they worked out. And this would itself be a great gain. 
But it would not be the Science of method, or the scien- 
tific study of method, but only the more or less slavish 
acquisition of the rules of the art of instructing 
and disciplining the intelligence. These rules, when 
further extended to moral and religious instruction 
and training, would constitute the whole art of educa- 
tion — an art based on science, it is true, but not 
studied as a science by you, the teacher, and, therefore, 
dead, as mere dogma always must be. 

Accordingly, if we are to proceed scientifically and 
introduce the teacher to the science or philosophy of 
his art, enable him to see the principles which guar- 
antee and inspire method, and how it is that they 
contribute effectually to our supreme ethical end, we 
must ask him to analyse with us the process of know- 
ing : in other words, we must ask him to study the 
psychology of intelligence from the point of view of 
the growth of intelligence. While dwelling for a 
time in this abstract region, we shall always keep 
steadily in view our practical aim. It is not psycho- 
logy as an abstract study that here concerns us, but 
psychology in its relations to the education of mind, 
that is to say, psychology in so far as it yields the 
Art of education as a system of principles ; or, briefly, 
as Methodology. 

I have now, accordingly, to ask you to accompany 
me into the abstract field of the philosophy of mind 
with special reference to education. Apart from its 
professional importance to you, it must be accepted as 
part of your academic discipline. For I hold that the 



viii.] Methodology and its Scientific Basis. 51 

study of education is itself an education, and rightly 
claims a position among university disciplines; and 
that not in the interests of school-teaching alone : for 
the philosophy of education is a philosophy of life. 

Note. — It will be said that all of us, whether boys or men, 
learn something somehow, whatever the method of teaching, 
and that very clever boys learn a great deal. If scientific 
method is of so much importance, how is this to be accounted 
for ? In answer to this question I would submit the follow- 
ing considerations : — 

1. As a matter of fact, the great majority of boys learn 
very little, and get no mental discipline worth mentioning. 

2. The proportion of those who learn anything is greater 
in primary schools than in secondary, and this simply be- 
cause primary teachers are as a rule alive to method (such 
as it is). 

3. All boys learn something, it is said, and some boys 
learn a good deal spite of bad teaching. True, and the ex- 
planation of this is that human reason is a pure activity, 
and that it either shirks a difficulty and turns to something- 
else, or it seeks of itself to reduce to order and method the 
confused lessons of the master. The abler minds accom- 
plish this task : the great majority cannot do so, and never 
do so. 

4. It is universally admitted that boys learn more, and 
get better discipline, from a good teacher than from a bad 
one, and that many good, and some admirable, teachers have 
been untrained. But if we look closely we shall find that 
the "good" teacher is a man who instinctively follows good 
methods, whether he knows it or not. The philosophy or 
theory of education includes the questions of end, of the 
educative process, of the materials of instruction and of 
method. Now, the earnest teacher has always in his mind 
some theory more or less vague ; and having end, general 
process, and materials clearly present to him, he instinctively, 
if he is as able as he is earnest, finds, ere long, a way or 



52 Institutes of Education. [lect. vm. 

method of instruction which is fairly good. Also, because 
he is earnest in his work, he relies largely on moral stimulus. 
This is the sort of man we call a " good " teacher, and 
whose success we admire. The object of the study of ed- 
ucation as a science and an art is simply to bring the end, 
process, and materials early into clear consciousness in the 
case of this naturally good teacher, and to show him, before 
he begins, the best way or method of doing his daily work, 
and so making it even more effective than it is. As regards 
all other teachers (the vast majority), the object is to raise 
them to the level of the " good " teacher — a level which they 
could never attain but by the help of instruction in their 
professional work. The study of education, in short, makes 
the good master better and brings the inferior master up to 
a fair average, and in very many cases, indeed, makes him a 
thoroughly good teacher, as the results of our primary train- 
ing colleges have amply proved. 

Then, quite apart from this practical aim, the study of 
education places the whole profession on a higher intellectual 
plane. Whatever raises the schoolmaster's conception of 
his task makes him a better man. Whatever instructs him 
as to his duties, makes him a better teacher. A firm hold, 
moreover, of end, principles, and method gives him faith in 
his daily work. 



53 



SECOND PART. 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLIGENCE AS 

YIELDING THE METHODOLOGY 

OF EDUCATION. 



LECTURE I. 

THE ANIMAL MIND. 

Poet and peasant are alike in this, that they are 
dependent on tradition. Differ as they may in tem- 
perament and in the quality of nerve-tissue, their 
minds would at the beginning of their life-career be 
blank, were it not for the inheritance which parents 
and society pass on to them. The form and outer 
expression of a man's poetic possibilities are as de- 
pendent on the imagery of feeling and of thought, 
and on the store of language to which he succeeds, as 
on the materials of his present environment. The 
peasant, again, finds his standard of life, and a way 
of judging things and of using the instruments of a 
struggle with nature, ready-made for him. Tradition 
is the handing on of the achievements of the past, and 
all are alike dependent on it. The schoolmaster plays 
an important part as one of the chief vehicles of trans- 
mission. Whether aptitudes, moral and intellectual, 
acquired during each generation's life are also handed 
on, has lately been doubted by the biologist. If it be 
really so, the progress of humanity is less assured 
than it was thought to be ten or twenty years ago. 
The power of the existing generation in influencing 
the future of our race is lessened ; but the teacher's 

55 



56 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

responsibilities as the transmitter of the past are not 
thereby diminished, bnt rather increased. 

With animals there is no tradition of recorded 
victories ; and if the new theory be accepted, no tradi- 
tion even of acquired aptitudes. They simply inherit 
a certain constitution, and they have to make the best 
of it in an ever-renewed contest with nature. They 
have mind as we have ; but mind within certain re- 
strictions of faculty. 

If we are to understand the human mind, we cannot 
do better than try to understand and to interpret the 
animal mind in its highest forms, for we shall thereby 
ascertain in what respects we differ from animals. 
We, too, are animals; but something more. It is 
because we, as self-conscious subjects, are animal and 
something more, that we are able, by observing the 
lower organisms around us, to say something regarding 
them, and get some light on what man is and can be. 
If we take the human mind by itself, without regard 
to other and lower stages of mind, we are apt to com- 
mingle elements which ought to be kept distinct, and 
to interpret phenomena in a confused and often self- 
contradictory way. 

We certainly share with the higher class of animals, 
not only the feeling of life-activity and life-impulse 
generally, but specific forms of these. All our ap- 
petites, as determined by our bodily needs, the out- 
going feelings and desires which enter into our scheme 
of moral motives — e.g. the feeling of goodwill or 
kindness to others, a feeling of the supremacy of 



i.] The Animal Mind. 57 

certain things over us (in animals little more than 
fear, which suggests escape from the presence of that 
which is felt to be more powerful), and a feeling of 
satisfaction or complacence in the goodwill or kind- 
ness of others towards us. 

Let me illustrate. When a lion and lioness are 
lying with their cubs in a cavern, the lioness licking 
her young or giving to them of the fruit of her own 
body, or such fragments of the chase as she may have 
brought home from her last raid, while the attendant 
lion growls defiantly on hearing a crackling among 
the reeds which he associates with a wild elephant 
or boa-constrictor, we have all the primitive feelings 
which I have above summarised in one tableau. In 
addition, we have the feeling of resistance to an exter- 
nal power as threatening the life of the family. Nay, 
more, we must at once see that the community of 
tenderness rests on a primary bond between the mem- 
bers of this group, which is Sympathy — that is, the 
feeling of the feelings of others, and the consequent 
presence of a disposition to satisfy the feelings and 
desires of others, in so far as these betoken a need of 
any kind. 

This is a picture, not only of the animal, but of the 
primitive man in his primitive relations, which he 
can no more help than he can help eating when he is 
hungry or drinking when he is thirsty. 

But at this point the lion stops j whereas the man, 
his wife, and children in the stone cave have in them 
possibilities, which may be said to be (speaking 
loosely) infinite, though always restricted by racial 
characteristics and possibilities. 



58 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

Let nie point out, that in addition to the bodily 
appetites which have to do with self-preservation, 
propagation, etc., we have in the above lion-group 
sympathy, kindness towards others, a pleasing sensa- 
tion in receiving kindness from others, a feeling of an 
actual or possible higher power, and of resistance to 
that power as threatening the life or happiness of 
the lion and his family. We can easily imagine the 
approach of a force so great as to overpower resist- 
ance by anticipation, and cause fear for life and a 
rapid retreat for safety. 

What now have we here as instincts ? 

1. Bodily appetites concerned in the preservation 
of life and the continuity of the species. 

2. Sympathy. 

3. Goodwill to others. 

4. Love of the goodwill of others. 

5. Feeling of superior power and dependence on it. 

6. Fear. 

7. Resistance to drive off danger to life (animal 
courage). 

If man were no more than this bundle of needs, in 
the form of appetitive impulses and desires, which we 
find in the lion, he would not be man ; he would not 
be even the king of beasts (save in the range of his 
sympathy, of which more hereafter), for the lion 
would soon make short work of him. So much for 
the feelings and impulses, which we call instincts, 
because they are connate. Let us consider, next, the 
phenomena which we call the intelligence of the 
animal. 



i.] The Animal Mind. 59 

. We have to go beyond mere feelings and impulses, 
and their inevitable manifestation in certain circum- 
stances, as, e.g. when the lion roars defiance in the 
circumstances we have supposed, viz. the approach of 
an alarming power. This necessity of going beyond 
mere feeling is forced upon us, if by nothing else 
than by this, that the feelings of which we have been 
speaking arise only after something else has happened 
in the economy of the lion-mind. 

That something else is seeing, hearing, and tactile- 
sensation. Make your lion deaf, and blind, and in- 
sensible to touch, and nothing happens as we have 
described it. 

Certain impressions are made on what we call his 
consciousness, because he becomes conscious or aware 
of them, through his eyes, his ears, and his skin. He 
feels these impressions in his conscious living subject 
— the impression of a crackling in the reeds, of the 
sudden presentation of a wild elephant or boa-con- 
strictor, and of the personal contact of his lioness and 
her whelps. These impressions are impressions of 
noise, touch, size, shape, motion, colour (in this rudi- 
mentary sense at least, that the colour of the elephant 
is different from the impression made by the sur- 
rounding atmosphere and the forest). 

The ear and the tactual sensibility thus furnish 
materials or facts to the lion's consciousness as they 
do to ours, but not to the same extent, or with the 
same delicacy or variety as the eyes do, for they are 
the chief channels of communication with the outer 
world. We shall, therefore, drop here all reference 



60 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

(except as it may arise incidentally) to any channel 
of sense-impression save the eyes. This we do in 
view of the task before us, and because what is true 
of the eyes is true, mutatis mutandis, of other organs of 
communication between the mind or consciousness 
of the lion and the external world in which he lives, 
and with which he has the hard work of correlating 
himself, in the interests of himself and his family, so 
as to secure a pleasing or instinct-satisfied existence. 

I would at this point emphasise the phenomenon of 
Feeling in presence of a presentation as the most uni- 
versal and primary experience of animal being. It is 
the starting-point of all manifestations of conscious- 
ness, and lies at the root of all that animal and man 
are and can be. 

Feeling cannot in any strict logical sense be de- 
fined; but it can be marked off from other experi- 
ences, and in contrast with them. It is a vague and 
indefinite awareness of a movement within the subject 
effected by a stimulus within, or from without, the 
physical organism. Without feeling there could be 
no beginning of conscious life, and in the highest ex- 
pressions of even self-conscious reason it is the ulti- 
mate guarantee that there is anything present at all. 
In the most abstract mathematical process a man in 
the energy of pursuit is not self-conscious of that 
process, and cannot be so until he makes that process 
an object to himself; but, all the while, he is sup- 
ported by the vague and indefinite feeling of conscious 
activity — a feeling and nothing more. 



i.] The Animal Mind. 61 

When an animal or an infant-man (passing over 
the preliminary experiences of life) opens his eyes, 
his nerve system, and through this his consciousness, 
becomes aware, through the external stimulus which 
we call an impression, of an universal extensity in 
which nothing is denned, all is confused and chaotic. 
Subject and object are, though not identical in fact, 
yet identical in feeling. There is no separation of 
feeling-subject from felt-object, still less is there 
separation of one object from another. We know 
that there must be a reaction in the nerve-cells, but it 
is not sufficiently energetic to reflect the stimulus as 
something not the subject feeling. 

By dint of continuous and oft-repeated impact the 
reaction becomes gradually more energetic, and the 
external stimulus B is placed outside as not the feel- 
ing-consciousness A. 

Generally it will be found that in its earliest mani- 
festations this feeling of a not-A is restricted to a 
single point, and does not embrace the totality of the 
stimulating or impressing B. For example, a snail, 
instinctively putting oat its organ of sensation, touches 
a rough stone and turns aside, or a leaf and takes pos- 
session of it ; it does not feel the stone or leaf in their 
respective totalities as stone or leaf, but feels only a 
certain repulsion or attraction limited to a single 
point. So, in the vegetable unconscious world we 
have an anticipation of this conscious action, as in the 
fly-catcher. There is more than vague feeling so far 
as the snail is concerned; there is a definite feeling 
of a " single " which is not-A ; and I would call this 



62 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

punctual consciousness " sensation " in its lowest form, 
and assign to it the name Sensibility. 

It would require a patient, critical, and sympathetic 
observation of the infant and animal mind to say at 
what point a stimulating object is more than this unit 
of sensation which I have called sensibility. To de- 
termine the passage of one stage of consciousness from 
a lower to a higher is probably impossible, because all 
things progress by infinitely small steps. None the 
less is the step taken, as we see from the result. At 
what fraction of a moment the hour-hand on a dial- 
plate points to twelve, I cannot tell, but at one 
moment it had not arrived and at another it had 
passed it. 

The next stage of consciousness of a definite kind 
worthy of notice here, is the feeling of total objects as 
totals. But it is manifestly impossible to feel a total 
save in so far as other totals emerge from the chaotic 
confusion of the extended manifold and are felt as 
there, and yet as not the particular total B, which for 
the moment specifically impresses, attracts, and occu- 
pies consciousness. 

The feeling of a total as not-A (A being the subject) 
but B, is the feeling of B as an object. There is here 
a distinctly emergent duality, and we have Sensation 
in full operation. This sensation involves a feeling of 
diversity (of diverse many totals), and the particular 
object specifically felt is that object (B) which at the 
moment most vividly impresses the conscious subject; 
and B will remain as the object in the field of sensa- 
tion until exhaustion takes place, or until C or D or E 



i.] The Animal Mind. 63 

has pushed it out and occupied the field of conscious- 
ness for itself in turn. How long the object B may hold 
the conscious subject in its grip, depends on the extent 
to which it interests the particular consciousness in 
whose presence it is. The point of special significance 
here is that sensation is still feeling in a higher form 
of reflex activity, that it is the object which holds the 
subject, and that it is successive objects which move it 
hither and thither. The Subject is subject (in the 
popular meaning of the word) to the Object. We may 
now, but only now, talk of Sensation as a phenomenon 
of consciousness, and we may call that which is sensed 
the sensate. 

Some psychologists tell us that the total object so impress- 
ing sense contains or brings with it all the categories. On 
this see Note A, Appendix. All I would insist on here is, 
that the sensing of the object involves externality, viz. B 
there as extended, and the feeling of being in B. 

The sensed total there-being (B) is sensed as a total. 
This is the sensate. Future experience tells us much 
more about it. We afterwards find that this total is a 
confused chaos of particulars, which we call its quali- 
ties and relations. But in the meantime we have to 
be content with the total as a total. 

This, however (as I have already indicated), is not 
all ; for the animal and the infant-man feel also at the 
same time the diversity of objects outside, and in a 
vague indefinite way their localised relations in Space 
and their successive relations in Time. I say feel, 
simply to indicate that the consciousness of all the 



64 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

other objects which, crowd around B is so incipient in 
its character as scarcely to deserve the name of sensing 
or sensation — though it truly belongs to this category. 

Note. — To say that an animal " perceives " an external 
object in respect of its size, shape, colour, or relations to 
other objects in space or in time, is to use a term which, in 
my opinion, is equivalent to knowing ; and knowing is the 
distinctive attribute of the man-animal, as we shall see in 
the sequel. 

True, this mere feeling of external objects, as objects and 
as external, is of every possible degree, and rises to a point 
of fineness and activity which approaches the borders of per- 
cipience ; but it never crosses into percipience except in a 
human being. The sensing of external impressions is usu- 
ally regarded as the basis of such intelligence, intellect, or 
understanding as each living organism may possess. Intelli- 
gence in its animal form is simply the reception and arrang- 
ing of sensates with more or less of reflex co-ordination in 
consciousness, irrespectively of the feelings or emotions which 
they excite. 

Keeping to intelligence, we find that the animal con- 
sciousness receives the totalities of objects without 
distinguishing the parts of these totalities and corre- 
lating them with the total as inherent in that total. 

This, I think, is an important point in the natural 
history of consciousness. It may be said, how can an 
animal see or sense the whole of a thing except through 
the parts ? The answer is, that the parts in their 
totality as a one extended object — e.g. a stone — make 
an impression of a certain kind different from that 
which another object in its totality makes — e.g. a 
tree. 



i.] The Animal Mind. 65 

How, then, can an animal possibly, when it sees a 
stone for the second or third time, sense that object 
as the same object as it has formerly sensed, if of the 
nnmerons qualities of that object it did not sense a 
single one, but only a whole in which the single "ones " 
of quality were all interfused ? The answer is to be 
got from your own experience. You see a man's face 
as he quickly passes you in the street, and if asked 
five minutes afterwards, you do not even remember 
that you saw it; but to-morrow the face you saw 
yesterday meets you again, and you are at once aware 
that you saw that same face on a previous occasion, 
although there was no one part of the face — nose, 
mouth, eyebrows, eyes, chin — which you could have 
described even approximately the moment before you 
saw it the second time and became then aware that 
you had seen it before — in short, recognised it. 1 So, 
with your eye placed at the hole in the tube, you turn 
a kaleidoscope and see a certain arrangement of col- 
ours and forms in a pattern. You go on turning, and 
you see the same pattern return within the area of 
your vision, and you say, " I saw that before." If I 
ask you which particular thing or things, character or 
characters, in it are the same as that which you saw 
before, you cannot tell me one; but you are none the 
less certain that it is the same pattern or a similar 
one ; that is to say, the totality, or the aggregate of 
impression, is quite similar to a preceding one, and 

1 It is difficult to avoid this word "recognised," though it is a 
bad one, inasmuch as its etymology points to a prior cognition, 
whereas there has been as yet no cognition at all, but only sensation. 



66 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

different, consequently, from all the other totalities 
of pattern which have been under your eye during 
the interval that elapsed between your first seeing B 
and then seeing the same B return within the area of 
your vision. 

Now, an animal does this. A dog does not con- 
found the second bone of his experience with a stone. 
He feels the similarity with the first bone, although 
none of the specific qualities that go to constitute a 
bone in sense are sensed by him. No doubt he asso- 
ciates with bone No. 2 a lively sense of satisfaction 
arising out of his pleasing relations of yesterday with 
bone No. 1 ; but when I hold out bone No. 2 to him, 
his recognition of it as a bone is due to the totality 
of the impression being similar to the totality which 
constituted bone No. 1. 

And I select this illustration because it directs us 
to the next point which I wish to note, which is 
this — 

Salient Qualities and Impressions. — While all the 
qualities which constitute for the dog the "bone" to 
sense are intermixed in a confused total, there prob- 
ably stands out in relief, after some repetition at least, 
one quality which gives rise to a particularly lively 
sensation, viz. the smell or the "sweet edibleness" 
of the bone. This experience of yesterday with bone 
No. 1 stands out prominently as constituting the thing 
bone more than anything else does, all the other qual- 
ities gathering round this in the confused aggregate 
of sensation. There has been an unpurposed selection 
of what suits. Plants and animals alike are always 



i.] The Animal Mind. 67 

selecting what suits them. The chief, the prominent, 
the salient quality of the bone is really the bone to 
the dog, all else being subordinate to the extent of 
being sub-sensational, by which I mean within Feeling, 
or lying on the border-line of mere Feeling and Sen- 
sation proper. 

So with other objects. With most objects it is 
simply the totality B, as not C or D, which has im- 
pressed the dog and has clearly crossed the threshold 
of consciousness, and he senses the totality a second 
time with a consciousness of sameness or similarity 
(as the case may be). But with many objects the 
case is different : there is, e.g., the bone in respect to 
which one salient quality ("sweet edibleness ") im- 
presses him most deeply ; again, there is water ; 
again, the specific smell of any object ; again, the 
particular whistle which, when he hears it, calls up 
into his consciousness the totality in sense which 
constitutes his master. 

Imitation and Rivalry. — Again you will notice that 
if a dog runs at an object, taking it for a bone, other 
dogs will also run and try to be at the object first, 
although these dogs, or some of them, may have already 
seen the object and had not themselves sensed that it 
was a bone. There is here Imitation. We saw that 
there was sympathy in the region of the natural 
feelings ; we now, in this incident, see sympathy in 
the sphere of Intelligence. 

And this new phenomenon further reveals a feel- 
ing in animals not yet adverted to — the feeling or 
emotion of rivalry — the desire to outstrip each other, 



68 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

Imagination. — One point more : the image of what 
has frequently been present to a dog rises up be- 
fore his consciousness when it is no longer present. 
There is evidence enough of this when he is awake ; 
much more when he is asleep and dreams that he is 
hunting or worrying. A dog, then, has Imagination, 
in its primary sense. 

I have led you through this analysis of phenomena 
familiar to all, in order to establish the following facts 
regarding the sensational intelligence of an animal of 
the higher order, viz. — 

1. The animal senses a totality without being con- 
scious or aware of the separate qualities which to- 
gether go to the making of that totality, be it a stone, 
or a bone, or water, or anything else. 

2. The animal may have, probably always after a 
time has, one quality of that totality so deeply im- 
pressed on its sensory because of its prominence, or 
salience, or some specific relation which that quality 
bears to its own organic pleasures or pains, that the 
total object is to it this particular quality plus a 
vague and wholly unanalysed agglomeration of quali- 
ties which together make a "total single" of impres- 
sion on his sensorium. 

3. The animal senses the likeness and unlikeness of 
these totals or objects, i.e. it compares ; but its com- 
parison is the comparison of sense or sensation, and 
is accomplished on it by the diversity of objects, not 
by it. 

4. The animal associates one experience with 
another; e.g. when a dog sees the cook open the 



i.] The Animal Mind. 69 

kitchen-door, he has a sensational image of bones, or 
when he hears a whistling, it calls up the sensational 
image of his master. The animal, then, has associa- 
tion of sensations. 1 

5. The animal remembers : when he sees A for the 
second or third time he feels the resemblance to the 
A of the first time ; and, further, the association of A 
with B tends to call up B out of the storehouse of 
recorded impressions when A presents itself. 

6. The animal has imagination : for it not only 
retains sensates, but these are suggested to his con- 
sciousness when the actual object is not present but 
merely suggested by association. So also when he 
dreams, the image of a sensate is clearly before him : 
the dog hunts in his dreams. 

7. Two dogs seeing a bone at the same moment, or 
one seeing it and the other instantaneously interpret- 
ing his excitement, run for it. Animals, then, have 
sympathy of sensational intelligence. 

8. Animals in presence of an object of common de- 
sire have a feeling of rivalry — a feeling of competi- 
tion one with the other, which we may call an emotion, 
as it is distinct from the desire for the object they 
pursue. 

But all these characteristics of intelligence are in 
sensation alone. The conscious subject is moved hither 
and thither by the wind of the moment. 

1 1 shall affirm, without further analysis, that the rule or law of 
this association is fundamentally this, that things felt together (in 
space or time), or as immediately sequent, tend to arise again 
together in the consciousness. 



70 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

In short, an animal's intelligence is a reflex intel- 
ligence. He receives, and, under the stimulus of 
impression or recipience alone, he reacts. 

I am aware that the term reflex is generally applied 
only to unconscious response to stimulus in vegetable 
and animal. I think, however, we need it to mark 
also a state of conscious response to stimulus. Ani- 
mals are conscious automata. 

The impressions of single "totals" made on consciousness, 
whether from within or without, are, as we have seen, regis- 
tered for future use. This means that they involve some 
process in the nerve-cells. Consequently, the involuntary 
or accidental repetition of the process in the cells (however 
started) will place the image of the absent object before 
consciousness. Also, any particular stimulus of the nerve- 
cells may set agoing a movement in another set of cells in 
a purely dynamical way, and without any consciousness 
intervening. This relation of cerebrations, as such, may be 
held, and yet we may also hold that the particular " conscious- 
ness " set up by stimulus No. 1 sets up a " consciousness " 
No. 2, which involves the corresponding nerve change as its 
consequent. 

Kecapitulation and Summing up. Attuition. 

By analysing a complex case (the lion-family) we 
were enabled to collect together the various inner feel- 
ings in animals ; meaning by feelings those states of 
the individual which stimulate to activity of some sort, 
and are complete only in activity. These arose either 
primarily from within, as, for example, the appetites, 
owing to those necessary workings of the animal econ- 
omy which we call instinctive or innate (and which 



i.] The Animal Mind. 71 

we have simply to accept as given potencies within the 
organism waiting to evolve themselves) ; or they were 
stimulated into existence from without after a nerve- 
transmission of impressions through the consciousness- 
capacity of the animal (which we call its intelligence), 
— the channel of communication with the outer world. 

We have now also gathered together the characters 
of this animal consciousness in its relation to the exter- 
nal. It is mere repetition to say that we have assigned 
to the animal mind the following characteristics : — 

The animal has sensation, and senses as mere matters 
of fact all that affects its being from within or without. 

The animal senses external objects as "totalities" 
without sensing the individual properties of these 
objects, still less sensing them as individual properties 
going to make up the said total object. 

In sensing total objects the animal senses them 
as diverse one from the other. Therefore the animal 
senses likeness and unlikeness. 

The animal senses an object, and when doing so 
senses its sameness or similarity with the same object 
as formerly sensed ; therefore, the animal has memory. 

The animal can sense vividly some specific quality 
of an object as involved in that object, while all the 
rest of the said object is in the confusion and mist of 
its original aggregate so far as sense is concerned. 
Therefore (and for other given reasons), the animal 
has association of sensations or impressions, and is 
under the influence of that association. 

The animal, further, through association remembers, 
and through sympathy imitates, and rivals. 



72 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

The quantity and quality of an animal's relations 
to the external world (which external world is to it, 
as to us, a various and complex chaos of coexistent 
and sequent series) depends on the constitution of 
the animal. Some animals may touch the world only 
at one point at a time, as the sea-anemone and the 
snail seem to do. Its sensations in these cases are 
units, and very uninstructive to us, though sufficient for 
the preservation of the animal's own existence. But 
as we rise in the scale of animal life, we find a more 
complex constitution bringing the conscious animal- 
being into wider relations with the complexity of its 
surroundings ; and, above all, enabling it to receive and 
deal with a sense-totality, a single object as distin- 
guished from other objects, and to have, simply, however, 
as sensation, Comparison, Association, Memory, etc. 

To formulate and tabulate : — 

Animal Mind or Consciousness. 

I. As regards Intelligence, we have in animals — 

1. Sensation of objects. 

2. Comparison of the diverse as a sensation 

(likeness and unlikeness). 

3. Sensation of relations of objects in time and 

space. 

4. Association of sensations. 

5. Memory. 

6. Sympathy of intelligence, and consequent 

imitation. 

7. Imagination. 



i.] The Animal Mind. 78 

II. As regards inner Feeling, we have in animals — 

1. The feeling of life-activity. 

2. The natural appetites working from within. 

3. Sympathy of being and of natural feelings. 

4. The feeling of kindness to others. 

5. The feeling of pleasure in kindness received 

from others. 

6. The feeling of a superior power in presence 

of anything that may hurt. 

7. The feeling of resistance (animal courage). 

8. The feeling of fear or of evasion of anything 

that may hurt (animal cowardice). 

9. The feeling of rivalry. 

All these insist on manifesting themselves as occa- 
sion arises. 

We have now before us the mental constitution of 
the higher animals ; but I should not have thought it 
necessary to dwell on this so long had it not been that 
we have here also our own human constitution in so far 
as we are animals. Further, we have before us our 
own nature and limitations up to the age of twelve 
months, less or more. 

The animal is a victim of its own sensations and 
feelings and associations. It is driven hither and 
thither by them. It is, both as a creature of inner 
feeling and outer feeling, merely a bundle of stimuli 
and reactions or reflex activities. It does not get 
beyond the reflex action of the cerebrum and of the 
conscious subject, although the constant repetition on 



74 Institutes of Education. [lect. i. 

its sensoriuni of external facts, calling for a constant 
repetition of responses, enables the more finely organ- 
ised animals to do things, by virtue of memory and 
association, that approximate very closely to the 
actions of a rational being ; especially when they are 
in constant contact with rational beings and imitate 
them. 

Now, the stage of Mind reached by the highest 
animals, whereby they are able to sense a total object, 
I call the attuitional stage. It is the highest form 
of sensation (the lowest form of which is merely 
sensibility to a unit of impression) , inasmuch as it is 
sensation of an aggregate of qualities (impressions) 
constituting in their aggregate a single object, and 
sensed by the animal as an externally existent whole. 
There is, in truth, a sensational reflex synthesis ; for 
which the proper name is Synopsis. 



LECTURE II. 

THE MAN-MIND. WILL: PERCIPIENCE. 
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 

When we speak of educating a man, the question, 
after all has been said, conies to this : How shall we 
make a man of him ? and, in the case of a girl, How 
shall we make a woman of her ? We do not propose 
to make a woman of a boy, nor yet to make a man of 
a girl. They are different from the beginning, and 
they are to be as different in the end as they are in 
the beginning, neither more nor less. 

But boy and girl share something in common, and 
that something is neither the male nor the female 
element, but the human. Thus far, the aim of edu- 
cation is the same for both; and when we use the 
phrase, "the education of a man," we use the word 
man in a generic sense as signifying humanity. The 
" worthier " gender stands for both male and female. 

Now, if I desire to "make a man" of a boy, I do 
not wish to train him up to be like this man or that 
man; but to be a true man. My standard of man is 
not Jones or Brown or Eobinson, but the ideal of 
man. It is something universal, not particular. And 
this ideal of man must contain the essence or idea of 
man — that whereby he is not anything else, but 

75 



76 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

only himself; not a wolf, nor a pig, nor a bear, but a 
man. 

Clearly, then, if I am to educate a boy I must have, 
in my thought the ideal or complete notion (to call it 
so for philosophical consistency) of a man; not of 
Jones or Brown or Eobinson, as I have said, who are 
poor specimens enough, but of man universal — of 
man as not anything else but himself. 

Now, in building up the complete notion of " Man," 
I have already taken the first step, — an important 
one, too ; for I have begun at the foundations of the 
fabric, and shown you what man is in so far as he is 
animal. Even as animal, man is richly endowed by 
nature, of which he is still a part, and with which he 
lives in the constant interchange of give and take. 
Simply as an animal, man is the most capable of all 
animals in the sphere of feeling and sensation. No 
doubt an animal of one kind develops for his specific 
needs a keener sense of sight, and an animal of 
another kind a keener sense of smell, another is 
fleeter, and so on ; but, take him all round, man is a 
finer, subtler, more enduring, and altogether more 
admirable product than any animal you can name — 
in brief, the " paragon of animals." 

If we stopped short at this point, then, we should 
have to consider what steps had to be taken to edu- 
cate him to be a perfect animal of his kind. And, in 
truth, the earlier races thought of little else, for 
obvious and sufficient reasons; and even in these days 
you hear such expressions as this coming with a pecu- 



ii.] The Man-Mind: Will, etc. • 77 

liar gusto from those who have not, probably, in their 
heart of hearts got very much beyond the stage of 
barbarism, viz. "The English public-schoolboy is a 
fine animal." 

To pass from this, however, we must admit that if 
man were only the finest of animals, our duty as 
educators would be to have in our heads a standard 
or type, and to educate him up to that. We should 
not think of educating a cat into anything but the 
perfection of its own kind, any more than we should 
think of educating a rose into a vine or an elm, but 
simply into being the best possible rose. You see 
the labour and ingenuity spent on an ox or a horse to 
make them the best of their own kind. In short, we 
educate a horse or an ox or a rose up to the perfection 
of itself ; that is to say, up to the ideal of an ox or 
a horse or a rose, which ideal we have present to our 
consciousness in imagination. 

All animals and plants have much in common : and 
to confine ourselves to animals here, they have the 
greater part of their nature in common. But each 
has something whereby it is itself. A horse and an 
ox have a great deal in common : indeed everything 
except that which finally differentiates the one from 
the other, and makes the ox an ox and not a horse, 
and the horse a horse and not an ox. This differen- 
tiating "somewhat," which is a secret, but which I 
infer from outer manifestations in appearance and 
in action, I call the " idea " of the ox or horse ; and 
if I am to educate either of these animals timry, I 
must, while paying due regard to all other facts and 



78 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

conditions of their existence, specially direct my 
attention to the "idea." To this I must educate 
them, so that they may be the best of their specific 
kind respectively. The total conception I have of an 
animal is to be called its notion, the differentiating 
character or characters are the "idea" within the 
notion. 

Now man is not only the paragon of animals, he is 
something more and different. If I am to educate 
him aright, then I must, while paying due attention 
to all other conditions of his existence, — to the total 
concept of him, the Notion, — educate him up to that 
" something " which differentiates him, and lifts him 
above and distinguishes him from other animals, if 
there be any such characteristic. And as this differ- 
entiation is a differentiation which lifts him above 
animals, it must govern all I do in educating him as a 
whole, because it is placed there by his Creator to 
govern all else that goes to constitute him, inasmuch 
as it constitutes him what he really and truly is. 
The idea in a thing always governs, always must 
govern and control the parts of the whole ; otherwise 
the thing would not be itself. 

What is that " idea " in the notion man ? Here we 
have him an attuitional animal of a very fine sort 
placed in numberless relations to nature and to other 
animals like and unlike himself, and instinct with all 
those feelings, and innate impulses, and sensations, 
and connate capacities, which I have already enumer- 
ated. But all these feelings and sensations are on 
an equal level — in so far as he is an animal. He 



ii.] The Man-Mind: Will, etc. 79 

gratifies first one then another as the fit seizes him 
or necessity demands, just as an animal does. He is 
a bundle of particulars ; he is without order in him- 
self ; he is an anarchy or chaos. Beasts, it is true, 
have instincts to this or that, or away from this or 
that, so strong that they manage fairly well to adapt 
themselves to their environment, and live and act in 
a satisfactory, though beastly, way. But man, alas ! 
has no such certainty of instinct to guide him, but 
has instead an endowment which specifically charac- 
terises him — "whence all our woe!" This endow- 
ment confounds the natural operation of instinct. 

The specific endowment which makes man different 
from other animals, lifts him above all animals, and, 
consequently, above his own animal nature, is essen- 
tially and primarily Will. If I had asked you for 
the differentiating characteristic which constituted 
the "idea" of man, you would doubtless have at 
once said Reason; and you would have been right. 
But for the sake of simplicity itself, I beg you to go 
deeper down and see in Will the root, possibility, and 
essence of this very endowment which in its fulness 
is called Reason. 

When some speak of Reason as being the specific 
endowment of man, they would almost seem to think 
that a piece of clockwork had been put inside him, 
on the top of his animal mind, to regulate that mind ; 
and then, when you come to the moral sphere, — the 
sphere of conduct, and encounter Will, they seem to 
speak of Will as if it were a bare force subsisting on 
its own account, and working in more, or (generally) 



80 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

less, harmony with the clockwork Beason, side by 
side with which it stands like a sentinel at an " out " 
barrack's gate. 

Now, if you desire simplicity, — the simplicity of 
truth, — try to get rid of these inadequate conceptions 
of Reason and Will. If you do, you will attain to a 
fundamental point of view which will give unity to 
your whole conception of man as a being to be edu- 
cated whether you regard his intellectual or his moral 
relations. 

Imagine yourself to be a conscious subject or being 
such as an animal is, looking out on the world, re- 
ceiving impressions from it, and having sensation of 
them and of the various objects by which you are 
surrounded and to which you are related. You re- 
ceive these in sensation simply as they present them- 
selves, and you sense and do this or that according 
as objects impress and stimulate you to reaction. 
This is the attuitional condition. It is summed up 
in the words " reflex consciousness." 

Again, throw yourself into a rudimentary state of 
mind, and feel the dreaminess and confusedness of it 
— the condition in which you are when the brain, 
exhausted by illness, takes slight note of things, or 
when, recovering from a faint, the outer has more 
power over your mind than any inner energy you 
can bring to bear on it, when the vital centres fail to 
react, and you cannot distinguish object from subject, 
and all is dreamily subjective. This would seem to 
be the condition of a babe in arms. 



ii.] The Man-Mind: Will, etc. 81 

Better still, perhaps, imagine yourself coming from 
another and wholly different planet, suddenly planted 
on a clear night on Edinburgh Castle with the stars 
above you, the brilliantly lighted town spread out 
beneath you, girded by a moonlit sea and backed by a 
misty suggestion of the distant northern hills. You 
have not had time to recover yourself, your conscious- 
ness is overpowered, you are aware of a multiplicity 
and diversity of objects and qualities ; but that is all. 
Sensation in an elementary chaotic form barely one 
step beyond Feeling (in which subject and object are 
inseparable) occupies the field. This gives place 
quickly to a vivid sensation of this or that particular 
object, and sub-sensations, or feelings, of all else. 

Soon you rouse yourself out of this sensational or 
attuitional condition, and bring the energy lying within 
your consciousness to bear on all these sensations. 
You move out of yourself to seize them one by one, 
separate one from another, discriminate them as sepa- 
rate totals, and reduce them all to some kind of order 
— though it be only an order of locality. 

Now, this movement, from within your conscious 
subject outwards, to seize each separate thing by itself 
and for itself, is to be called Will. If any weak per- 
son, calling himself a " scientist," has a superstitious 
dread of the word Will, let him call it Spontaneity. 

This state of consciousness is no longer the mere 
reflex action of animal consciousness stimulated by 
external impressions ; it is that, but it is something 
more. It is the free outgoing of your conscious subject 
to take possession of these various and varied objects, 



82 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

and make them your own by distinguishing one from 
the other, and placing them back in your conscious 
subject as your own — re-ducing them to the conscious 
subject. Along with this act there arises the impulse 
of naming. This is true doctrine unless you accept 
the only alternative, viz. that the mind of man is to be 
explained as a bundle of impressions and reflex actions 
determined always and at all times by something not 
himself, and that what you imagine to be the purest 
and loftiest act of Will is merely (as some would call 
it) the resultant of a " complex of sensations." It is at 
this point, and at no other, that the battle of Free Will 
as a moral question must be fought, and either gained 
or lost. If Will be not root of pure reason, it is an 
illusion to imagine it free when directed to moral ends. 

Now this movement of will, prehending and bring- 
ing back, or reducing, to your conscious subject an 
object which is already in the subject as a sensation 
(or thing sensed, a sensate), is Perceiving or Ele- 
mentary Knowing. 

The very word perception — per and capio, to take 
— points to the nature of the act as an act : so does 
apprehension — ad-prehendere, to seize to yourself. 

Through the evolution of this Will in your conscious 
subject you have emerged out of and beyond animal 
sensation in its highest form (Attuition), and are now 
a percipient being, a knowing being, a man-being, a 
self-determining being, and no longer a mere victim of 
the dynamical interplay of feelings and sensations. 

Perception or percipience, then, is the separating of 
an object already in sense from other objects, seizing it, 



ii.] The Man-Mind: Will, etc. 83 

and placing it in your own conscious subject as then 
and thus known, and, in the crisis of being known, 
affirmed ; and thus urgently demanding a name. 

To ascertain what it is that you first perceive, you 
must go back to the record of attuitional consciousness, 
and you will find that you first perceive totals as totals 
— -total objects, diverse one from the other, e.g. the 
guns, walls, trees, streets, lights, houses, sky, sea, hills. 

Now, suppose you fall asleep, outworn and over- 
whelmed by the multitude of objects that oppress you, 
and awake refreshed, you re-perceive these "totals" 
and recognise them — the guns, the walls, the build- 
ings, and so forth. Remember that merely as an ani- 
mal you are already endowed with memory, association, 
a sense of likeness and unlikeness, and so forth : I 
pass all this as known to you from our previous 
analyis. 

Now, if you were asked to specify by what qualities 
you recognise this to be a gun, that to be a ball, and 
that a wall, you could not name one. You would 
simply be able to say, " the total impression made on 
my sense was that which you call here a gun, there a 
ball, and there again a wall." You have discriminated 
and fixed each total. Perception is always of the 
single. This distinct differentiation of an object is 
the reduction of the object to consciousness, in which 
act semiconsciousness is involved, though it does not yet 
quite emerge. Of this differentiation and reduction, 
affirmation, viz. " that thing is " — is the issue ; and if 
we go on thinking for ever, our last question will still 



84 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

be our first question, viz. what is the object ? Along 
with the affirmation that A is, we have, I have said, an 
impulse to name A. Without a word to fix the deter- 
mination of the thing, and externalise our conscious- 
ness of it, we should probably have to go through a 
fresh process every time we saw the same object ; and 
progress would be impossible. The articulated sound 
fixes and symbolises an accomplished process, which, 
though it be in a sense repeated every time we subse- 
quently perceive the object, is yet repeated with ease 
and rapidity by the help of the familiar symbolic utter- 



[There seems to be a general law in the universe that 
impression completes itself in expression, and that the 
former is incomplete without the actuality of the latter.] 

Conscious subject, as now freely willing, moves 
about prehending all that comes within the range of 
the tentacles of sense. Further, the conscious subject, 
thus spontaneously moving or willing, has, within this 
movement (Will), an end towards which it moves, and 
that end, at first unself-conscious and terminating in a 
percept, is (after a slight experience) knowledge itself 
as such (a universal). Of this again. 

The bringing of the sensate a second time into con- 
sciousness as a discriminated and affirmed object, is 

1 According to this theory, a deaf-mute, hefore he attains to the 
use of manual signs, affirms when he perceives. The affirmation is 
arrested hy the inability to articulate ; but there is an accentuation 
of the affirmation, not only in consciousness, but also physiologically, 
by an inner movement or outer gesture. The percept is thus in 
some material way fixed, but always inadequately. 



ii.] The Man-Mind: Will, etc. 85 

called reducing it to the unity of consciousness, — to 
that basis which remains a " one " in the midst of end- 
less receptivities and activities. 

Perception, then, may also be defined as the seizing of 
an object as a toted and a single and reducing it, as itself 
and nothing else, to the conscious subject. 1 

We have now passed from passive-activity to active- 
activity. We have got pure Will as the differentia 
or idea of man as distinguished from other animals. 
Let us keep fast hold of it as the clue which can 
alone guide us through the labyrinth of mental evo- 
lution, and, by reducing all to unity, give simplicity 
of view. The " idea " in a thing, remember, governs 
by inherent right all the elements in that thing. It 
is supreme in all its relations to the thing, and all 
the relations of that thing to other things. 

We have now passed from Nature (with its impres- 
sions and reflex activities) to Spirit and Freedom. 

Note now : 1. The definition of Percipience ; 2. 
That percipience is of singles; 3. That it is an act of 
discrimination whereby one is separated from all else 
— all else being meanwhile in attuent sensation alone; 
4. That percipience as above defined is of inner 
sensates as well as of outer sensates ; 5. That the 
knowledge of all we can finally knotv begins with 
percipience ; 6. That this percipience is the first 

1 There is here manifestly a process which is a dialectic process ; 
but for this I refer to my book entitled Met. 2V. et V., merely say- 
ing here that this first and elemental process of percipience is the 
process of Reason generally, or, as we say, its Form, Essence, or 
Idea. 



86 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

movement of Eeason in taking the universal com- 
plex we call experience, and, subsequently, each, 
individual complex, to pieces with a view to building 
up these elementary percepts into a known unity, and 
so superseding the sensed whole, the mere attuit; 

7. That after the first act of percipience is performed, 
the total sensate or attuit is converted into a percept ; 

8. That an attuit involves consciousness ; a percept, 
self-consciousness ; 9. That the mere separation of 
sensates (singles or aggregate wholes) as diverse in 
attuition, is a separation effected by reflex action in 
response to an impression or stimulus ; while the dis- 
crimination effected in percipience is through an act 
of Will, and involves affirmation and speech. But, 
above all, note that the movement in percipience is a 
free movement of Will — a differentiating, pure, sub- 
ject-generated act which lifts man out of the animal, 
and is thus, as idea of man, the key to all intellectual 
operations (e.g. Concept, General Concept, etc.), the 
governing principle in Ethics, the guide in the maze 
of Political Philosophy, the master-conception in the 
education of a human being. 1 

The educational deduction is this — 
The education of mind as reason is the train- 
ing AND DISCIPLINE OF WlLL AS A poiver ,' AND 



1 Not only so ; but in an analysis of the percipient process which 
lies outside our purpose here, and of the nature of the act as a 
differentiating, negating, and determining act, lies the true critique 
of knowing, and the explanation, though not perhaps always the 
solution, of many metaphysical questions. 



ii.] The Man-Mind: Will, etc. 87 

SECONDLY, THE TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE OF THE 

Will-movement as a process whereby the con- 
scious SUBJECT TAKES THE WORLD TO ITSELF AS 
KNOWLEDGE. 

But, we live in a Real, not in a Formal world; and 
in selecting subjects for education ice have to consider 
man's immediate needs and duties, while always using 
these subjects in such a way as to train and discipline 
the Will-Power and the Will-Process. 

I have pointed out that what I first perceive as a 
one thing is that which is already a sensate. To 
ascertain, then, what it is I perceive, I must under- 
stand what the sensate yields to pre-percipient sense. 
It yields — (a) The consciousness or sensation of a 
complex extended total ; (6) The consciousness of that 
total as being; (c) The consciousness of that complex 
total as localised out there ; (d) A consciousness of 
the spatial relation of that total to other diverse 
totals. 

None the less is percipience the percipience of a 
one total sensate. The sensate itself is a complex, 
but it is as a fused complex that it is first perceived. 



Note on Consciousness and Self- Consciousness. 

I have said that a sensate is an object in sensation. It is 
only when the inner reaction is adequate that an impression 
extricates itself from identification with the subject-con- 
sciousness and becomes an "object." The fact and word 
" object " brings necessarily with it the correlative fact and 
word "subject." Prior to this there is a state of what we 



88 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

may call subjective feeling, but there is no experienced 
subject, because there is no experienced object. 

Now in sensation I do not in any sense know the object. 
The subject is at this stage merely a basis or point of sup- 
port for the object. I sense the sensate (object) as a some- 
thing not the subject, but the subject itself is not objectified. 
The subject is sunk in the lower state of Feeling simply. 
The subject senses the sensate, but it only vaguely feels itself. 
That is to say, the subject is not yet extricated from the 
whole of being and made to stand out as itself a substantive 
and specific being. This is possible only at a subsequent 
stage of mind beyond that of sensation and attuition, — the 
stage at which there advances, from within, the energy or 
force of which I have spoken (call it Spontaneity or Will as 
you please), and seizes or grips the sensate and takes it back 
a second time into consciousness. 

Note that sense and the sensate, the conscient and the 
conscite, 1 are already there ; but the latter, the sensate or 
object, is sensed as the negation of the subject, the former, 
i.e. the conscient or sensing subject, is merely felt as ground, 
and not, in any strict meaning, sensed as the positive of the 
negation. 

But, when I a second time, through a pure act of Will, 
take hold of the sensate or object, what do I do with it? I 
replace it in consciousness as an object, and at the same 
time affirm it to be an object there-existent (outside) and 
not me the subject. In thus placing the sensate a second 
time into the conscious subject, I affirm all that has been 
sensed, including negation of the subject, and, further, be- 
come aware of the subject itself as that into which I have 
replaced the object. I perceive the object and I sense the 
subject; and have now, further, the power of perceiving and 
affirming the subject when the time is ripe. 

For the affirmation of negation is the affirmation of 
position. 

1 If I may use such terms. 



ii.] The Man-Mind: Will, etc. 89 

Why then do I not say at once that the perception of the 
object is also the perception of the subject, instead of saying 
that the result is only the sensing of the subject? The 
answer is that the potency of perceiving the conscious subject 
by the conscious subject, in other words, self-consciousness, 
is certainly now on the field ; but the act of perception, let 
us remember, involves the discrimination of an object from 
all other objects through the negation of those other objects, 
and we cannot attain to a clear perception of the subject as 
such by the subject, except by an observation of inner facts 
and conditions, — a more difficult operation than the obser- 
vation of external facts and conditions. Accordingly, the 
state of the case is this, that we, as a matter of fact, at this 
stage do little more than sense the subject as, in a general 
way, not the object. Mind grows gradually and by infinitely 
small steps. 



LECTURE III. 

CONCIPIENCE AND THE SENSE-CONCEPT OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL. 

With all the celerity that belongs to Mind, the per- 
cept of the determined total becomes a perception of 
the elements in that complex total. The moment the 
subject is conscious of any separate element in the 
single total before it (the attnit or sensate), it syn- 
thesises that element with the attuit as a one with it. 
This is the point of transition from Percipience to 
Concipience. 

The attnited object, we have seen, may have some 
quality so prominent as to impress sense more vividly 
than the other elements in it (e.g. to a dog, the smell 
of the object) ; still, this quality is, as yet, simply a 
sensation. But if, in the percipience of the total, I 
rapidly distinguish in it a specific character or quality, 
the percept of the total is then affirmed along with its 
most prominent mark thus distinguished. 

And this means that the Percept of the total attuit 
has suddenly become a Concept of the total attuit. 

Why a Concept? Why not still call it a Percept? 

Because percipience of the singular or individual must 

precede the consciousness of an object as made up of 

many singulars. The holding together as a unity of 

90 



lect. in.] Concipience and the Sense- Concept. 91 

differentiated elements in any total object is Conceiv- 
ing in its strict signification. 

I have the whole world present to my consciousness 
as a sensational attuit and as individual attuits. Each 
object comes to me as a complex and laden with all the 
categories ; many of which are blazoned on it and 
simply received by me, such as extensity, quantity, 
quality, relation; others are implicit, and await the 
emergence in my consciousness of the capacity to see 
them, which capacity is a pure activity, viz. Will. All 
as yet is in sense. 

I then make the first step in knowing ; for I reduce 
this that, and the other sensate or attuit to self -con- 
sciousness, as discriminated, perceived, affirmed. But 
the pure activity of Will, just because it is pure 
activity, insists on prosecuting its work of reduction 
to consciousness, with a view to the ascertainment of 
the elements, relations, and implications of the thing 
before me, in order that it may ultimately convert the 
as yet complex chaotic thing into a rational unity. 
Finally, it strives to convert the whole world-presenta- 
tion into a rational unity or cosmos. 

In the last word of the Eational alone can Reason 
ultimately rest. Will, and the process whereby it 
reduces and harmonises sensation, has its own right 
to live, as much as a rose or a bird has. It perseveres 
in its own existence for the fulfilment of its own life. 
It has a long and difficult task before it ; for it has 
not only rationally to know things, but to actualise its 
knowledge in conduct in the face of an infinite number 



92 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

of obstacles and antagonisms. But this it must do, or 
it will die overwhelmed by nature and sense. 

I have reached this point, that from among a multi- 
tude of objects in sensation I have discriminated, per- 
ceived, and affirmed a total object as a total, e.g. orange, 
I thereupon discriminate the most salient impressions 
or qualities ; and so, almost before I am aware of it, 
pass from percipience to concipience, from self-con- 
sciousness of the single or individual to a self-conscious- 
ness of that individual as a unity of separate and sepa- 
rable elements. At this point I have a Concept of 
the individual — a true synthesis of activity (not of 
mere sense) so far as it goes. The attuit is no longer 
merely a total and single, it is a Unity and a One. 
Now, still following the same lines, I begin to discrim- 
inate, perceive, and affirm other parts or elements 
which enter into and constitute the complex orange to 
sense. These I continue to hold together as they exist 
outside there together in the object. But the object 
as sensate always remains as a total ; that is to say, 
the general total impression of the object on sense is 
not superseded: it is only, so far, transcended and 
explicated. 

Let us return now, at the risk of repetition, to the 
salient feature of the object. In sensation-proper, a 
dog, when sensing a man or a wheelbarrow, has a 
sensate of these objects as totals, the particular quali- 
ties of these objects being fused and confused in the 
whole. But after a sufficient number of repetitions, 
he becomes aware of one or more particulars as asso- 



in.] Concipience and the Sense- Concept. 93 

ciated with the total in sense and distinguishing it : 
it may be the general gait or swing of the man, or the 
revolving wheel of the barrow. These prominent or 
salient characteristics impress him most deeply (make 
a deeper dint, so to speak, on his sensory), because 
of their prominence and salience. Different animals 
will have natural affinities, as determined by their 
organisms and needs, for different qualities in a total 
thing present to them. These salient qualities are 
only associated in sense ; not affirmed in percipient 
and concipient activity. 

Now, in percipience it is the same as in attuition, 
but with a difference. In actively breaking up and 
discriminating the qualities aggregated in the total, 
you will perceive, first, the deepest impression, that 
is to say, the most salient quality. The perceived 
total, the orange, is, no doubt, sensed as distinct in 
number and locality and relation from other objects as 
a single, but the elements are as yet in sense alone, and 
not explicated into perception : for this they are wait- 
ing. It is only retrospectively, and after percipience, 
that I am able to say that these elements ever were in 
the primary complex at all. You will probably first 
of all perceive the roundness, and then the yellowness 
of the orange, as opposed to other objects which are 
not round and yellow. You now are conceiving ; that 
is to say, you are taking together two or more quali- 
ties as constituting the orange as a perceived "thing." 
Your concept is now a " round yellow thing. " Observe 
the word thing — the thing being the total sensate (or 
attuit), which always persists in your consciousness 



94 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

awaiting further dissection in percipience, with a view 
to a richer and ever richer concept of itself. 

Consequently, however many facts I perceive and af- 
firm, these have always a sub-self-conscious reference to 
the total in sensation. (Note at end of Lecture.) This 
orange which I perceive is not only yellow and round, 
but smooth, thick-skinned, pulpy, sweet, odorous. 
All these percepts, taken together, ere long constitute 
the object in knowledge, and are held together by the 
force of my Will. The total single in sensation has 
been transformed into a unity in percipience, or a unity 
of percepts. These percepts are taken together — con- 
cepted — and the unity of the perceived object is now 
the concept of the object. 

TO CONCEIVE ANY OBJECT, THEN, IS TO TAKE TO- 
GETHER IN A UNITY THE PERCEIVED PROPERTIES OF 

that object. The Concept is a One in Many. 

So various and infinite are the suggestions of the 
universal outside me, that I, as a mind struggling to 
know and to use what I know, am driven into a habit 
of mental shorthand. When I perceive an orange as 
a total thing presented to my consciousness, I, after 
the preceding analysis has been effected, also at the 
same moment, conceive it as a unity; but I do not 
rehearse in my mind the series a, b, c, d, which make 
up its concept. I see a house : what goes on in my 
consciousness? This: first, I sense the house as a 
total object, separated from other totals in space; 
secondly, I perceive a certain quality or property, or 
qualities or properties, of that house, e.g. its con- 



in.] Concipience and the Sense- Concept. 95 

figuration, its colour, its door and its windows (one or 
more of these), and at the same moment I conceive 
these percepts (take them together), and say "that is a 
house," and not anything else. But there are numer- 
ous other formerly perceived qualities of a house quite 
well known to me which never emerge into clear con- 
sciousness at all. They are sub-conscious, and are 
ready to be brought up to the plane of self -conscious- 
ness if I should happen to want them. 

Once I have so far analysed the total object in per- 
ception, and affirmed certain percepts as in and of it, 
I cannot, if I would, now perceive a house except in so 
far as I conceive it; for there is now more than one 
element in my conscious experience of the total as a 
one. 

The percepts by which I recognise a house are, doubt- 
less, those which most vividly presented themselves to 
me in sensation — the salient and most impressive 
properties (percepts) which came first in experience, 
and formed a kind of nucleus round which the others 
clustered. These not only came first in experience, 
but, so far as we can see, they come first in every suc- 
cessive experience of the same object. For the mind, 
advancing by stages to knowledge, not only assumes 
the prior stages, but repeats them. When I see a 
house and call it a house, I feel, I sense, I perceive, 
and I conceive. The ignoring of this fact leads to not 
a little confusion in psychology. 

Order in Concipience. — Observe now the order in the 
Concipience of a complex object; (a) The most promi- 



96 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

nent and salient qualities are first perceived, and (b) these 
remain with us as a representative notation whereby we 
recognise an object which has been once conceived by us. 

As our experience extends, all our percepts of things 
become concepts of things. As total single objects we 
perceive the sensate as discriminated from other sen- 
sates ; as a one in many, we conceive the object in its 
parts relatively to itself as a system of parts. It is a 
unity. After this stage, we never can be said to per- 
ceive an old object, whether in presentation or repre- 
sentation, without conceiving it. 

The parts of an attuit which we first discriminate 
and perceive are, we have seen, the most prominent 
and salient: these being the most impressive of the 
qualities of the object, they demand the minimum of 
exertion for Percipience. And these salient qualities 
we hold in our consciousness plus the sub-consciousness 
of the totality as impressed on sensation; and these 
together constitute the object for us. 

This psychological fact yields us guidance in the 
Art of teaching, for it tells us this — 

Principle of Method. — Teach first the most sali- 
ent QUALITIES OR CHARACTERS OF THINGS, AND THERE- 
AFTER FILL IN, UNTIL THE CONTENT IN CONSCIOUSNESS 
EQUALS THE CONTENT OF THE THING OR SUBJECT 
TAUGHT. 



We have now made some progress in our Psychology, 
for we have the whole animal intelligence before us, 
which is also ours, and, further, two movements of 



in.] Concipience and the Sense- Concept. 97 

mind which are distinctive of man, and which are both 
dependent on the central energy, Will. 



Note. — The Sub-Conscious. — Without entering on the 
general question of the Unconscious, I would remark 
here : 

1. That conscious or attuent activity, being within the 
sphere of the dynamical, is constantly operative ; but that 
se//-conscious activities (which are all on a higher plane), 
when they are intense and concentrated, suppress the merely 
conscious or sensational solicitations. Where there is no 
self-concentration, these conscious or attuent solicitations 
and suggestions occupy the whole field, being granted, when 
vivid, a certain dreamy admission to the self-conscious 
sphere. These consciousnesses, which never cross the boun- 
dary line of self-consciousness, fulfil a function in the growth 
of the fabric of mind generally, as regards its material. 
They doubtless enrich the soil of mind (so to speak). 

2. That it seems to be an error to speak of sub-conscious 
operations ; for unconscious consciousness is a contradiction 
in terms. There may be, of course, cerebration going on 
which does not rise to consciousness. There seems, how- 
ever, to be no limit to sub-self-conscious operations, which 
may be going on unheeded by the self-conscious subject 
when it is concentrated or asleep. Suspend self-concentra- 
tion, and we constantly become aware of the fact that con- 
sciousness as sensation has been going on. Harking back 
a little, we recall that the "clock has struck without our 
knowing it" (as is said) — the retrospective perception of 
a dying sen sate. 

3. That a knowledge or volition which has been self- 
consciously achieved becomes, by frequent repetition, a con- 
stituent element in the merely conscious or dynamical life. 
Effort is no longer necessary, and the act, whether intellectual 
or moral, is accomplished with only a minimum of self -con- 



98 Institutes of Education. [lect. hi. 

sciousness being present. It is, secondarily-automatic. The 
product of the higher energy of self-conscious mind would 
seem to sink down, as a permanent possession, into the 
merely reflexive conscious sphere of natural action and 
reaction, and become an integral part of our nature and 
character. 



LECTURE IV. 

UNITY OF THE RATIONAL MIND: IN ITS EDUCATIONAL 
REFERENCE.! 

Rational intelligence, as we have seen, is the con- 
scious subject freely functioning Will as its instrument 
in dealing with the multifarious presentations in sen- 
sation or attuition. The subject, as functioning Will, 
is like Neptune raising his head above the troubled 
ocean to see what is going on, and to regulate and 
direct. The conflicting waves have, however, dynam- 
ical laws of their own, which they are obeying : the 
sea-god has to accept these laws, and by his will to 
control them to certain ends. This energising of Will 
is at once, accordingly, an intellectual and an ethical 
movement; for an ethical act is simply Will effect- 
ing a thought end, which end is conceived, made 
one's own, and projected by mind, as motive of 
action. 

You will observe, then, that this fundamental con- 
ception of rational psychology has, because of its 
ethical bearing, a very great significance in education. 

In psychology as a science, also, apart from its edu- 
cational reference, the conception is pregnant with 

1 See also Appendix, D. 



100 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

results. The most important is this, that it gives a 
clue which guides through the labyrinth of mental 
phenomena. Fix your attention on this Will, take 
hold of it, and follow it as it moves step by step in its 
triumphant progress towards the reduction of all pres- 
entations to consciousness from without and from 
within. In contemplation of this one movement, you 
see revealed the fact that reason is essentially a one 
faculty, and not an aggregate of many faculties. And 
yet, there are steps to be taken by it which must be 
taken one after the other, viz. Percipience, Concipi- 
ence, etc., and these involve prior attuition, compari- 
son, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. The steps 
have to be looked at by us in order of time; but, as a. 
matter of fact, these, and all further, steps are already 
contained in the mere knowing of any one object. 
This knowing is, in short, a one complex act; but in 
order that we may understand it, the act has, as being 
&X)rocess of Will, to be resolved into its parts — broken 
up into its elements. When we speak of Percipience, 
Concipience, and the further steps of Keason yet await- 
ing our consideration, we are simply analysing the 
complex unity of the act of knowing any one thing as 
it may be known. Since these steps are elements in a 
complex, they are to be called "moments," in the one 
Will-movement or process. But we separate them 
logically, and as the first is necessary to the second, so 
we place them in a time-order. 

Conceive, then, Reason (as distinguished from and 
transcending feeling and sensation — the whole sphere 
of Attuition) as — 



iv.] Unity of the Rational Mind. 101 

1. Will-power, pure and simple. 

2. Will-process, with all that it involves. 

Do this, I say, and there can be no doubt that, 
whether true or not, the conception will give simplic- 
ity and unity to your grasp of Season in all its active 
successive manifestations on the way to its end, which 
end is knowledge and consequent action. Once grasp 
the central thought and your future study is shortened 
as well as simplified : the theory of the education of 
man's intelligence is revealed. 

To work out fully all that is contained in the above 
conception of reason, would be to lead you into what is 
called metaphysics ; but it would be also to lead you 
away from the practical aim of these lectures, which is 
the doctrine of rational mind in the definite and re- 
stricted field of the education of rational mind. It is 
evident that if mind grows to maturity after a cer- 
tain way, the education of mind must follow that way. 
Method in education means simply a " way " ; and the 
method of educating mind must be the way of mind 
itself as it grows from infancy to maturity. Accord- 
ingly, the Theory of Education, in so far as it is 
Methodology, is simply the governing principles of the 
method of discipline and instruction, as these can be 
shown to flow from the way mind grows. 

You will find, as you go on, that many of these 
principles have been empirically ascertained, and have 
received the support of every writer on education, 
without regard to the question whether they have a 
scientific basis in the laws of the growth of mind or 
not. Our business here is to bring to view the scien- 



102 Institutes of Education. [lect. iv. 

tific basis, and make you conscious of it; and this is 
Theory as distinct from Methodology. 

Let me now sum up what we have ascertained as 
regards the animal or sensational, and the man or 
rational mind and also give definitions. 



LECTURE V. 

SUMMING UP AND DEFINITIONS (THUS FAR). 
MIND. 

Intelligence : Common to Animal and Man. 

[The Feelings and Desires of Animals, as collected 
in Lecture L, Part II. , are here omitted, because 
they fall under the ethical section of the phi- 
losophy of rational mind.] 

1. Sensation of objects, and & feeling of the individual 

subject. 

2. Comparison of objects in sensation (or as sensates) : 

likeness and unlikeness. 

3. Sensation of relations of objects in time and space. 

4. Memory (involving retentiveness, and a sensation 

of similarity of a present to a former presentate). 

5. Imagination (images of what is not now present), 

or Representation. 

6. Association of sensations as sensations, viz. asso- 

ciation of sensations as like and unlike, and as 
coexistent, or immediately sequent, in time or 
space. 

7. Sympathy with the intelligence of others : conse- 

quently, Imitation. 

103 



104 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

All this is on the reflex or passivo-active plane of 
Consciousness. The animal is moved by the object, 
tossed hither and thither by impressions as reflected 
by its own subject. For example, when an animal 
seems to be occupied with an object, it does not 
"attend" in any true meaning of that term, any more 
than it ever " intends " ; it is detained by the object, 
and what we have before us is a detention of the con- 
scious subject, not attention by it. Again, the animal 
does not compare or discriminate : objects compare and 
discriminate themselves on the subject: The term 
assigned to the reflex sensational intelligence of the 
animal is Attuition, not Perception, still less Knowing. 



Man Intelligence. 

All the above passive activities of mind are con- 
stantly operative in man, and constitute a great part 
of his daily life, which is largely automatic both in 
the intellectual and moral sphere; and they occupy 
almost the whole field of consciousness in the mind of 
the infant and child. 

But now, the conscious subject functions a free 
energy or power to be called Will, and the result is a 
movement towards the prehension or apprehension of 
sensates, and this in successive steps or moments, by 
which it effects their reduction to consciousness, 
affirmation, and rational knowledge. Hence — 

1. Percipience and the Percept, 

2. Concipience and the Concept : 



v.] Summing up and Definitions (thus far). 105 

and the other steps in the one reason-movement still 
to be considered. 



Definitions. 

At this point it may be well to make clear our 
terminology, that yon may have it for reference; and 
the doing of this will give us an opportunity of con- 
versationally revising and supplementing what has 
been said in past lectures. 

A. — Mind is Consciousness from the lowest animal, 
to its highest man, manifestation. 

The fundamental fact of mind is Feeling, and this 
is both outer and inner. Mind starts into existence 
with a presentation. We can get no better name for 
the rudimentary fact than Feeling, whether we speak 
of the intelligence, or of the appetites, of instincts, 
impulses, or emotions. 

(a) Feeling is to be defined as an indefinite aware- 
ness, in which mind as subject is not yet differentiated 
from the presentation which is the content of the Feel- 
ing, and which may be called the object. There is as 
yet, however, no Object and Subject. Feeling may 
be of the single or of the multitudinous. 1 

1 Some writers seem to have an almost superstitious delight in 
exaggerating the mystery of certain phenomena, and the impossi- 
bility of fixing them. Not only can this primal mental state be 
detected in the young of animals and man, but the most cultivated 
man, unless he is wholly destitute of the emotional element, and 
lives an exclusively arithmetical existence from which everything 
is excluded save what can be numbered and measured, constantly 
experiences Feeling as I have defined it. Indeed, it is pretty certain 



106 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

(b) Sensation is feeling which, at the continued 
solicitation of the presentation, has evolved into a 
feeling of the presentation or content as separate. 
This stage of feeling is sensation. Sensation, becom- 
ing aware of a variety of objects, is the sensation of 
diversity ; but this is no new phenomenon, but merely 
a numerical addition to the first sensation, and like it 
in kind. 

We now have, as a matter of fact, Subject and Object ; 
but we do not have a sensation of Subject. For this 
we must manifestly first sense subject as an Object, 
which is, at this stage, impossible. We feel the object 
as 7iot subject (this is sensation) ; but we do not feel 
the subject as not object. We simply feel subject as a 
vague point of support for object. To sense subject as 
an object is to be se^-conscious — conscious of one's 
own being as a being. 

The sensing of the " object " is not simple. There 
is contained in this consciousness — the being of the 
object and the extensity of the object, and the there- 
ness or outness of the object. 

The organic appetitive feelings we do not at this 
stage sense, but only feel vaguely. 

(c) Desire is to be defined as a feeling from within, 
so intense as to cause movement and a pressing forward 
to some object for its own filling or satisfaction. 



that even the most rational adult has never a clear perception or 
conception of anything new, without beginning at this point of 
vague indefiniteness, where subject and object are undifferentiated. 
This is Feeling in the generic use of the term : it is also specifically 
used to denote feelings which have an inner origin. 



v.] Summing up and Definitions (thus far^). 107 

(d) Emotion may be defined as desire to satisfy 
needs outside and above the merely organic and appeti- 
tive; e.g. the need of satisfying goodwill to others, 
the need of satisfjdng the feeling (when "Reason" 
appears) of the beautiful, of the universal and rational, 
of the infinite, and of God. All morality and religion 
are based on primitive needs, and corresponding 
impulses to satisfy needs through that which is not 
the subject itself, but something else. 

(e) Sympathy is a community of feeling of one being 
with other beings (and with the universal of Being), 
and is the precondition of all emotion (though best 
defined after it). 

(/) Subject and Object. — By Subject is meant the 
one permanent conscious entity which receives pres- 
entations to sense from whatever source, inner or 
outer, they come. The Object is the presentation to 
consciousness, and is to be called the Presentate. 

(g) The Eepresentate is the name to be given to all 
objects in consciousness which have been previously 
there, but which are not then .selves now really present. 
It is equivalent to image, but ought never to be called 
idea, which is a word sacred to a specific meaning. 

(Ji) Analysis is the taking of a complex whole to 
pieces; and Synthesis is the putting together again 
of the parts, and so transforming the " whole " into a 
"unity." 

This involves the self-conscious separating of one 
thing from another, and as opposed to that other, 
i.e. Discrimination; and Discrimination is impossible 
without an act of will directed against a complex 
whole. 



108 Institutes of Education. [lect. v. 

(i) Will is the free self-generated nisus of the 
conscious subject. 

(j) Attention is an act of will sustained with a 
purpose. 

Note. — Every new movement of mind presumes 

ALL THE PRIOR MOVEMENTS, AND CARRIES THEM 
WITH IT. 



LECTURE VI. 

APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS TO EDU- 
CATIONAL METHOD. 

When we spoke of the Human Body as vehicle of 
sensation and of activity alike, — the physical basis of 
Mind, — we showed that it was the first thing to attend 
to in the education of the young. The first, because 
the necessary condition of the health of mind, but not 
the most important. We must eat to live, but eating- 
is not so important as living. We also deduced the 
lessons which the laws of the body impose on the edu- 
cator, whether he be a private or public iustructor. 1 

We might postpone a similar application of the 
Doctrine of Mind until we had completed our survey; 
but it is, for many reasons, better that you should now 
at this stage comprehend the educational and concrete 
significance of the philosophical and abstract, so far as 
we have gone. 

The First Principle of Method, as deduced from the 
supreme ethical end of education, is — 

Turn Everything to Use. 
Corollary — Teach nothing that is useless. 



1 To save space, these were not elaborated, but only indicated. 

109 



110 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

Passing from this, let us take up in order the vari- 
ous stages of conscious mind. We encounter first of 
all Feeling, as pre-condition of consciousness-proper. 



Feeling. 

I. The babe in arms is, in its earliest stages, a 
creature mainly of Feeling — that state in which sub- 
ject and object are practically identified. So far as 
Feeling, therefore, is concerned, the philosophy of 
mind teaches us nothing as to the education of mind. 
All we can say is, that looking to the facts that all 
is always in and through nerve, it is important to a 
healthy nerve-tissue that we should protect the child 
from all painful, discordant, or offensive impressions. 
Calm and placidity, which indicate a harmonious equi- 
librium of nerve processes, must have some effect on 
the future mind-life of the babe. Were it possible 
then (we speak of an ideal state of things) to promote 
this equilibrium by securing perfect health in the 
organic functions, and by admitting to the avenues 
of sense nothing but pleasing sounds and smells 
and sights, and avoiding all that is sudden, harsh, 
discordant, and offensive, it would be a good thing. 
When Montaigne's father would not permit him to be 
suddenly awakened from sleep, but roused him gradu- 
ally with gentle music, he was not so far wrong. Who 
knows but that much of Montaigne's sweet reasonable- 
ness of nature may have owed something to this deli- 
cate solicitude? Can any one look at the treatment of 
infants by the majority of well-intentioned mothers 



vi.] Application of the Preceding Analysis. Ill 

without being surprised that they are so quiet as they 
are? The mothers seem to imagine that if they are 
gratifying their own animal affection, the babe should 
in some way respond. Their general intelligence is 
too low to understand the dictates of sympathy for 
their little charge. They think of themselves and 
their too explosive love, and not of the actual condi- 
tion and needs of the babe. The instinct of animals 
teaches us a lesson. They never seem to meddle with 
their young at this stage, save wisely. Providing for 
all their wants, the parent seems to leave the rest to 
na,ture. Men and women are apt to forget that mere 
gushing tenderness for helpless babes is a very cheap 
matter, and that true love shows itself, not in ill- 
regulated fondling, but in the sympathetic action which 
understands, anticipates, and satisfies the needs of the 
infant. Doubtless, mothers and nurses more or less 
consciously aim at this. Let us wish them more 
success. 

Let us not forget that the whole of mind, including 
the essential man-characteristic, is always there in the 
man-child, waiting for the conditions which make its 
emergence possible. Accordingly, we cannot say at 
what specific point a babe begins to perceive, as dis- 
tinguished from the mere sensing of, objects; but this 
is manifest enough that sensation comes first, and as it 
is the source of all future material of mind (save the 
matter and issue of the Reason-process itself — nisi 
ipse intellectus), certain propositions may be advanced 
with some confidence. There is an order in the devel- 
opment of Faculty. Accordingly, 



112 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

If one Rule of Educational Method be more conspic- 
uous than another (so far as we have yet carried our 
analysis) it is this — 

Second Principle : — In educating, follow the 
order of Mind-growth, which is also, generally 
speaking, the order of brain-growth. 

An old and empirical rule this : all we can do is to 
point to its scientific vindication. Doubtless we all 
have to recognise this rule, whether we will or not; 
and in our attempts (which are constant) to ignore it 
we meet with signal failure. But, spite of this, we go 
on believing that we know better than nature and God, 
and taking advantage of a child's memory for symbolic 
sounds we impart knowledge (so-called) prematurely 
— a practice not only useless, but hurtful and obstruc- 
tive. Take any subject you please, you must regulate 
your action by the principle, or fail. Not only has 
each age its own fitting studies, but it has its own way 
of comprehending and assimilating the same study. 
Take, for example, religion and the idea of God. The 
man-child is essentially a religious being, and you have 
to help him in the slow evolution of his religious life. 
What can God be to a child? He can be something; 
but what ? Whatever He can be, He ought to be by 
your help; but no more. And so on with morality 
and with all intellectual teachings. Find out what 
things cayi be to a child, and limit yourselves to that, 
if you wish to succeed. Of this more fully when we 
speak of applied method, which is the Art of education. 
I would only make one remark here, that if ever you 
have the mind of an undeveloped adult to deal with (a 



vi.] Application of the Preceding Analysis. 113 

Central African, for example, or a British boor), and 
desire to teach him anything, yon mnst, even with 
him, start from the simplest child-elements of it. 
(Let the clergy and missionaries take note of this.) 

The order of mind-growth in knowing is also the 
order of the object-growth in completing itself. Not 
only does the knowing faculty move to its end after 
a certain manner and by a certain series of steps, in 
other words, by an evolutionary process ; but we may 
say that the object of knowledge itself by a kind of 
parallel movement builds itself up out of sensation 
into knowledge. It may be said to separate itself 
from other things, assume its own percept and con- 
cept, and so forth: A (tree) differences itself as a 
percept from B (bush) and C (carrot). We may look 
at the growth of knowledge from the side of the object 
as well as of the subject. 

Consequently, we can deduce from the Second Prin- 
ciple these Rules — 

Rule 1. In the teaching of every subject build it up 
in the mind of the child in accordance with the order of 
mind-growth. 

Rule 2. Proceed step by step, and step after step. 

Sensation. 

I shall not at this stage speak of those character- 
istics of. the conscious subject which follow the sensing 
of an object, viz. retentiveness and memory, imagina- 
tion, etc., because we have still to consider to what 
extent these native capacities of all mind (if we may 
use that term) are effected by the emergence and 



114 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

activity of Will and the Rational; and, consequently, 
anything I might say now would have to be repeated. 
I speak here only of the Sensational or Attuitional 
stage of human intelligence. 

At this stage we have the conscious subject here and 
objects there, which objects as sensed we have called 
sensates. It is probable that this sensational life is 
dominant (though not, of course, excluding Percipient 
and Concipient activities) from the age of nine months 
to about six years of age complete — the period 
(roughly) of the beginning of the second dentition. 
If this be so, then the educational lesson is that we 
should not interfere with free sensational life. 

Third Principle : — Up to the age of six, what- 
ever ELSE IS DONE LET THERE BE NO INTERFERENCE 
WITH THE FREEDOM OF SENSATION, BUT RATHER EN- 
COURAGE CONTACT WITH ALL FORMS OF EXISTENCE, 
AND PROMOTE THE NATURAL ACTIVITY OF THE CHILD 
IN EVERY DIRECTION. 

Sensation is observation of external facts and rela- 
tions; but this of a purely animal kind. It is not 
human observation. Cultivate the senses, we are told, 
as if this were the sum of early education. This is 
one of the results of an inadequate psychology. What 
we have to cultivate — i.e. train and discipline — is 
Percipience and Concipience. But the universal basis 
of finite mind is sense (sensations of the outer and 
sensations of the inner), and a broad and liberal founda- 
tion must be laid if the mental growth is afterwards to 
be broad and liberal and sound. Some people would 
make the child exact from the first. The exactness of 



vi.] Application of the Preceding Analysis. 115 

Percipience and Concipience is limitation. Let the 
child alone : let him be the victim of the myriad sen- 
sations which pour in on him. The soil may be 
growing nothing, but it is being fertilised with a view 
to a future harvest. It is mere pedantry to interfere 
at this stage, and the result will be, or ought to be, 
narrow and pedantic. By all means provide raw 
material for the child, but leave him alone to make 
what he can of it. By all means give him paper, and 
pencils, and painting brushes, and colours, and bricks, 
and spades; but let him alone. We were not sent 
into this world to be manufactured by pedants, but to 
grow from our own roots and soil. Nature in this 
earliest stage is itself accomplishing the work that has 
to be done for the individual mind. But we can do. 
much to help nature here as elsewhere : and by " help- 
ing " I simply mean giving nature a chance and remov- 
ing the impediments which civilisation has put in one 
child's way, and giving to another child the advan- 
tages of civilisation. 

For example, a city child comes into contact with 
so many existences, — persons and things, — and these 
for the most part in continual motion, that his senses 
are stimulated to an early, even precocious, activity 
beyond the possible experience of a rustic. On the 
other hand, the rustic is impressed by the comparative 
repose of things, with the forms of nature, with ani- 
mals, and the slow operations of agriculture, and so 
receives a depth of impression which gives solidity, 
without variety and alertness, to the future intelli- 
gence. A rustic child, then, should visit cities for 



116 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

activity and versatility; a city child should visit the 
country for nature and repose. It is not necessary to 
be always directing the child what to look at. Let 
hirn feel to repletion, and leave " Eyes and no Eyes " 
to the copy-books. Let him look at what he likes, 
but give him opportunities. This is what I mean by 
cultivating sensation. Percipience and Concipience 
are, of course, going on in the child, because he can't 
help it. He is selecting what suits him; and you may 
depend on this, it is not what suits you. Sensation, 
as such, is the basis of the future operations of reason, 
and should be rich and various that it may be fruitful. 
Do not, therefore, limit, or in any way restrict, the 
receptivity and natural free activity of the child under 
the pretext of turning his knowing powers to account. 
The Kindergarten system may, as regards the intelli- 
gence at least, be abused by the over-direction, with 
an ulterior purpose, of the free natural activities of 
the child. The chief gain in the kindergarten system 
is its full recognition of the activities of the young in 
the direction of construction. It thus gives a city 
child of wealthy parents, some of the advantages of 
the gutter. It is an extension and an evolution of the 
nursery practice of playing with bricks, encourage- 
ment being, however, given to imitate definite forms 
presented as drawings. The flat brick with, toothed 
ends, admitting of one being fitted into another, is of 
more value than all the Frobelian " gifts." The moral 
and physical influences, on the other hand, of a wise 
Kindergarten are, considering the barbarism of the 
lower stratum of our population, wholly good. 



vi.] Application of the Preceding Analysis. 117 

And note : what is true of the child is also true of 
us men. We are (if we may so say) too much the 
victims of regulated and reasoned sensations, and, con- 
sequently, too much the slaves of a narrow and logical 
activity. We, too, should remember that it is God 
Himself who so lavishly offers to each of us the riches 
of sensation and feeling, and that if we do not keep 
the sensational consciousness open we are guilty of a 
"sullenness 'gainst nature" and God, and tend to 
grow narrower as we grow older. Our little person- 
alities shut out the wealth and glory of the universal. 
We do not wish to rear poets ; but except in so far as 
a man is a sharer in the inspiration of the poetic tem- 
perament, he is only half -born. Philosophy and relig- 
ion are to him sealed books ; in the one department, 
as in the other, he is fit only jurare in verba (literally) 
magistn. Reason gives interpretation and form, but 
feeling is the inexhaustible fountain of reality. 

Men, whose avenues of Sensation have been early 
blocked by the limitations incident to definite knowl- 
edge, have often great force within a narrow sphere of 
intellectual or moral activity; but their narrowness 
interferes with enjoyment of life in any large sense, 
and may even unfit them for the administration of 
important affairs. Their sympathy and imagination 
are cold and barren. True life, as distinguished from 
departmental knowledge and purposed activity, in- 
cludes (always along with these, of course) openness 
to the universal in all its myriad forms, and a ready 
response to its never-ceasing solicitations. Educa- 
tion is an extensive as well as an intensive process. 



118 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

The mind that is the slave of knowledge tends to be 
essentially obscurantist, because it is the slave of tra- 
ditionary conceptions by which it judges all things. It 
is this traditionary spirit which is the enemy of 
Humanism, though, strange to say, it is often most 
conspicuous in men who have been trained exclusively 
in the (so-called) Humanities. The historical struggle 
between Obscurantism and Humanism repeats itself in 
every age, and, indeed, in the struggles of each indi- 
vidual with himself. 

In the case of the city child, then, let him have the 
country as much as possible ; in the case of the rustic, 
let him have the city : and failing that, markets, fairs, 
travelling circuses, panoramas (especially geographi- 
cal), musical entertainments, games, and magic-lantern 
exhibitions. It is true that the life of sensation is 
never more, intellectually, than the attuition of objects 
as wholes and of their relations in locality; but this, 
after all, is the foundation of the fabric of mind, and 
has to be respected. But we are not to forestall the 
next stage of mind-evolution. 

Take note of this, however : just because a child is 
a human, and not a mere animal intelligence, the rudi- 
mentary acts of Percipience, Concipience, Generalisa- 
tion, and Seasoning are all going on, in a dim and 
groping way, during the whole of the sensational period 
without your interference. For example, the marked 
and conspicuous difference of one thing from another 
— a stone from a piece of wood, grass from trees — is 
making the percipient act, though it is an act of will, 
easy. So with concepts of individuals, which to a child 



vi.] Application of the Preceding Ayialysis. 119 

consist of the most prominent characters only. So 
with generalisations, which are rude and inadequate 
because they deal only with what most vividly im- 
presses sense. To hasten the ripening of these acts 
is to barter life for knowledge, and to cheat the child 
of a multifarious experience which will be afterwards 
in due time turned to account- 

Up to the age of five or six you may introduce a 
child to new objects as sensational wholes, which in 
his ordinary experience might escape him; but this is 
all. He perceives these objects as "wholes"; and 
object-lessons should never go beyond this. During 
the last two years of infancy — the sixth and seventh 
years — you may safely give object-lessons of a more 
extended kind, but they must be given as an exercise 
in the perception of qualities which are obvious and 
superficial; and objects not within the range of com- 
mon life should always be avoided. It is in the 
breaking-up of what is already attuitionally familiar 
that the discipline of object-lessons consists. There 
is no good to be got from a lesson on copper ore or on 
a megatherium. This is a fact of ordinary teaching 
experience, and confirms the deductions of the theory 
or science of education. But, perhaps, we somewhat 
anticipate in these remarks. 

When we begin formal instruction, the principle of 
method to be deduced from the above considerations, 
which exhibit sensation (inner and outer) as the basis, " 
and as furnishing the raw material, of all subsequent 
processes of mind, is this — 

PRESENT TO SENSE. 



120 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

The visible must be seen, the tangible must be touched, 
the odorous must be smelt, the audible must be heard, 
the inner feeling or elementary emotion must be felt. 



Will and Percipience. 

The characteristic of sensation is variety, multi- 
plicity, disorder, even confusion, into the midst of 
which, as we saw, Will enters in the form of the rudi- 
mentary reason-ac£ of Percipience. The important, 
nay, vital point in the movement which we call reason, 
is this, that it is Will. I can perceive nothing, conceive 
nothing, know nothing, save in so far as I do so as a 
self-conscious subject that wills. The fact that there 
is no conscious effort in much of our knowing, that it 
is so easy to begin with, and becomes, in the course of 
repetition, almost automatic, does not affect the ques- 
tion. Try to perceive and conceive, or in any way 
know, something new and strange, like that clock on 
the wall, which you can imagine yourself seeing for 
the first time when totally ignorant of its purpose and 
mechanism, and you will realise to yourself what Will 
is as an initiating energy, and also what it is in its 
process. 

What principle of method do we deduce from the 
fundamental fact of reason? This — 

EVOKE THE WILL OF THE PUPIL. 

This principle lies at the root of all true discipline 
of the mind of man, just as it lies at the root of that 



vi.] Application of the Preceding Analysis. 121 

mind as rational mind. Sensation furnishes the mate- 
rial and occasion of the new movement, but, at the same 
time, it blocks the way, and has to be overcome. 

It is true, as I have said above, that in the case of 
a child as of a man, the oft-repeated and insistent 
presentation of an object in attuition makes easy, 
and almost unconscious, the movement from within 
whereby that object is perceived. If, however, I pre- 
sent, even to a child, an object which by its novelty 
stimulates him to interest, he exerts himself to look 
at it, and to handle it, and so forth, i.e. attends to it, 
and so perceives it as a total, like or unlike previous 
experiences ; and he then immediately advances rapidly 
to the conceiving of that total through the perception 
of its most conspicuous characters. The continuous 
application of will to an object of knowledge with 
the purpose of knowing, is called Attention. Every 
teacher fails who cannot in practice solve for himself 
this problem, "How can I secure the attention of a 
class?" The general answer is, "By following the 
principles of method in teaching ; " but to this has to 
be added regard for physiological conditions, and the 
extent to which the teacher's manner, as sympathetic, 
interested, and vivacious, engages, by a natural reac- 
tion, the interest of his pupils. 

In teaching a subject, I must follow the process of 
knowing, whatever that process may be. I cannot 
advance by walking backwards. 

Manifestly, then, in evoking will to enter on the 
path of knowledge, I must begin with Percipience and 
go on to Concipience, and so forth. Percipience is 



122 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

first, and lies at the foundation of all accurate knowl- 
edge. I find accordingly certain principles here await- 
ing me. All is complex, but perception is of the 
single. Accordingly we have this priniciple — 

In the training of Percipience confine your- 
self TO wholes as singles, and to singles as 

WHOLES. 

Eule. — One thing, or one element of a thing, at a 
time. 

Let any rational mind try to realise in itself an 
adequate knowledge of any new thing whatsoever, and 
he will fail until he has analysed the complex in con- 
sciousness down to its underlying percepts, and dis- 
tinctly apprehended these. 

It is no mean element in the work of rational mind, 
this accuracy of Percipience. It is the foundation and 
necessary condition of every subsequent step, if that 
step is not to be simply a step into confusion. 

It may be of little moment to perceive distinctly the 
object "tree" as opposed to " shrub," or any one qual- 
ity in tree as opposed to any other one quality in tree, 
so far as mere substance of knowledge is concerned. 
But the important point in this, as in all other edu- 
cative processes, is the training and discipline of 
faculty. This has always to be kept in view as our 
main end, — effectiveness of faculty ; and we can then 
let knowledge take care of itself. This is education 
of intelligence. Nothing else can be called education 
without involving ourselves in a contradiction of terms. 
One percept at a time, then, and that clearly differ- 
entiated. 



vi.] Application of the Preceding Analysis. 123 



Concipience. 

The next step in knowing an object is the raising of 
the percept of the object as a single whole, to its per- 
ception as a unity. Mind has been discriminating 
diverse objects one from another. It now continues 
its occupation with each object to see what the object 
has got to say for itself. The various qualities impress 
themselves on sense, and have now to be discriminated 
in relation to the total object, and as elements in it; 
and those qualities which are not obvious have to be 
sought for. 

The mind in knowing will not be hurried. It must 
take one step after another, and only one at a time. 
Like all things in nature, it grows by infinitely small 
steps. 

In teaching botany to a school I present a bluebell. 
To the children it is familiar; but it is little more, as 
yet, than a perceived attuitional total. If they know 
anything about it beyond what they know about all 
other plants that are becoming daily familiar to sensa- 
tion and perception, it is that on the top of a thin 
green stalk there is a blue cup. To this extent the 
bluebell is not only perceived as a whole in sensation 
discriminated from other things, but is conceived, by 
virtue of certain qualities and characteristics of its 
own, relatively to itself. 

It is manifest that until Will, in the energy of 
knowing, has reached the point at which it discrimi- 
nates the various characters which go to make the 



124 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

complex individual in sense, it has advanced only one 
step beyond attuition, and that the second step is the 
truly instructive one. It is now answering the ques- 
tion, What is that complex object before me? — the 
first and final question of reason. The answer is 
ascertained by an analysis, which gives an adequate, 
though, of course, superficial, synthesis of the ele- 
ments in the object; and this synthesis constitutes 
its (unity in many) concept. Will has here a higher 
and more difficult task to perform than in Percip- 
ience, and greater demands are made on its sheer 
power of holding things together. The discipline of 
Will and the training in the process whereby Will 
reaches knowledge, are here, accordingly, higher 
than they have yet been. It follows the prior dis- 
cipline in simple percipience. Consequently the 
principle — 

In training in Concipience practise in the syn- 
thesis OF ONE IN MANY. " 

But remember, meanwhile, the magistral principle 
of order in conceiving, and confine yourself to the 
obvious for a considerable time. Not only must you 
confine yourself to the obvious for some time, but in 
your first exercises you must limit yourself to the 
most salient characteristics. Why? 

Because we discovered in our philosophy of mind 
that it was the salient characteristics which were first 
apprehended by mind in building up a concept of a 
thing. Thus a second principle (not to be called a 
rule, because it is not a deduction from a prin- 



vi.] Application of the Preceding Analysis. 125 

ciple, but itself directly deduced from the mind- 
process) — 

In training to adequate concepts of objects, 
teach first the salient and prominent charac- 
teristics before proceeding to others. 

Anticipate a little, and apply for yourselves 
this principle of method to geography, history, 
grammar, language generally, etc., and you will 
see how sound it is, and how universally it is 
neglected. 

No doubt a human being, especially if he has a 
happy nerve-basis and a suitable environment, may do 
much of all this for himself; but if he could do it as 
well as he ought to do it, education, whether by the 
parent or the teacher, would be superfluous. It is 
because the human animal cannot educate himself that 
we interpose and educate him. And, so far as the 
intellect is concerned, it is only by following the 
method of mind in its process of knowing that we can 
teach any subject effectively, or as Comenius would say, 
easily, solidly, and surely. But far more important 
than the teaching of particular subjects is (let us never 
forget) the training and discipline of the knowing 
function in man. Eeason (which is sometimes called 
divine) is in our hands, to make or mar. Our respon- 
sibility is great. For on reason and its sane activity 
in search of true knowledge, depends ultimately the 
true ethical life — the life of conduct as well as of 
contemplation. 

Far be it from me, however, to say that, without the 



126 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

formal training and discipline of reason, a man cannot 
be ethical. He may be so constituted as to have a 
natural affinity for the humane feelings which are the 
fountain of the ethical, and he may be by nature so 
open to the spiritual ideas which are presented to him 
in the example and teaching of others, that he leads 
an exemplary life in all his relations. God has not 
left the all-important question of conduct in the hands 
of intellect alone. Even "to the poor (in mind) the 
gospel is preached." But we cannot trust to such 
casual results. The very purpose of all education is 
to strengthen the ethical in the individual, for himself 
and for humanity, by the discipline of reason, at the 
same time that, by that discipline, we secure a more 
effective discharge of all the duties of life, individual, 
social, and political. Surely a great work ! An unedu- 
cated man, moreover, however finely attuned by nature, 
necessarily has narrow interests : his horizon is limited, 
and he must always fail to rise to ethical conceptions 
in any large sense. The world and all its interests 
are for him his village and his home. 

It may be said by the hypercritical, that, after all, 
many of these principles of method, so far as we have 
yet gone, are already in the market. True ; but they 
are not bought and paid for by those who most need, 
and ought to use, them. Experience in the course of 
the ages forces profound truths on men with the very 
minimum of thinking on their part, simply by show- 
ing them that certain things won't work and certain 
others will. Nature, so to speak, takes care of itself; 
for there is a Reason in the affairs of men. Our busi- 



vi.] Application of the Preceding Analysis. 127 

ness is to explicate that reason, and to find the scien- 
tific or rational explanation of good practices, and to 
show the untruth and ineptness of bad ones. This in 
education is called theory, and it is this which every 
man who proposes to educate a mind is asked to 
study. 



LECTURE VII. 

THE GENERAL CONCEPT. 

The process of mind on its way to knowledge has 
been our theme ; but our work is as yet only half done. 
The moments of sensation, of perception of sensates, 
and the conception of the percepts inherent in the com- 
plex sensate, take us a considerable step on the reason- 
road. We can imagine an intelligence so constituted 
as to stop at this point ; but if so, its reduction of the 
material in sense to self-consciousness, and consequent 
knowledge, would be partial and inadequate. The 
concept, even supposing it complete, would give us 
only the separate parts of a single thing in unity. 
These are in the object fused, for we cannot locally 
separate the colour from the form or hardness or 
odour : they are not separated parts of the thing stand- 
ing side by side as a collocated aggregate. Still they 
are collocated parts of an aggregate in the sense of 
elements in the total thing. We may regard them as 
the anatomical description of the thing. But we are 
not content with this as knowledge. 

We press forward to a higher conception — the con- 
ception of the relation of these parts, which relation 
truly constitutes them into the actual thing before us. 
Passing over many subordinate and preliminary analy- 
128 



lect. vii.] The General Concept. 129 

ses, we ultimately desire to see the molecular elements 
of the thing, and the dynamic force or forces which 
bring about that specific constitution of molecular 
elements which we call the "thing." The mere collo- 
cation of parts gives us no satisfaction; we desire to 
detect the precise nature of the energy which deter- 
mines that these elements shall be here A and there B 
or C. In short, we seek the causal relations of the 
elements within the thing and "for itself." 

For, after all, the question we ask of each thing 
(and of the whole of experience) is, What are you? 
You have qualities which I find everywhere else : your 
colour I find in other things, your texture and hard- 
ness and odour and form I find in other things ; but 
they are combined in you in such a way as to make 
you a thing by yourself, and not anything else. And 
I want to know what you truly are — in short, what is 
your essence, which is also your idea, and the purpose 
or re'Xos of your existence. 

To face me, I have a quantitative difficulty : Will 
is a great power; it can hold present to consciousness 
several percepts and concepts at once, while, at the 
same time, more or less vaguely sensing a multitude of 
subconscious or sensational elements which can be 
made to emerge when I desire to realise them clearly. 
But the multitude of individual concepts is so great 
that Will exhausts itself quickly in their presence, 
and gladly catches at some way of symbolising many 
individual concepts as represented by one. Millions 
of dogs are represented by the one word, " Dog " or " a 
Dog"; millions of individual men by the one word, 



130 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

" Man " or " a Man. " We say " a Dog is a quadruped, " 
meaning "all clogs;" Man is rational, meaning "all 
men." We thus abbreviate the work of Will-reason. 
This is itself a great gain if it were nothing else, 
because it abbreviates and simplifies thought. 

[To this aspect of the general concept I mean here to 
confine myself. Its relations to Cause, Essence, Idea, lie 
within the sphere of metaphysics.] 

If we can utter a judgment the predicate of which 
will cover at once many millions of individuals, it is 
manifest that we have acquired an intellectual sym- 
bolism which facilitates enormously the progress of 
reason in knowledge. 

How then do we get for consciousness the word 
"Dog" as distinguished from this, that, and other 
dogs? 

Thus : 

I have already perceived and conceived an indi- 
vidual object, differing from other creatures within 
the area of conscious experience, and named it "dog." 
Many other creatures now pass before me which, 
though differing in certain respects (which are super- 
ficial enough), e.g. size and colour, are yet possessed 
of those characters which made me originally call a 
particular creature a " dog " in order to mark it off 
from the many other creatures previously seen. Be- 
cause they possess in common those characteristics 
which difference a dog from other creatures, I call 
them all "dogs." While doing so, I am gathering up, 
by the force of Will, into a unity in my consciousness 



vii.] The General Concept. 131 

these common (differentiating) characteristics, and so 
constituting a new reality (for consciousness), the kind, 
species, or genus, or class, Dog. This is the General 
Concept which manifestly exists as an entity of Season 
only; its actual existence being found only in that 
series of individuals in which I have noted the common 
characteristics. "Dog" is all dogs and no dog. 

General Propositions. — Now this General Concept 
is the mother of general propositions, thus : The com- 
mon characteristics, above referred to as found in the 
series of individuals, are a, b, c, d. Consequently the 
general concept Dog contains in itself, ready to be 
explicated whenever I choose, the general proposi- 
tions — 

All dogs have a. 

have b. 

have c. 

have d. 

Note next, that the affirmation of the general con- 
cept " Dog " presumes that I have seen all individual 
dogs and recorded their characteristics. But it is in 
no man's power to do so. There is, then, manifestly 
lying buried in the general concept " Dog " an assump- 
tion or hypothesis, viz. : This clog, that dog, and a 
multitude of creatures (to which I originally attached 
the differentiating name of " dog ") represent or stand 
for " all dogs ; " therefore, " Dog, " as a general concept, 
contains all dogs. So firm and rigid is the conviction 
that I have got the true general concept which exhausts 
individuals and affirms a class or kind, that if any 



132 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

traveller sent me a picture of a strange animal and 
called it a dog, I should say at once, " It is not a dog, 
because though it has a and b and also a certain general 
sensational resemblance, it has not c and d, and is 
therefore not a dog, but some new beast not yet clas- 
sified. 

[Some may say that the general proposition must precede 
the general concept. Doubtless it is silently there, but in 
its explicated form as a proposition it follows (I think) the 
general concept, and is an explication of it. For educational 
purposes this matters little.] 

The formation of the general concept, apart from its 
value as the shorthand of reason, is of great signi- 
ficance. It implies a poiver of Will in discriminat- 
ing and holding discriminations together in a unity, 
with a sub-reference to innumerable individuals, much 
greater than any yet brought into operation. The 
abstraction necessary in percipience and concipience 
is here quite outdone ; quantitatively outdone, and also 
outdone because in holding present to consciousness 
the general concept, we have now no longer the support 
of the thing as there and then present to conscious- 
ness, but, instead of this, only an entity generated by 
mind. 

The significance of the General Concept is great, 
because it carries with it the whole process of reason- 
ing or ratiocination as distinct from Reason in its 
larger sense: and in reasoning are included both 
Induction and Deduction. 



vii.] The General Concept. 133 

Its importance in the ordinary life of man is also 
great; because the true measure of our power over 
things lies in the truth of our general concepts. On 
this the accuracy of our judgments in the affairs of 
life depends. 

Its ethical importance again is supreme; because the 
general concept is the "form" of ethical ideas, and 
these constitute at once the motive and the end of all 
conduct. 

Further, the importance of a proper understanding 
of the process of formation is also great; because, if 
understood as it has been explained above, ethical 
ideas, however exalted, are not in themselves existent, 
but are existent only in so far as they make manifest 
their existence in the particulars of conduct — the 
daily and hourly life of each of us. They live, they 
can truly live, only in the particular. 

You can understand, then, how it is of all things 
most desirable that in the self -education of our own 
minds, and the education by us of other minds, we 
should see to it that they are trained and disciplined 
in the accurate construction of general concepts. On 
this depend soundness of judgment and the validity of 
concrete reasoning. 

A treatise, De Emenclatione Intellectus, might well 
centre round the general concept. ISTot only for its 
own sake, but for its implications; for this stage of 
the process of Will in knowing rests on the previous 
stages, without which it could not emerge; and it 
contains also implicitly the ratiocinative function. 
Without the accurate concept of the individual, which, 



134 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

again, depends on accurate or true percepts, and these 
on full and true presentation to sense, the general con- 
cept would be hopelessly vitiated : and the vitiation 
may enter at any one or all of these stages. 

Principle of Method. — Train the young in the 

FORMATION OF GENERAL CONCEPTS, AND IN THE 
ANALYSIS OF THOSE THEY HAVE IMMATURELY FORMED. 

With this object in view obey the following rule : — 
Rule. — Teach generalisations as generalisations ; 
that is to say, proceed from the particular to the gen- 
eral; from the concrete individual to the abstract. 

The tradition-bound teacher of language will say 
that the abstract syntactical rule of grammar can be 
learned quite easily by boys. Of course it can — as 
words; but it can never be anything but a meaningless 
collocation of words until it is filled with the concrete 
individual " instances " which the boy is daily encoun- 
tering in his studies. And inasmuch as the human 
mind, as a matter of fact, gets its general and abstract 
proposition (even if it has to do so retrospectively, i.e. 
by going back) through particulars, our duty is to lead 
it to its general proposition along the road or way of 
particulars. The mind will thus make easier and more 
solid and more rapid progress in the knowledge of a 
subject, and will also have an intellectual interest in 
the subject. But these are not the sole, nor yet the 
chief, advantages ; for it is only by following the way 
of reason that we can truly train and discipline reason 
to the sound and effective exercise of its powers on 
all the affairs of life. 

The same remarks apply to the teacher of elementary 



vii.] The General Concept. 135 

science. Even the humblest school-science consists of 
generalisations, or aims at them. Unless the pupil is 
led, step by step, to approach these through particular 
observations, full and exact, the conclusion, be it in 
the form of a generalisation or a formula, is not knowl- 
edge any more than the case which contains a diamond 
is the diamond. The great facility many boys have 
in appropriating the words and propositions that for- 
mulate knowledge, deceives the teacher. Real contact 
with particulars, so that the boy himself can of him- 
self draw the scientific conclusion, is alone of any 
value. Even an unintelligent knowledge of a Greek 
verb is more disciplinary and more instructive than 
verbal scientific knowledge. Such knowledge is not 
real; and it is only in so far as it presents the 
real relations of things, and in so far as these are 
clearly perceived and conceived, that science in- 
struction has any rightful place in the school. The 
Eatichian rule, "per experimentum omnia," is here 
absolute. 

And yet words and formulation are necessary. If, 
without the help of language to fix and symbolise, we 
could make little progress on the percipient and con- 
cipient planes of mind, how hopeless would be the 
attempt to convey a generalisation and reasoning with- 
out it. Until we formulate thought to ourselves in 
words, we are not, strictly speaking, thinking, but 
only striving to think, struggling with thought — 
"licking," as Montaigne says, "the formless embryo." 
On this parallelism, or rather interpenetration, of 
thought and language, rests ultimately all argument 



136 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

for language as an educational discipline; apart, that 
is to say, from its ethical and aesthetic aspects. 1 

Note. — Here I may state explicitly what I have elsewhere 
indicated, that the child — indeed, we may say more truly, 
the infant — begins with general concepts. By this I merely 
mean that the infant, having seen and named an individual 
(the totality of impression which is the individual in sense), 
forthwith uses that individual image and name as a general. 
Having once seen and named a cow, he calls the four-footed 
animals which thereafter come before him "cows," until he 
knows better (as we say). 2 So vague are sensates, and the 
first percepts of these sensates, that he sees a general like- 
ness before he begins to differentiate in any close analytic 
sense. Till he gradually, by the concurrent processes of 
differentiation and likening, builds up for himself the con- 
cept of this and that individual, he is constantly wrong, and 
the resultant in his consciousness is always confused and 
inadequate. Still more must this be the case with the proc- 
ess of forming the general concept, which demands much 
more energy of will applied to things than the individual 
concept does ; for he has to compare, analyse, and discrimi- 
nate with a view to the integration of a new unity in con- 
sciousness. Not only is this process one demanding in itself 
more energy of will, but it is vitiated by all prior errors in 

1 Dr. Sully (i. p. 420) refers to a deaf-mute who, before learning 
the manual signs, reached " the highly abstract idea of Maker and 
Creator, and applied this to the world or totality of objects about 
him." If my analysis of percipience in Met. Nov. et Vet. be correct, 
this is not impossible. He had the feeling of Being-universal, and 
the perception and conception of the multiplicity of objects as 
grounded in Being-universal. 

2 Why does a child see generals vaguely, and only slowly advance 
to differentiation and true generals ? Because he is in the sensa- 
tional stage, the victim of impression, whereas the analytic act is 
an act of Will directed against the object, and is necessarily of slow 
and gradual emergence. 



vii.] The General Concept. 137 

percipience and concipience — nay, also, by the incomplete- 
ness of the primary sensation. Concepts both of the indi- 
vidual and of the general are allowed by the inactive mind 
to form themselves (so to speak) as vague impressions, and 
the result is fatal to adequate and accurate thinking. We 
educate in order to correct all this. We do not, however, 
wish to interfere too much with the natural flow of mind, 
but only to regulate and direct it ; and, as the young grow 
older, we further wish to rouse in them a self-conscious 
purpose of attaining a knowledge which shall be exact and 
true. 

The next movement of Mind in knowing is Reason- 
ing, Inductive and Deductive, already contained in the 
general concept, but now explicit and self-conscious. 

Having treated this briefly, we shall then speak of 
Cause as ground of things, just as Reasoning contains 
the ground of conclusions. 



LECTURE VIII. 

REASONING OR RATIOCINATION — MEDIATE 
AFFIRMATION. 

We now have to deal with the final processes of 
Reason, viz. Reasoning, and the ascertainment of the 
Grounds or Causes of things. 

As I am not attempting a systematic treatise on 
Psychology, but rather exhibiting, in lectures, the 
critical movements of the conscious subject in reduc- 
ing the world of sensation to itself, I shall take the 
privilege of a lecturer and briefly repeat, though in a 
slightly different form, what I have already said on 
general concepts, because a consideration of these is, 
it seems to me, the best introduction to the reasoning 
process. 

Think what an unfortunate gift the power of acquir- 
ing percepts and individual concepts would be if we 
stopped there. The whole complex world would be 
an infinite series of individuals. If we, as endowed 
with Will, felt an impulse to go further, memory would 
break down. You could not speak of " hill, " or " dog, " 
or "cow," but only of certain individual objects one 
after the other, each with its own specific name. 
138 



lect.viii.] Reasoning or Ratiocination. 139 

As a matter of fact, individual things outside are 
all in community with other things, and share their 
properties. The fire is hot, so is the sun; the grate 
is black, so is a negro's face or a starless night sky. 
Many animals are so like each other that we popularly 
say they are the same animal; not numerically, but 
yet the same, e.g. one cow is like another. There are 
slight differences of size and colour, it may be, but 
they are substantially alike (whatever " substantially " 
may mean) ; and we apply the same name to all of 
them, though as individual objects there are hundreds 
of millions of them. 

This is, as we have seen, generalising, or the 
forming of general concepts; grouping individuals 
as kinds or classes. 

When I speak of a cow, e.g. in this way, "The cow 
gives milk, " " The cow is good eating, " and so forth, 
I do not specify in thought or speech any particular 
cow more than another, but all cows whatsoever. 
Thus, under cover of one word used as a symbol, I 
am able to speak of millions of things. 

Now, how do I get at this admirable time-saving, 
thought-saving result? 

Thus : 

I have perceived an individual cow: nay more, I 
have conceived it; that is to say, I have perceived 
certain qualities which it possesses, and these quali- 
ties — e.g. living, animal, four-footed, cloven-hoofed, 
large-uddered — are grasped together as a unity or 
concept in my mind, which reality I have called a 
"cow." But numerous animals pass before me, and 



140 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

I perceive such a resemblance of qualities in certain 
of them that I feel that they are not only similar 
animals, but substantially the same, though numeri- 
cally distinct. All these similar individuals I call 
cows ; and then I find that I can talk of cow, or " the 
cow, " in a general way, meaning all cows, but yet no 
one particular cow more than another. This thing of 
which I speak is the cow as a class or kind. The word 
cow is now no longer simply an individual sense- 
concept, but a general concept, and the name " cow " 
is a general or class name. 

Now, what have we been doing ? Evidently com- 
paring one animal with another. That is to say, we 
have held present to consciousness certain individual 
sense-concepts, and looking from one to the other we 
have seen likeness or unlikeness, and have gathered 
under one general, or class, or kind-name, all the 
similars. 

This is Comparison. Comparison, then, is the basis 
of generalisation. 

The general concept cow is reached by us after a 
comparison of a large number of individual or partic- 
ular concepts. Looking at a great number of animals 
which are prima facie like each other, we have found 
a common expression for them — which common ex- 
pression I call a general concept. Spite of many 
differences, each animal has certain qualities a, b, c, 
d; therefore, a, b, c, d are the common characters, and 
any word may be the symbol of these. 

There is, manifestly, in this process a high energy 
of will as a sheer power holding things together; and 



viii.] Reasoning or Ratiocination. 141 

that, without the advantage of a sensible support as 
in the sense-concept. 

But this general concept "cow," though it is one 
word denoting a unity of particulars, contains implic- 
itly the general proposition, "All animals called 
'cow ' have a, b, c, d." The general concept then con- 
tains in it and yields general propositions, which have 
for their sign the word "all." 

In saying " All cows have cloven feet, " I merely say 
out at large what already had been put by me as the 
result of my perceptions into the general concept 
"cow." "Cloven-footed" was one of the qualities 
or characters which we, on comparison, found always 
present in a certain number of individual animals, and 
was one of the grounds for our throwing them alto- 
gether under the name, class, kind, or general concept 
"cow." It is as if I had put ten pebbles into a bag, 
one of them red, and then said, that bag contains ten 
pebbles, and one of them is red. I knew what I put 
in, and so I know what I shall take out. 

Many difficult and subtle questions arise in common 
with this generalising operation. 1 

Enough for our purpose to note that I have reached 
the general proposition, "All cows are cloven-footed," 
"All cows are large-uddered, " "All cows are rumi- 
nant," and so on, by perceiving these several char- 

1 For example, as to the complex of qualities which constitutes 
the general concept cow. A gentleman arrives from the Antipodes 
to show me a cow which has solid hoofs like a horse. Another 
arrives from Spitzbergen to show me one which has a thick coat- 
ing of fur, and so on, and so on. I shall pass this question here 
(advisedly) . 



142 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

acters in each of the animals presented to me, and 
which I have classed as cows, or rather, nnder the 
general concept and name "cow." 

It is thns, as we have seen, through the perception 
of the particular or individual that we reach the general 
proposition, and that the general proposition has 
meaning to us — is alive to us. If we do not see the 
general proposition, in and through its particulars, it 
is simply so many words — voces etprceterea nihil Of 
this again in a minute or two, under " Induction. " 

As to Comparison : — We said that animals were able 
to compare; but it was the comparison of one sensa- 
tion with another, — a vague indefinite process on the 
plane of sensation, and also very restricted for want 
of Will to separate, to perceive, and to hold percepts. 
They sense likeness and unlikeness of objects. The 
likeness and unlikeness is imprinted on them. But 
they make no further progress, because they cannot 
function free Will : consequently, they do not perceive 
and conceive objects; that is to say, know them by 
separating, seizing, apprehending, and placing them 
back in their conscious subject, as a thing taken pos- 
session of and labelled. What enables the child to 
shoot ahead of the animal and perform this process? 
Will, and nothing but Will ; a free movement issuing 
from the conscious subject, which spiritual dynamic 
constitutes his differentia, and enables him to advance 
and to conquer. By dint of this Will he perceives 
and affirms relations, and also the fact of relation as 
an abstract. By this he holds each percept or concept 



vin.] Reasoning or Ratiocination. 143 

close to him, and perceives (not merely feels) the dif- 
ferences. The holding of two or more objects close 
to consciousness in order to perceive their likeness or 
unlikeness is, we have said, Comparison. But it is 
no longer now the comparison of animal sensation, — 
a mere feeling, a comparison made by the thing (so to 
speak) on the reacting conscious subject, — but the 
comparison of perception and conception, — the com- 
parison in which Will, the conquering energy evolved 
in the conscious subject, plays from first to last the 
leading, because the conditioning, part. It seizes the 
qualities which are the common characteristics of indi- 
viduals, and holds them apart from the individuals. 
This is the Abstraction of generalisation. 1 

Note. — But before going farther, let me point out that 
while the above is the order of the process whereby general 
propositions are first reached, it is for the most part an 
unself-conscious operation. The forming of percepts is un- 
self-conscious, the forming of concepts is unself-conscious, 
and the forming of general concepts and the general propo- 
sitions implicit in them is unself-conscious. By this I mean 
that we go on doing all these things, in the first instance, 
without any set purpose, but only under the general stimu- 
lus of Will-reason. But man being a self-conscious being, 
can become aware of his acts and propose to himself deliber- 
ately to perform these acts, with a view to knowing things. 
For example, I become through sensation aware of a great 
many objects which, though somewhat differing, yet, roughly 

1 No dog or horse can speak at all, or name even one quality ; 
still less can either of them say or think, " All cows have cloven 
feet." And yet, I think it by no means impossible that certain 
sounds should emanate from animals as associated with certain 
individual things. 



144 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

speaking, may all be called " grass " : and I may deliberately 
proceed to collect all these objects and endeavour to find out 
what they have in common. And after careful observation 
of each of the different, yet similar, grasses, I come to the 
conclusion, " All grasses are a, b, c, d," etc. One differs 
from all the rest in respect of /, another in respect of g, 
another in respect of /, g, and so on, but they all have the 
qualities a, b, c, d, etc., in common. Thus I reach a general 
proposition purposely and self-consciously. 

The object of psychology of the Intelligence (in which 
is necessarily included the fundamental principles of logic) 
is to bring into view the various operations which mind 
carries on in order to reach knowledge or truth. Thereby 
we extend knowledge itself by a knowledge of that which 
is the organ of knowledge ; the most interesting, surely, of 
all objects of inquiry to the being whose differentiation and 
prerogative it is to know. And besides this ; by revealing 
the process we stimulate to the correct use of that process, 
and guard ourselves against prevalent and almost inevitable 
abuses of it; for the human mind is always packed full of 
generalisations, a great many received from parents and 
others — all of them provisional, most of them quite wrong, 
and leading to endless errors of opinion and conduct. 

The lesson to be drawn by the teacher, as I have 
already said, is this, that general concepts and gener- 
alisations are mere words and nothing more, except in 
so far as the particulars are known : this is essential 
to their being distinct and clear. In other words, let 
general concepts and general propositions be taught 
in the way in which they are formed. 

The transition to the next movement of mind is best 
made, I think, through a consideration of the act of 
judging. 



viii.] Reasoning or Ratiocination. 145 

Judgment and Deductive Reasoning. — From the very 
first we have been judging — always judging. 

To judge is to predicate one thing of another. But 
even in the first percept ever formed by us, we affirmed 
the identity of a thing with itself. Judgment is also 
affirmation, which, when put in words, we call a prop- 
osition; e.g. " a horse is a quadruped." The first limb 
of the proposition we call the Subject, and the second 
the Predicate. 

Every successive movement of mind is by way of 
judgments ; for of everything, whether it be a percept, 
a concept, or general concept, we say that "it is," or 
"is not." 

It is unnecessary for our educational purpose to go 
farther into the subject of judgments. Indeed, the 
subject is introduced here only because it seems to be 
the most natural and easiest approach to the apprehen- 
sion of the process of Seasoning, or the Syllogism. 
For a large number of our judgments are mediate 
judgments ; 1 that is to say, they acquire truth and 
validity, not by the direct perception of the fact before 
us, but through other judgments. I am referring to 
those judgments which involve general concepts. For 
example, I say, "This tree is an oak," without realis- 
ing to myself the ground of my affirmation. If I 
realise that the ground of my judgment has been the 
observation that it produces gall-nuts, it is at once 
manifest that my judgment is mediate or syllogistic, 
and when explicitly stated is this : 

1 All judgments are at bottom mediate ; but to show this would 
lead us aside into metaphysics (Met. Nov. et Vet.), 



146 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

All trees that bear gall-nuts are oaks. 
This tree bears gall-nuts ; 
Therefore, this tree is an oak. 

These three affirmations, propositions, or judgments 
we call the major premiss, the minor premiss or sub- 
sumption, and the conclusion. 

Thus, in a multitude of ordinary colloquial judg- 
ments, we are always syllogising without realising 
that we are doing so. 

The process which has been illustrated above is 
mediate judgment, or reasoning, or ratiocination, or 
the syllogistic process (deductive). If a traveller in 
Central Africa writes that he met with a strange 
animal which was yet to all intents and purposes a 
cow, then I know that that animal must have the 
qualities a, b, c, d, etc., which he and I, and the rest 
of us, have agreed to regard as constituting a cow, as 
distinguished from every other animal. I then pro- 
ceed thus : 

All cows have a, b, c, d, etc. 

This new animal is (I am assured) a cow; 

Therefore, this new animal has a, b, c, d, etc. 

Or, you may ask me the question, Has a new animal 
lately found in Central Africa cloven hoofs ? I say, 
What does the traveller call it ? You answer, He 
says it is a cow. Then I reply, It has cloven hoofs ; 
because cloven-hoofed is one of the qualities which, 
we have agreed, go to constitute the animal cow. 
Thus: 



viji.] Reasoning or Ratiocination. 147 

All cows have cloven hoofs. 

This new animal is a cow ; 

Therefore, this new animal has cloven hoofs. 

This is Deductive reasoning; and its trnth depends on 
the truth of the general proposition under which you 
conclude as to this or that predicate of the individual 
which you range or subsume under the general propo- 
sition. You are simply taking out of the general 
concept or proposition, in relation to a particular case, 
what you have already put into it. You see then 
how careful men must be of their general propositions, 
which, in truth, are mostly wrong; and even when 
they are right enough for colloquial and provisional 
purposes, they are wrong scientifically. 

Your syllogism may be in point of form quite cor- 
rect, but if your general proposition is defective, to 
that extent your particular conclusion is defective and 
really incorrect. 

How then did we get this general proposition on 
which so much depends ? 

Inductive Reasoning. — Here we must go back to the 
general proposition (p. 141), "All cows are cloven- 
hoofed," which was extracted out of our general concept 
" cow," the moment we had made it. There was here a 
secret process going on which has to be brought to light. 

We had been gradually noting, as was pointed out, 
the qualities which we might predicate of an animal 
called a cow to justify us in calling other animals 
"cows," and not horses, or anything else, Among 



148 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

other things we noted "cloven-hoofed" in each indi- 
vidual animal that passed before us. Then the general 
concept cow yielded at the very moment of its for- 
mation the proposition, " All cows are cloven-hoofed." 
We might not put it in words, but the proposition 
was silently there, contained in our act and the con- 
clusion of that act. And it was so contained because 
we had examined, one after another, a large number 
of instances. We had virtually said this animal, which 
impresses us in such or such a way, ice call a cow, and 
it is cloven-hoofed. Cow No. 2, which similarly im- 
presses us, and which we also call a cow, is also cloven- 
hoofed, and so on. And then we concluded, "All cows 
are cloven-hoofed." 

Now, had we seen all cows ? Certainly not. Accord- 
ingly the process was this : 

This cow, that cow, and the other cow have cloven 

hoofs. 
These cows which we have observed represent all 

the cows not yet observed ; 
Therefore, all cows are cloven-hoofed. 

This process is evidently the same as the syllogistic 
process whereby we affirmed confidently that the cow 
in the African desert was cloven-hoofed, simply be- 
cause it was a cow, and because all cows are cloven- 
hoofed. But it is the reverse process. It is a mediated 
general judgment, mediated through particulars. It is 
a process whereby we reach the general judgment or 
proposition through particular propositions or judg- 



vin.] Reasoning or Ratiocination. 149 

raents. This is Inductive reasoning, and is the proc- 
ess by which we formed the general concept, in the 
formation of which inductive reasoning was implicit. 

Thns reasoning (syllogistic) goes inductively from 
particular to general, and also deductively from gen- 
erals to particulars; and the concluding judgment, 
whether particular or general, is always mediated. 

Thus by means of these general propositions as 
induced from particular propositions, and by means of 
particular propositions which may be deduced from 
them, we acquire a kind of mental shorthand which 
gives us great power over our materials of perception 
and conception, and enables us to connect things 
together in a reasoned whole. So strong is this 
impulse of rational mind that its ideal aim is always 
a reasoned system of things — a cosmic connected 
whole. 

But we have always to be on our guard, because our 
general proposition may be on wrong lines. It may 
be defective in its particulars, to begin with. Such 
general propositions, in truth, are always provisional 
in their character, and to that extent have an arbitrary 
look. 

[It is only when I am able to name the qualities which 
a cow must have in itself to be a cow, the qualities " essen- 
tial" to a cow, that I am entitled to say that I have truly a 
right to a general proposition which is irrefragable. And 
this " essence " I cannot get hold of. Yet enough is given 
me for the ordinary purposes of life and knowledge.] 

Now, at this point we might, as finite intelligences, 
rest satisfied. We can reduce the multitude of objects 



150 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

by which we are surrounded to percepts and concepts : 
we can determine their relations, and gather these 
together into general concepts and general proposi- 
tions ; and further, we can move freely from one thing 
to another, and arrange all our knowledge in a con- 
venient way, as a connected rational system. But this 
does not suffice: there still awaits us the final and 
consummating movement of mind — 'the mediation of 
the real; or Causal Induction. 

Before considering this final reason-movement, let 
me again impress on you the bearing of these discus- 
sions on educational method. The proposition, " Grass 
is a living organism," in so far as it is the conclusion 
of a deductive syllogism, is entirely dependent on 
the prior general propositions, "all plants are living 
organisms," and "grass is a plant." The proposition 
is manifestly analytic, for it is already contained in 
the general concept "Plant." If grass be an entirely 
novel experience to me, all that I have to ascertain is 
whether it is a plant or not, and then I know the rest. 
This is, as we have seen, what is called a mediate 
knowledge or mediate syllogistic judgment because it 
is not direct but mediated through another knowledge, 
viz. the general proposition. Now, the world and 
human affairs and relations are excessively complex, 
and, in order to save ourselves from over-pressure by 
particulars, we are always taking refuge in general 
concepts and general propositions. It is evident, then, 
that if we are not excessively careful in forming our 
general concepts and propositions, we shall fall into 
endless error, — error, too, of a particularly fatal kind, 



viu.] Reasoning or Ratiocination. 151 

because, the logical form being correct, we are apt to 
standby our erroneous conclusion as also really correct. 
For, as I have endeavoured to show in the specific 
educational reference, these general concepts, and the 
general propositions issuing from them, are, in truth, 
inductions. That is to say, they are the tying up in a 
bundle and labelling of a large number of particular 
percepts and concepts. The general concept and gen- 
eral propositions, as such, thus give us no new knowl- 
edge as regards the particulars (though they may seem 
to do so), for each individual percept and concept is 
presumed to have been seen by us; they merely give 
us this new knowledge, viz. that all the particular 
things are the same, or similar, in certain respects. 
Neither the inductive result, accordingly, which is a 
general, nor the deductive result, which is a particular, 
proposition, give us any new knowledge of things 
beyond the fact that certain things not within our 
immediate purview are alike in certain respects. The 
syllogism, in truth, whether inductive or deductive, 
is simply a way of first formulating and then utilising 
knowledge already presumed to be gained by the 
observation of particular things. Accordingly, the 
truth of every judgment and proposition, whether it 
be a general or a particular, depends, ultimately, on the 
exactness or truth of our individual percepts, concepts, 
and general concepts ; and it is, consequently, difficult 
to exaggerate the educational importance of exactness 
in percipience and concipience. There is a mediating 
process of mind which is universally recognised as 
adding to our knowledge, — a mediation not through 



152 Institutes of Education. [lect. 



propositions, but through realities, — the mediation 
of Cause; but the truth is, that if we trace any propo- 
sition whatsoever back to its origin, it too exhibits 
real relations, and, only in so far as it does so, is it of 
any value. 

The formation of the habit of exact perceiving and 
conceiving is necessary, not only as a foundation for 
sound reasoning, but also to enable us to detect in a 
complex presentation or statement the important vital 
points. Our knowledge is advanced by bringing new 
cases under already known generalisations. Accord- 
ingly, in a new case, we have to detect in the object 
before us those characteristics which, spite of its 
apparent novelty, bring it under some general concept 
or proposition through certain attributes of likeness. 
This demands an active and penetrating observation 
of its various features. A man who can see his way 
to an accurate mediate judgment, by bringing the new 
particulars before him under some general head, is 
said to be a man of sound judgment. To judge soundly 
is one of the highest functions of intellect, because it 
involves accurate discrimination and perception of the 
elements in the thing before us, the possession of 
general concepts which are in their content clear and 
distinct, and thereafter the power of relating the par- 
ticular to the general with a true insight into simi- 
larity. The man who can do this supremely well in 
science, philosophy, or politics is the man of genius. 

In the ordinary affairs of life, again, the man who 
can readily detect the characters, more or less hidden, 
of the particular case before him, and bring it under 



vin.] Reasoning or Ratiocination. 153 

its solving universal, is the prince of practical men. 
But it is not always an easy task. A man may culti- 
vate a solemn expression, and have always the air of 
pronouncing sound judgments, and may thus easily 
acquire a reputation with undiscerning people as a 
man of "common sense." But the reputation is con- 
stantly ill-founded. The men who " look wiser than 
any man ever was," are often to be distrusted. Some- 
times they are not truly in earnest in their desire to 
get the truth, but merely to play the rdle of judicially- 
minded men, and they will consequently, after due 
shaking of the head, utter a common-place which 
solves nothing. They are ambitious, not of truth, 
but of a "reputation." Then, again we have men of 
honest and truly sound judgment; but this within a 
very limited range of principles. Their area of vision 
is circumscribed, and they unconsciously hasten to 
reduce the particular question before them to one or 
other of the few formulas which constitute their stock- 
in-trade. They are to be respected as the necessary 
ballast of society. A judge on the bench is thus arti- 
ficially limited, though, personally, he may see beyond 
the law-inscribed horizon. The truly sound judgment 
on the complex before a man will be found to be, for 
the most part, predictive. It is justified by the sequel. 
And this remark applies, not only to ordinary affairs, 
to commerce, to politics, and ethics, but to scientific 
investigations. For such a judgment there is needed 
the greatest possible exactness in matters of fact, 
truthfulness of purpose, and, above all, a regulated 
imagination. The issues, both in the sphere of pure 



154 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

knowledge and of action, are always present to the 
supreme judgment. 

Educationally, then, it is difficult, as I have said, to 
exaggerate the importance of exactness of mind. It 
is also clear that a man cannot be called educated in 
the highest sense, unless his education has been di- 
rected to this end of sound judgment. The education 
must be not only intensive and exact, but extensive 
in respect of the material of knowledge. But both 
combined will fail to produce the educated man, if 
there be not the ethical impulse and the ethical aim ; 
so closely are the intellectual and the ethical inter- 
woven. There must be & purpose of truth. 

In teaching, then, the endless affirmations or judg- 
ments current in ordinary intercourse and in literature 
have to be traced to their general ground (or as it 
is sometimes called "principle"), and not accepted 
simply because they are as propositions clear and 
intelligible. If a man does not carry on this process 
while reading or conversing, he is the victim of end- 
less fallacies. Accordingly, we have to call on the 
mind we are educating to analyse what is before it, 
to justify it, and to vindicate its truth by making 
explicit its premisses, and so reconstituting the syn- 
thesis for itself. Herein lies the training and disci- 
plining of ratiocination; and, when we do this, we 
find ourselves thrown back on percepts, and individual 
concepts, and wholly at the mercy of these primary 
acts of intelligence which lie at the foundation of the 
general. Eeality is truth, and truth is reality. All 



viii.] Reasoning or Ratiocination. 155 

reality is derivative, save the primary percepts. Thus, 
let Hie repeat ad nauseam, there is forced upon us at 
this stage, as at all stages of education, the supreme 
value of exercise and discipline in accurate discrimi- 
nation — not with a view to knowledge, but to a habit 
of mind. And it is solely because certain studies pro- 
mote this (e.g. object-lessons and science-lessons), 
that their place in the school can be justified; not 
because of the knowledge they give. 

Principle of Method. — Teach reasonings as rea- 
sonings ; THAT IS TO SAY, ANALYSE THE AFFIRMA- 
TIONS BEFORE YOU, AND MAKE EXPLICIT THEIR 
RATIONAL BASIS. 

[Analysis and (syllogistic) synthesis.] 
Analytico-Synthetic. 



LECTURE IX. 

CAUSAL INDUCTION. 

The proposition or judgment, "Fire burns wood/' 
is said to be a causal judgment. And so it is in a 
sense. But as it is a mere observation of the sequence 
of two events, the former of which controls the appear- 
ance of the latter, I would prefer here (in view of 
educational applications) to call it a dynamical judg- 
ment. 

Now, the whole range of statical and dynamical 
judgments, even were it within our grasp, gives us 
only a superficial and preliminary knowledge of things. 
The central impulse of reason is towards the affirma- 
tion of the ground or cause of things. The issue of 
reason is an answer to the question, What is A, or B, 
or C? and the "is " involves Cause. 1 The dynamical 
judgment does not satisfy us ; for it is a mere obser- 
vation that one appearance always follows another. 

The true causal knowledge of a thing is the compre- 

1 When I see a thing in its identity of cause, process, and end, I 
know it, and, so far as it is concerned, there is nothing more to he 
done. I would fain rest : and, in point of fact, I would then lie down 
and rest, were it not for the infinite relations of the said thing, and 
the ultimate cosmic question which is always luring on Will-reason 
in its free and unresting activity in search of an absolute synthesis. 
156 



lect. ix.] Causal Induction. 157 

hension of the how and why of the sequence; and to 
this all other knowledge is merely preparatory. This 
kind of knowledge is by way of pre-eminence called 
Science, Scientia, or the knowledge. This search for 
causes of visible existences, results, or effects, is the 
task of the man of science in all the departments of 
human experience and endeavour, and not in physics 
alone. 

We feel that we truly know a "thing," only when 
we know it in its cause or causes. 

That tree, for example, I perceive, conceive, con- 
nect with its general concept " Tree " and its higher 
concept "Plant," and, through generalised proposi- 
tions within whose sphere it falls, I can reason to 
this or that conclusion about it. For example, I do 
not see its roots; but I know it has them. Why? 
Because it is a tree. I do not see its fruit; but I know 
it has, or will have, it. But what I now want to know 
is, what are the causes which underlie the visible, and 
bring about stem, branch, leaf, and fruit? Until I 
have ascertained this, I do not really know the tree. 
I am not yet at the end of my quest. Why does that 
branched object before me bring forth fruit? You 
answer, "Because it is a tree." I reply, not so; that 
is the reason why you say that it brings forth fruit. 

The true cause lies somewhere in the reproductive 
necessity of the tree's nature. Suppose I could name 
this cause and call it A. A is the cause of the fruit- 
bearing; but even of this as the true and necessary 
cause of the fruit -bearing I cannot speak with confi- 
dence until I have further ascertained how it does it. 



158 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

It is necessary to see the process at work, and we shall 
then see what the sequence which we call Cause and 
Effect must be. 

How do I proceed ? 

There are many events that precede what I see. I 
examine these, separate one from the other, and, carry- 
ing my observation through a number of instances, and 
excluding first this antecedent as the cause, and then 
that and the other antecedent, I finally isolate the true 
cause ; and, by further examination and experiment, I 
confirm what I have detected. This is a process of 
analysis resulting in the synthesis of cause and effect, 
which synthesis now constitutes for me the true 
knowledge of that particular thing. It is an analytico- 
synthetic process ; but it is also a process of induction, 
because I examine numerous " cases " in order to find 
the truth. I pile " instance " upon " instance," and I 
also conclude with a general proposition, saying, " All 
things which are precisely similar to this experience 
before me are caused in this particular way (uniform- 
ity of nature)." And, at this point, enters my previous 
generalisation of objects into trees, or more generally 
still, plants ; and I say with confidence, " All plants 
grow thus ; if they do not, they are not plants." 

In ascertaining the cause of the visible thing called 
fruit, you examine many trees which produce fruit, but 
you do this simply because you thereby see similar 
objects in differing circumstances. I take advantage 
of the experiments (so to speak) which nature makes ; 
and, if nature gives me no ready-made experiments, I 
make them for myself, as in physics and chemistry: 



ix.] Causal Induction. 159 

but this, if I had clearer and subtler vision, would 
probably not be necessary. One "case" would then 
suffice. As a matter of fact, however, and as a sub- 
stitute for my limited vision, I go from tree to tree, 
observing closely and applying my tests, in order to 
discover the cause ; or to verify what I think I have 
already discovered. At bottom, however, I have sim- 
ply been analysing or taking to pieces the complex 
system of antecedents which have for their invariable 
sequent, fruit, eliminating what I ascertain not to be 
the true efficient antecedent ; and this I do until I 
have isolated the true antecedent or antecedents which 
being present, the result or effect appears, and which 
being absent, it does not appear. 

Having done this I then (as has been said above) 
take advantage of my previous operations in general- 
isation, and say, " All fruit is produced by like causes." 
Why ? Because " all fruit " is simply a gathering 
together in thought of a great many individual things 
which are already known to be repetitions (it may be 
with slight differences) of the same thing. 
I may now put the process in another way : — 
We generalise the statical qualities of things. But 
when we seek the cause of anything, we look at it not 
only dynamically, but as grounded in its antecedent, 
and necessarily arising out of that antecedent. You 
regard B as an event which is brought about by some 
antecedent event. There is a sequence. The antece- 
dent may be a, b, c, d, e, f, etc. You have the thing or 
event B before you, and you put it into ever so many 
different circumstances, and detect that antecedent 



160 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

circumstance or event which never fails to appear, 
while all the others are sometimes there, sometimes 
not there. You fasten on this common permanent 
antecedent among many variables, eliminating the. 
variables, and isolating the common antecedent as the 
Cause, which we shall call a. You can then very 
often test your results by putting a into operation, 
and seeing whether B follows. But, although you 
may be convinced of the necessity of the causal con- 
nection, you can never see it, until you see Jww it is 
that a must produce B. Your concept or synthesis of 
B is now aB. There are a great many false causal 
connections current in the world. The function of 
Science is to reveal the true and necessary. 

In ascertaining the necessary causal antecedent of 
any thing or event, it would appear at first sight that 
there is no inductive generalisation, and that the term 
"induction" is incorrectly applied. And we can easily 
understand that, if possessed of greater intellectual 
power of perceptive discrimination than we actually 
have, we should be able to separate or isolate the true 
causal antecedent of any result by merely looking at 
the single experience before us long enough. But, 
even then, the process, however apparently intuitive, 
would be as follows : the cause is not d nor e nor /, but 
it is a. It is the function of genius to seize quickly, 
and almost by a kind of intuition, the true cause. 
But even genius, and still more manifestly the ordi- 
nary investigator, is always generalising. For he 
looks at a, c, d, e, f, etc., and sees how each behaves. 



ix.] Causal Induction. 161 

Now, this is equivalent to looking at a series of simi- 
lar cases, and finding what is, among many variables, 
the common antecedent fact present always. Isolating 
that, he calls it a: a is the cause of B. The inves- 
tigator has thus generalised from the observation 
of instances the common invariable antecedent, and 
causal event. 

The process, then, whereby we find the cause of any 
existence or change is, I think, rightly enough called 
a process of induction and generalisation, although 
the fundamental movement is one of analysis and 
synthesis. 

You will now see that the generalisation which 
yields a general concept and general propositions, e.g. 
"All horses neigh," is an induction of statical facts. 
The induction which yields the causal antecedent of 
an existence or event is an induction of dynamical 
facts or sequent movements, which are determining 
movements, e.g. "Heat consumes wood." We have 
been seeking for a common cause of a great many like 
particulars. Whenever there is a conjunction of heat 
and wood we now know what is to happen. But, 
further, we have not satisfied the causal impulse of 
reason until we have ascertained how the antecedent 
works so as to make necessary the sequent. We thus 
get the true and final causal synthesis of the two 
things. 

Note. — This causal conception completes the knowledge 
of a thing. In the mind-process, in so far as rational, it is 
the primary form of knowing the particular in its most 
elementary stage, and it is also the final and ultimate form 



162 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

in which we grasp the total of things — a One Cause out of 
which all differences emerge — the unity in all difference. 
Until the intellect reaches to this conception of universal 
causal law as explicitly present to consciousness, it has not 
completed its education, for it does not know God in the 
world. The religious idea is the final aim of the education 
of the rational, as well as of the ethical, in man. 

Principle of Method. — Complete instruction 

THROUGH CAUSES ; FOR THE KNOWLEDGE OF A THING 
IS COMPLETE, AND INTELLECT CAN BE SATISFIED ONLY 
IN THE APPREHENSION OF CAUSE. 

Bemember, however, that all educational method is 
governed by the principle which requires us to follow 
the order of the growth of mind (which is also the 
order of the growth of brain) ; ] and, consequently, that 
the age at which a boy is to study things in their 
causes is a question to be anxiously considered. 

Mere dynamical relations of sequence, however, are 
among the earliest experiences of mind, and the causal 
in this superficial sense may be early introduced into 
education. Again, one element in the causal concep- 
tion is purpose — the use which any concrete thing 
serves ; and this, being always concrete and obvious, 
may also be early utilised for educational purposes. 
The superficial aspect of cause I would call, for educa- 
tional purposes, the relation of sequence. For example, 
in an early object-lesson on tea, I speak of tea and its 
uses ; but ere long I may extend these sequences back- 
wards to the place which yields tea and the way it 



1 See Lect. XI. seq. 



ix.] Causal Induction. 163 

Even when we have made up our minds as to the 
age for beginning strictly causal or science studies, we 
must bear in mind that sense and the concrete, and 
percipience, and concipience comparison must always 
have their claims satisfied before we proceed to abstract 
conceptions. And, accordingly, all science teaching 
which is not a series of experiments and essentially 
heuristic, is simply word-teaching and charlatanism. 
A so-called cause may be to a boy merely one more 
fact, which is of no more significance for discipline 
than a second aorist, and of little significance for 
knowledge, save in so far as it is experimentally ascer- 
tained. I should say that (setting aside exceptional 
boys and exceptional teachers) a boy cannot begin to 
study scientifically with advantage even the elements 
of physiography and of plant-knowledge till his fif- 
teenth year. The preparation for this will be found 
in object-lessons which have to do with percepts and 
concepts, and relations of an external and sequential 
character merely. When he passes beyond the expla- 
nation of the facts of everyday experience, he, even at 
this age, wastes his time. 



LECTURE X. 

SURVEY OF THE PROCESSES OF REASON IN ORDER TO 
SHOW THAT THEY ARE EACH AND ALL ANALYTICO- 
SYNTHETIC IN THEIR CHARACTER. 

Principle of Method. — Teach Analytico-synthet- 

ICALLY. 

This, as resting on a generalisation of the nature of 
each successive step in mind activity (the will-proc- 
ess), is a governing principle. 

See Appendix, Note D, for the materials of this lec- 
ture. To introduce the argument here would weight 
the text too much. 



164 



LECTURE XL 

UNFOLDING OF INTELLIGENCE; OR ORDER OF INTEL- 
LECTUAL GROWTH IN TIME. 

The successive stages or periods of mental develop- 
ment from infancy to maturity have now to be con- 
sidered. " V esprit, non plus que le corps, ne porte que 
ce qu'il peut porter," says Rousseau. And again, 
" Laissez murir Venfance dans les enfans"; to which 
we may add, " Let boyhood ripen in boys, youthhood 
in youths, and manhood in men." Do not anticipate. 

We shall find that these periods pass into each other, 
and can only be roughly marked off. (See note at end 
of this lecture.) Speaking generally, the time-ovder 
is indicated by the logical order of the successive move- 
ments of intelligence in knowing, as these have been 
exhibited in the preceding pages. If we regard the 
logical movements of intelligence, as also the chrono- 
logical, we, manifestly, simplify things very much. 

The successive movements may be roughly arranged 
thus : — 

1. Babehood — The period of Seyisation and Attui- 
tion (one year). 

2. Infancy — (a) Perception; (b) Sense- Conception 
(from the second year, when speech begins, to the 

165 



166 Institutes of Education. [lect. 



eighth year, the period of second dentition) ; (c) Rela- 
tional Conception, including superficial dynamical se- 
quence, and involving crude Comparison and Judg- 
ment. The whole of this period corresponds to the 
duration of the Infant School. 

3. Childhood — Conception (single and relational) 
is now in full activity with Generalisation and Reason- 
ing incipient (from the eighth to the fifteenth year, the 
age of puberty). This period corresponds to the 
duration of the Primary School, and is divided into 
two parts — the Lower Primary, from the eighth to 
the twelfth year, and the Upper Primary, from the 
twelfth to the fifteenth year. 

4. Boyhood and Girlhood, or the Juvenile Period — 
Generalising and Reasoning Stage, when the perception 
of true Cause and Effect becomes active (from the fif- 
teenth to the eighteenth year). This period corre- 
sponds to that of the Secondary or High School. 

5. Adolescence — All the faculties in full operation, 
and with the further tendency to form ideas, and to 
co-ordinate knowledge into the unity of science (to 
the twenty-second year). This period corresponds 
to that of University life. Thereafter Manhood and 
Womanhood. 

The Physiological relations of this Development of Mind 
have to be considered. 



The principle has already been laid down that all 
education and all instruction, — intellectual, moral, 



xi.] Unfolding of Intelligence. 167 



and religious alike, — if they are to be effective, are to 
be carefully adapted to the stage of mental develop- 
ment which the pupil may have reached. 

Note. — Transition from one plane of Mind to another. — 
Perhaps this is the place to point out, once for all, that as 
all things in the universe are related and interrelated, and 
one state of a thing passes into another state by insensible 
degrees — degrees so infinitely small that they elude us; so, 
Mind is a complex one, in which every element and capacity 
and possibility are present at once, and that all our analysis 
is merely an attempt to discriminate phenomena that shade 
off into each other, in so far as they can be detected to be 
distinct and discriminable. But, all the while, the synthesis 
of the whole is always present in each diverse mental mani- 
festation. We speak of Feeling, Sensibility, Sensation, Per- 
ception, Conception, General Conception, Reasoning ; but at 
what point and in what circumstances are these not all pres- 
ent, and at what point does the one pass into the other in the 
synthesis of the whole ? No man, it seems to me, can say at 
what point a mind that already senses, has entered on percipi- 
ence, concipience, etc., any more than he can tell at what point 
a bud is a flower. [And yet we are not entitled to say, " All 
is becoming " ; but rather, if we are to be accurate, " All is 
at once becoming and become."] By extensive observation 
of minds, animal and rational, and much self -reflective vigi- 
lance, a thinker may put his finger on distinctions ; but 
when it comes to the actual working of the mind, we can 
distinguish only in a very general way. Take, for example, 
the state of " dispersed attention," as it is called. I should 
call this state one of sensational or attuitional dreaming, in 
which i" am carried on from image to image by the play of 
mind and the interactions of nerve-cells. But all the while 
I am a man, and, consequently, Will is there lying at the 
heart of the chaotic series, and ever and anon striving to 
assert its own right to existence, and to mastery over the 
objects that entrain me. At any moment this Will may 



168 Institutes of Education. [lect. xi. 

press its way through, and my attuitional state become a 
percipient and rational state. So with an infant. To the 
age of nine months he may be regarded as an animal pure 
and simple ; and yet he is something else, for Will lies con- 
cealed there seeking its opportunity and gradually forcing- 
its way to the front. The eye and face of an infant already 
reveal that, while he is a victim to sensation, he is yet grad- 
ually bringing a reserve force into the field. Then, if Percip- 
ience be elemental reasoning, it may be said that he reasons 
even before he can talk. And so on. All the while, the 
infant is undergoing the parturient labours of self-delivery. 
He is bringing forth himself — he is not brought forth. The 
conscious subject is gathering, in silence and in secret, the 
energy which will soon proclaim itself as Will, and in full 
Percipience take the first step in seZf-consciousness. [This 
Percipience is the first movement to reduce the sensational 
world to a cognitive world, and the process is a dialectic 
process.] 



LECTURE XII. 

MATERIALS AND DYNAMICS OF THE BUILDING-UP OF 
THE FABRIC OF MIND AS A REAL. 

When B is presented to A (the conscious subject), 
and A is aware of it (I pass over rudimentary "feel- 
ing," of which we can know little), we call A mind 
and B the presentation. But, further, Mind being 
the subject of the presentation, we call B the object. 

Whether from within the body or from without the 
body, the access of presentations" is through nerve- 
tissue, and the reactions are also through nerve-tissue. 
The terminal of the impression is Consciousness, and 
the reflex return starts in and from consciousness. 

The nerve-tissue (which may be summed up in the 
one word cerebrum), inasmuch as it is matter, obeys 
the laws of matter, and as vehicle of consciousness, 
receptive or reactive or active, is probably the highest 
department of physics. Whatever the laws be whereby 
the nerve-cells transmit movements and maintain com- 
munication with each other, and subsequently repeat 
for themselves, under some inner stimulus, past move- 
ments when the existing agent (the object) is absent, I 
say whatever these laws may be, it cannot be doubted 
that they exist. As a system these laws would be 

169 



170 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

called Cerebral Dynamics, or the Dynamics of cerebra- 
tion. 

As might be expected a priori, there is little donbt 
that there is unceasing cerebration without conscious- 
ness as a concomitant. 1 At a certain point in the 
process, and under certain conditions, cerebration 
passes into consciousness. 

That cerebrations exist and affect each other, and, 
without the presence of fresh stimuli, set up in the 
subject a consciousness which is neither the a of 
primary impression nor the b, but a resultant and com- 
plex c, is not incredible. The dynamics of cerebration 
we leave; for little is known about it, and inferences 
are unfortunately drawn from that little which fill the 
"non-scientific" and merely metaphysical mind with 
amazement. 

It is with the action of the environment (including 
the cerebrum as part of the environment) when it passes 
into " consciousness " that we are concerned. 

Here we find a mutual involvement and reciprocity 
of mind and cerebrum. Cerebration sets up a con- 
sciousness, and consciousness of mind sets up a 
cerebration. It is not a molecular disturbance of 
nerve-cells which causes a dog to seek water, but 
the consciousness of thirst which results from that 
molecular disturbance, and which sets in action the 
whole motor system. 

And yet, even in this region of mind, we are still 
within the sphere of natural action and reaction. 

1 Appendix B. 



xii.] The Building-up of Mind as a Real. 171 

Mind has as yet no inhibit ive or regulative energy. 
The appearances of this regulation in instinct are the 
result of certain innate impulses, concrete aptitudes, 
and reflex activity combined. If this be so, then 
there is such a thing as the natural dynamics of con- 
scious mind traversed by the dynamics of material 
cerebration. 

The next stage of Mind is distinguished by the 
advance of will and consequent self-consciousness, 
which profoundly modifies the dynamics of conscious 
mind and of cerebration, and directs all to ends. 
This is Keason. 

Accordingly, I must ask you to go back to the lec- 
ture on the intelligence of animals, in order that you 
may there see how the instruments of mind, as not yet 
a self-conscious mind, constructs its own intelligent 
life. We find in the animal the whole dynamic of 
conscious mind ; and having also found it in ourselves 
as the platform on which Will and self-consciousness 
stand, we have to note to what extent the natural 
dynamic is modified by the intrusion of Will and 
self-consciousness. 

Natural Dynamics of Conscious Mind as Intelligence. 

We found that the dynamical movements might 
fairly be generalised under the following heads : — 

Conscious Mind. 
Attuition. 
Sympathy of Intelligence. 



172 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

Imitation. 

Imagination. 

Association. 

Memory. 

Comparison. 

Sense of relations in Time and Space. 

By means of operations dependent on these factors, 
the animal mind builds itself up, and the man-mind 
does the same, in so far as it is animal. As in infancy 
and childhood the animal predominates, the considera- 
tion of these connate capacities or faculties x ought to 
yield much that will guide the teacher to principles 
of method and rules of procedure. 

I cannot, within the limits assigned to this book, 
treat adequately of these capacities ; I shall only give 
a single brief paragraph to each, chiefly that I may 
engage your interest in the modification which the 
emergence of Will effects. These paragraphs will be 
more fully expounded in lectures. 

Generally, it has to be observed that all the charac- 
teristics of mind which we share with animals are 
emphasised and accentuated by Will-reason, and by 
the purpose of thinking and doing which belongs to 
Will-reason alone. 

(1) Imitation. 

Were it not for the sympathy of intelligence bind- 
ing creatures of a like kind together, and giving rise 

1 It seems to me to be quite unnecessary to abandon the use of 
so useful a word. 



xii; ] The Building-up of Mind as a Real. 173 

to Imitation, each would have to begin from the begin- 
ning for himself, and the growth of mind in each 
would be slow. 

The recognition of this fact gives us a very impor- 
tant principle of method in education, viz. — 

PRESENT A GOOD MODEL. 

This principle is of wide and various application, 
and touches the teacher's work in every subject, and 
in all his relations to his pupils. The child naturally 
imitates : but, he also wills to imitate. The action of 
others supplies him with his concrete ideal. Note, 
however, that imitation rests on sympathy of intelli- 
gence; and, accordingly, the pupil who by bad man- 
agement finds himself in antagonism to his teacher 
will not imitate him, or, at best, he will confine his 
imitation to mimicking. 



(2) Imagination. 

This is simply the reproduction in sensation of the 
impression made by an object which is now no longer 
present. We thus repeat and revise our sensations, 
and are not left entirely at the mercy of objects in 
actual presentation. 

(a) On the plane of sensation we have merely 

Representative Imagination. 

(b) When Will-reason enters, we have 

Productive or Constructive Imagination. 



174 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

Here the will seizes representations, or images 
dynamically arising, and even searches for images 
with a productive purpose. 

The principle of method which this yields is — 

CULTIVATE THE IMAGINATION. 

And this we do by allowing free play to the repre- 
sentative imagination (a child educates himself even 
by dreaming), and by evoking the productive imagi- 
nation, through the furnishing of the child with pro- 
ductive work, as in fairy tales, narratives of events, 
simple poetry, and so forth. All this is necessary to 
the rich growth of mind as a substantive reality ; and 
this quite apart from its ethical importance. 

(3) Association. 

1. Association as Condition of Knowing. 

Sensations and sensates occur in experience either 
together or in sequence, and they are thus linked 
together. There is an external linking in time and 
place, and there is also an inner or real linking of like- 
ness and unlikeness. We desire to reproduce past 
experience, and we have to take advantage of these 
actually existing dynamical relations. They go on in 
spite of ourselves, it is true; but the introduction of 
Will-reason enables us to take advantage of them 
with a view to recall past experiences for purposes of 
knowledge. Association as an instrument in the 
building up of the fabric of knowledge is a subject 



xii.] The Building-up of Mind as a Real. 175 

demanding from the psychologist elaborate analysis. 
One might say that just as all nature presents itself 
to us as an extension of that which already exists, but, 
in each successive object in the rising scale, with a dif- 
ference; so, knowledge of one thing after another is 
essentially an extension of that which is already 
known, to that which is like it, but with a difference. 
There is no break or leap. 

Hence, if we are to instruct with effect, we always 
must build the new on the old, i.e. on what already is 
known. 

Principle of Method. — Link the teaching of the 

NEW WITH FACTS ALREADY KNOWN WITH WHICH 
THE NEW HAS A REAL RELATION OF LIKENESS OR 
UNLIKENESS (i.e. LIKENESS IN UNLIKENESS), SO THAT 
THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE MAY BE AN ORGANIC 
GROWTH. 

Rules : — 

(a) When introducing a new subject or a new les- 

son, go back upon what is already known. 

(b) Prepare the mind for the lesson. 

[I say likeness in unlikeness, for it seems to me 
that the association of contrast does not exist (a midge 
does not suggest an elephant), but that when carefully 
analysed it is likeness in unlikeness, or unlikeness in 
likeness, that really associates experiences.] 

2. Association as aiding Memory. (Suggestion.) 

The dynamical connection of experiences, which 
brings it about that one suggests the other to con- 



176 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

sciousness, is called the " Association of Ideas " (not 
a good name), and takes the following forms : — 



LAWS OR RULES OF ASSOCIATION. 

(a) On the sensational plane — 

1. Contignity in time or place (co -existent or 

in a series of sequence). 

2. Likeness, and nnlikeness in likeness. 

3. The whole and the parts of a thing in a 

vague sensational way. 

(6) On the plane of Will-reason. 

1. Whole and parts, viz. individual concepts 

and their elements or parts, suggest each 
other; general concepts and their parts 
suggest each other; reasonings, i.e. the 
three propositions of a syllogism, suggest 
each other. 

2. Cause and effect suggest each other. 

Principle of Method. — Associate teachings so as 
to Am memory. 

The growth of the fabric of mind, both in the dy- 
namical sphere of sensation and in the self-conscious 
or purely active sphere of will, is always, as I have 
said above, through association of some kind. It is 
an organic growth. Hence the importance of the 
principle which we laid down, viz. Link teachings, so 
that the new shall grow out of the old (that which is 



xii.] The Building-up of Mind as a Real. 177 

already known). This cannot be done if we start a 
new subject or a new lesson without bringing into 
activity the existing material in the memory of the 
child, which is the natural basis for the next step. 
Psychologists treat Association too exclusively under 
its second and secondary head of Suggestion. The 
two aspects of Association taken together yield the 
following : — 

Principle of Method. — Enrich your teaching 
with as many relevant associations as possible. 1 

(4) Memory. 

The first condition of memory, speaking generally, 
is the retention of what has once been present in con- 
sciousness. 

It may be defined as the identifying a present con- 
sciousness with a consciousness formerly experienced. 
• 1. On the plane of sensation. 

Presentations and representations (images of pres- 
entations) are felt to be similar to prior presentations 
and representations. This we see in animals. They 
have, however, to wait for the action of their environ- 
ment on them, or the dynamical movements in their 
cerebrum. This pas sivo -active memory may be called 

Reminiscence. 

2. On the plane of reason. 

Here Will has entered, and the self-conscious sub- 
ject seeks purposely to recover and reinstate past 

1 Education is an extensive as well as an intensive process. 



178 Institutes of Education. [lect. xii. 

experiences with a view to knowledge. This activo- 
active memory is to be called 

Recollection, 

and is, of course, peculiar to the man or rational mind 
alone. 

It is manifest that in Reminiscence we are wholly 
in the hands of environment and Association, and 
that in Recollection we have to follow the track of 
Association in order to recover the past. 

Principle of Method. — Memory should be culti- 
vated — 

(a) As an act of Will, and therefore a discipline. 
(6) As alone conserving the materials of knowledge, 
(c) As an exercise facilitating the acquisition of 
new knowledge. 

The conditions of remembering are — 

Vividness of impression (and accentuation by 

an act of Will) ; 
Duration of impression; 
Repetition of impression; but, above all, 
Association of the thing to be remembered with 
other things. 

Principle of Method. — In teaching repeat and 

RE-REPEAT, REVISE AND RE-REVISE; AND BE ALWAYS 
FALLING BACK ON ELEMENTARY FACTS AND PRINCI- 
PLES RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT OF INSTRUCTION, 
SO AS TO MAINTAIN THE SERIES OF ASSOCIATIONS. 

Note. — The restrictions connected with the cultivation 
of memory, as such, demand consideration. 



PART III. 
METHODOLOGY. 



METHODOLOGY. 

The doctrine of Method is the last chapter in the 
theory or science of the education of a mind, and the 
first chapter of the Art or practice of education. It 
stands by itself, and consists simply of a gathering 
together of the principles which the discussion of 
mind as a growing or evolving organism has yielded. 
In so far as the theoretical argument is unsound, the 
principles of education deduced from it are unsound. 
This chapter, accordingly, merely brings together 
results already ascertained. 

It is true that the human race, by the combined 
operation of inner tendency, self-evolved will, and 
pressure of environment, has somehow educated itself 
without the knowledge of these principles ; also that 
successive generations of men have applied many of 
these principles in the form of empirical rules with 
more or less of mental confusion and more or less of 
success. The same remark, however, is applicable to 
political economy, political philosophy, and indeed 
to all science. None the less do we study the science 
of all subjects ; and this both for the sake of knowl- 
edge in itself and for the improvement of practice. 
If we can by any possibility attain to a wise prac- 

181 



182 Institutes of Education. 

tice in the education of the human mind, we cannot 
doubt that it will be of vital importance to future 
generations of men. 

Summary of Principles. 

The supreme End of the education of mind being 
ethical, that is to say, the expression of each person in 
self-directed daily conduct, we fairly enough deduce 
from this the principle — 

1. Turn everything to use. 
Rules : — 

(a) Teach nothing that is useless. 

(b) Connect all that is taught with the ordi- 

nary and everyday life of the pupil. 

(c) Call for the reproduction and application 

of what you teach. The ultimate test 
of exact knowledge is the power of 
applying it. 

(d) Turn what is known to use for yielding 

new knowledge. 

2. Follow the order of mind-growth (which, 
speaking generally, is also the order of brain-growth). 

Rules : — 

(a) In teaching every subject, and every 
successive lesson on the same sub- 
ject, build it up in the mind of the 
child in accordance with the order of 
mind-growth. 

(6) Proceed step by step, and step after step. 

3. Encourage contact with all forms of 
existence, and promote all forms of natural 
activity. 



Methodology. 183 



This, in order that there may be a rich sub- 
stance of mind. (Education is an extensive 
as well as an intensive process.) 

4. Present to sense. 

Bule. — Never teach anything that can be 
seen, touched, heard, etc., without the 
presence of the object, ox a vivid 
representation, of it ; 1 and appeal to 
every sense, wherever practicable, in 
the teaching of every subject. 

5. Evoke the will of the pupil. 

Note. — Except in so far as a boy applies him- 
self he knows nothing, but is a merely 
passivo-active creature of sensation. 
The child attains to knowledge, not by 
receiving it, but by taking it. He 
instructs himself. The teacher is the 
guide, co-operator, and remover of 
obstructions only. 
This mode of teaching by throwing the 
work on the pupil gives him a pleas- 
ing sense of power and self-achieve- 
ment which are in the highest degree 
stimulating. 

6. Teach all that is complex analytico-syn- 
thetically, i.e. reduce an object to its elements, 
and then build it up again. 

7. Percipience is of the single, and percepts 
lie at the basis of all knowledge ; therefore, 

1 1 should expect that magic lanterns would, ere long, he added 
to school apparatus. 



184 Institutes of Education. 

teach one thing at a time, whether it be a 
whole or an element in a whole. 
Rules : — 

(a) In object-lessons, etc., do not proceed to 
the elements or properties of a thing 
until the mind is accustomed to dis- 
criminate and name things as wholes. 

(b) Dwell long over the simple elements of a 

subject. Confusion in the beginning viti- 
ates the whole after-process of learning. 

8. In concipience practise pupils in the analy- 
sis OF COMPLEX THINGS AND THE SYNTHESIS OF MANY 
PARTICULARS IN ONE WHOLE, IN ORDER TO TRAIN TO 

exactness of conception (analytico-synthetic prin- 
ciple). 

Note. — This applies, first of all, to object- 
lessons of every stage of difficulty up 
to science instruction; but also to all 
other subjects. 

9. Teach first the prominent or salient char- 
acteristics OR ELEMENTS OF A THING (OR SUBJECT), 
AND THEN PROCEED TO OTHER ELEMENTS. 

Rule. — Confine yourself for a time to the 
leading outlines of a subject, and then 
fill in gradually (Geography, Gram- 
mar, History, etc.). 

10. Teach generalisations as generalisations, 
i.e. advance from the particular to the general, 
from the concrete to the abstract. 

Note. — When you encounter a generalisation 
in the course of reading, analyse it 



Methodology. 185 



into its particulars, and put it to- 
gether again (analytico -synthetic prin- 
ciple). 

11. Teach reasonings as reasonings, i.e. get 

THE PUPIL TO MAKE EXPLICIT ALL IMPLICIT REASON- 
INGS (analytico-synthetic principle). 

12. Complete your instruction in a subject by 
teaching through causes (analytico-synthetic prin- 
ciple). 

13. Present a good model of what you wish 
the pupil to do (Writing, Drawing, Carpentering, 
Composition, etc.). 

Grown men are imitative, but children most of 
all; they do what they see you do. 

14. Cultivate the imagination. 

15. Associate teachings, i.e. always link the 

NEW WITH WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN. THIS IS ESSEN- 
TIAL TO THE ORGANIC GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE AND 
TO INTELLECTUAL INTEREST ; AND, CONSEQUENTLY, TO 
SUCCESSFUL TEACHING. 

Eule. — Prepare the mind of the pupil for a 
lesson, so that there may be no abrupt 
transition. The mind does not take 
leaps. 

16. Associate teachings in order to aid the 

MEMORY. 

The Association should be a real association; but 
failing this the external associations of conti- 
guity in time and place may be taken advan- 
tage of. 

17. As TO ASSOCIATION GENERALLY. 



186 Institutes of Education. 

Eules : 

(a) Support and enrich your teaching of 

a subject with as many illustrative 
and relevant associations as possible. 
(This not only helps the memory, but 
gives breadth and pliancy to mind.) 

(b) Let all associations with your teaching be 

pleasing, so that there may be no 
physical or moral obstruction to the 
natural growth of knowledge. 

18. Cultivate the memory. 

Eule. — Eepeat and re-repeat, revise and re- 
revise, always falling back on the 
elementary facts and principles of the 
subject taught. Thus the memory of 
a subject is the memory of real rela- 
tions, and not of mere words and 
formulae, which is rote instruction or 
cram. Repetitio mater Studiorum. 

Our survey of elementary physiology 
taught us the great fact of physio- 
logical habit and its relation to all 
intellectual and moral activity. All 
functions of mind, intellectual and 
ethical, are strengthened and made 
easy by use. 

19. Therefore, repeat and re-repeat the same 
intellectual operations in connection with a 
continuous subject, with a view to the forma- 
tion of a good intellectual habit. 



Methodology. 187 



This alone is true training and discipline, for this 
alone is permanent in its effects. 

" Use almost can change the stamp of nature." 

Hamlet, iii. 4. 



The above scheme of Method is a summarised state- 
ment of the Art of education, in so far as intelligence 
is concerned, and it is applicable to all possible sub- 
jects of instruction (including the ethical, as we shall 
see). 

To instruct well is to instruct (consciously or uncon- 
sciously) in accordance with these principles and rules, 
i.e. in accordance with Method. It is necessary to 
instruct according to Method, if our instruction is to 
be sound and sure, and, above all, if we are to train 
and discipline (i.e. educate) mind. And this is the 
point to emphasise, that training and discipline is 
greater than knowledge, and that only by sound method 
can we train and discipline faculty. Method derives 
its chief importance from this. 1 

The point chiefly to note in connection with these 
rules of the Art is that they are ascertained, not 
empirically (though many of them had been found 
out long before psychology was applied to education), 
but scientifically. That is to say, they flow by neces- 
sary deduction from the science of Mind. 

Thus it is that we vindicate for the art of education 

1 Strange that classical teachers, who are .most of all identified 
with the theory that discipline is all in all, have he en most active 
in the defence of "No method." 



188 Institutes of Education. 

a prior and governing science. Take any of these rules 
you choose, and go back on our statement of the pro- 
cesses of intelligence, and you will see for yourselves 
its scientific basis. If we can ascertain (as we can) 
how it is that mind knows and grows, how it is that 
intelligence intelligises, it is clear as noonday that 
we have also got the how of teaching, because teaching 
is simply helping the mind to perform its function of 
knowing and growing. 

These principles and rules, I would repeat, as the 
issue of scientific analysis, form the last chapter of 
the Science of education, and at the same time the 
first chapter of the Art. All the subsequent chapters 
of the Art are merely the application of this chapter 
to the various subjects which we wish boys and girls 
to learn. We have nothing to add to them except 
this, that their practical application from day to day 
is modified by two considerations, viz., First, the cir- 
cumstances (by which I mean mental rather than 
physical circumstances) of the pupil. Secondly, the 
subject we are teaching. Not that the principles do 
not apply to all subjects, but that each subject will 
suggest its own expedients, if not also rules. 

I shall explain these two points : — 

As regards the first: if the pupils to whom I am 
giving object-lessons or any other lessons are of the 
more educated classes of society, it is absurd to make 
oneself a slave to the rule of " little by little " and 
" step by step " to the extent to which we subject our- 
selves to it when dealing with poor children whose 
minds receive no home cultivation. In the case of 



Methodology. 189 



the former, we can take much for granted and advance 
more rapidly than with the latter. This considera- 
tion is of greater weight in some subjects than in 
others, e.g. in examining on the reading-lesson. You 
can yourselves, after a little reflection, supply all 
that I omit saying in this connection. The age of 
the pupils, too, is one of the most important of the 
conditions under which we teach. Setting aside the 
question of the age at which a natural science can be 
taught scientifically, all will at once see that with 
boys of fourteen we must proceed much more slowly 
than with boys of sixteen or seventeen. . The lecture 
on the periods or stages of mental growth will sug- 
gest to the thoughtful reader all that has to be said 
on the question of rapidity of progress. 

As regards the second point : — additions to the 
rules, or modifications of them, are naturally suggested 
to anybody's common sense by the nature of the sub- 
ject he happens to be teaching. For example, the 
mode of procedure in teaching the English language 
is fundamentally the same as that to be followed in 
teaching French or Latin. But the fact that English 
is the native tongue admits of a procedure which is 
impossible in the case of a foreign tongue. The most 
important difference of procedure is suggested by the 
fact that English grammar is, in the mind of the child, 
implicit. We are merely making explicit, and reduc- 
ing to order and rule, what is already there. It is 
plain that we cannot do this in the case of French or 
Latin. On the other hand, presuming that all will 
agree with me in thinking that the native grammar 



190 Institutes of Education. 

must be the basis of foreign grammars (in order that 
the new may grow out of the old and knowledge be an 
organic growth), then it is absurd not to take advan- 
tage of English grammar in teaching French or Latin, 
and not to assume that a good deal of the grammatical 
work is already done to my hand. And so on, as 
when we pass from Latin to Greek. Here common 
sense comes in ; and though it be " the rarest gift of 
Heaven," we must take it for certain that all teachers 
are endowed with it. 

And this allusion to common sense suggests that I 
must still make one remark before I conclude this part 
of my subject. 

It is possible to overdo method. 

You may be giving a lesson quite in accordance with 
sound method, but you may be pedantically taking- 
step after step with too exclusive an eye on method of 
procedure, and too little regard to the subject you are 
teaching, the mental condition of the pupil you are 
teaching, and the proposed end of your teaching. You 
may forget entirely that the prime condition of all suc- 
cessful method is the sympathetic movement of the 
mind before you with your mind, and your mind with 
his. Indeed, without this sympathy, subtle and deli- 
cate in its nature, your method becomes wooden and 
lifeless. This, now, is to be a slave to method, 
whereas method ought to be your servant, not your 
master. Sympathy cannot be taught by any professor 
of education. It is a thing of native growth, but its 
germs may be cultivated. The greatest stimulus to a 
young mind, you may be sure, is your sympathy with 



Methodology. 191 



it, for this is always accompanied with a genuine 
desire to lead the pupil into the subject; and that 
desire will in all, save a few cases, be reciprocated by 
the pupil. There is no device for commanding atten- 
tion and no methodology which can be a substitute for 
interest in your subject and sympathy with the mind 
before you. In fact, one might almost supersede all 
study of method if one could only secure this, that the 
teacher was able sympathetically to place himself in 
the mental attitude of the pupil towards the lesson, 
and advance along with him step by step to the full 
comprehension of it. 

It has also, I think, to be noted that it is above all 
that philosophy of mind which regards mind as being, 
under more or less disguise, a process of sense-agglut- 
ination, which will generate a method in the forming 
of mind as pedantic in practice as it is unsound in 
theory. The growth of a mind, even if we regard it 
as a mere fabric of stones and cement, is not depend- 
ent on the educator. It fulfils its own life in its own 
way. We merely fix the end, give direction, supply 
defects, remove obstructions, and, generally, lend a 
hand. Some would build up mind as if they were 
laying a tessellated pavement. Method which does 
not confine itself to the order of studies and the dis- 
cipline and development of faculty generally, but con- 
descends to the minutest details of the order of 
questions to be put even in a simple narrative lesson, 
is method run to seed. The human mind, as a living 
energy, is always arranging its own material for itself, 
and children are not so dull as some method-mongers 



192 Institutes of Education. 

seem to imagine. Still more clearly shall we see the 
fallacy of the pedantic extremist in method, if we 
recognise reason as at root a will-energy ever seeking, 
by the necessity of its own nature, to correlate presen- 
tations and representations under the stimulus of the 
native form of End. To stimulate and direct this, 
taking care to keep to the highway of mind-process, is 
more than half our task. 

In short, one great advantage accruing to the study 
of the science of education, as distinguished from the 
art as a dogmatic system, is, that it makes the student- 
teacher master of method, and prevents method, in 
the sense of rules, being master of him. He sees the 
ultimate ground and significance of the rules, and feels 
free and unencumbered in his use of them. His obedi- 
ence is the obedience of a freeman, not of a slave. He 
is the subject of a constitutional monarch, not of a 
despot. We rightly despise "rule of thumb " ; but let 
us remember that there is such a thing as a pedantic 
system of rules which becomes a kind of organised 
"rule of thumb" — perhaps a more dangerous enemy 
of true method than the traditionary practices which 
make no pretensions. 

Note. — There ought to follow Methodology, a discussion 
of the art of examining and a consideration of manner in 
the teacher as distinguished from method. On these subjects 
much might be said. As to the art of examining, I would 
say generally, that the moment it departs from the type of 
an intelligent conversation conducted with perfect natural- 
ness, it goes wrong. 



PART IV. 

APPLIED METHODOLOGY, OR THE ART OF 
EDUCATION. 



APPLIED METHODOLOGY, OR THE ART 
OF EDUCATION. 

Method of intellectual education, i.e. of m- 



I do not say methods of instruction, but of " intel- 
lectual education," because it has been already shown 
that all sound instruction of the intelligence involves 
training and discipline, and all sound training and 
discipline of the intelligence can be secured through 
sound instruction alone. The two taken together 
constitute the education of mind as intelligence. 

We divided subjects of instruction into two classes, 
the Beal, which specially feed the mind, and the 
Formal or Abstract, which specially discipline. The 
Real comprised Naturalistic and Humanistic subjects ; 
and so with the Formal. We shall take the Real 
first. 2 



1 The practical application of Method to the various subjects of 
instruction would naturally extend to about twenty-five lectures. 

2 There is also, doubtless, a reality of fact and relation in the 
abstract. 

195 



196 Institutes of Education. 



A. — Application of Method to Instruction in the Real. 

The Naturalistic. — (1) Object-lessons and Nature- 
knowledge. Elementary service generally. 

(2) Knowledge of the Human Body. 

(3) Geography (as defined in Lecture V., 
Parti.). 1 

(4) Physiography. 
The Humanistic. 

Introductory. — Eeading as a merely instrumental 
art. Writing as a subsidiary instrument. 

(1) Language, 2 i.e. — - 

(a) The Vernacular language as the expres- 
sion of the thought of others — Liter- 
ature. 

(p) The Vernacular language as a synthetic 
exercise — the expression of one's own 
thought — Imitative Composition. 

(2) Foreign Languages as Literature. 

(3) Economics. 

(4) History with Civil Relations. 

(5) Moral Sentiments and Precepts [Minor 
Morals]. 

!For a paper on "Method in Teaching Geography," see Occa- 
sional Addresses. 

2 The substance of my lectures on Language and Literature will 
be found in the book entitled Language and Linguistic Method in 
the School (Cambridge University Press) . The student is also re- 
ferred to "Theory and the Curriculum of the Secondary School," 
in Teachers' Guild Addresses (Percival & Co.), and to "Liberal 
Education in the Primary School," in Occasional Addresses (Cam- 
bridge University Press). 



Applied Methodology. 197 

(6) Spiritual Ideas (including the Beautiful) 
and Religion. 

B. — Application of Method to Instruction in the Formal. 

Drawing. Language as Grammar (native 

Arithmetic. and foreign languages). 

Geometry. Rhetoric. 

Logic. 

The lecturer on education will treat all the above 
subjects in detail. I merely name them here. 

Note. — The inclusion of drawing among " Formal " sub- 
jects may give rise to question. I regard outline drawing 
(including geometrical) as belonging to the formal of sense, 
and as an essential element in all education of the intelli- 
gence. Apart from numerous other advantages, the practice 
of drawing must tend to give a definiteness of outline to all 
mental operations : these have a tendency to visualisation as 
they become absolutely clear and distinct. The effort also 
to copy a line or curve so that it shall be a true copy, is an 
effort of self-directed will which is of disciplinary benefit, 
and yet within the capacity of the youngest. 

As to materials of education generally, I would here lay 
down two propositions which ought to be constantly pres- 
ent to the teacher as governing all that can be said as to 
"materials." 

I. The child of six or seven may, without exaggeration, 
be said to come to school from the home, the fields, and the 
streets with his mind full of the elements of evert/ department 
of knowledge included in the above classification. He is 
already a walking miniature encyclopaedia. We are much 
mistaken if we think his mind is waiting for us before it 
begins to work. It is chockful of judgments. The subjects 
included above under the heads Real and Formal are (with 



198 Institutes of Education. 

the exception of foreign tongues), if closely examined, merely 
a generalisation and classification of the materials in and 
through which the life of each is being carried on as a 
matter of course. 

II. The teacher's main business is to take the chaotic 
child-synthesis to pieces, make clear what is confused, and 
build on the foundations thus laid. But the teacher never 
leaves behind him the ordinary experiences of child-life ; he 
simply interprets and extends them. It is daily life which 
gives material, and the school which gives interpretation, 
direction, and form. Life and the school should be in a 
continual reciprocity — never disjoined. Vitce non scholce 
discendum est. 



We have now come to the end of that portion of 
the Institutes of Education which deals with Eight 
Judgment, including as elements of right judgment, 
and therefore as materials of instruction, moral and 
spiritual ideas. But knowledge, and even wisdom, 
which issue in judging knowingly and wisely, are of 
little avail, save in so far as they express themselves 
in " Good action under a sense of Duty," and find their 
completion in a " comprehension of the spiritual sig- 
nificance of nature and life" (p. 33). Thus alone do 
we achieve the Ethical End; and we must now indi- 
cate the lines and method of instruction, training, and 
discipline in respect of this the ultimate aim of all 
our endeavours. 



PART V. 

ETHICAL EDUCATION— SPECIALLY 
CONSIDERED. 



LECTURE I. 

ETHICAL IDEAS AS THE REAL, OR SUBSTANCE, OF LIFE. 

Note. — The following lectures consist of summaries 
and paragraphs only. It is presumed that the student 
now turns back and re-peruses Lectures IV. and V 
Part I. 

The problem of education may be summarised, as 
we have seen, under the three heads of the end, the 
means (which comprehends materials and process), 
and the agency, which sets the whole in motion and 
carries it out to its completion. The agency is the 
teacher, who passes into the higher category of " edu- 
cator " only when he works under the inspiration of 
an ethical purpose. On his personality so much 
depends that the determination of ends and the dis- 
cussion of materials and processes seem to sink into 
comparative insignificance. But were we to consider 
this personality itself (which lies outside our plan in 
this book), we should find that in the teacher, as in 
education generally, it is the ethical which is of 
supreme moment. No system of training can guar- 
antee ethical fitness ; but it can shape to an excellent 
issue the ethical predisposition, and constrain those 
endowed by nature with this predisposition seriously 

201 



202 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

to ponder the best ways of fulfilling their obligations 
to their own educational ideal and to the national life. 
The teacher who is ethically endowed will see that 
the materials which he uses for knowledge, and the 
discipline which he gives by means of these materials 
have for their ultimate object the fitting of the young 
to interpret their daily experience, subduing all to the 
service of an ethical ideal. But knowledge and intel- 
lectual discipline alone, he is well aware, even when 
animated by an ethical purpose, will not of themselves 
suffice; instruction must be given in ethical ideas 
themselves as the true and ultimate realities of life, 
and direct discipline must also be given in ethical 
habit. 

We find, as the last result of human experience, 
certain moral ideas ready made for us. This is ethical 
tradition. Ethical Education consists in training the 
young so as to put them in possession of these ideas 
as motives of conduct, and as necessary to their ethical 
completeness. Thus we build up Conscience in them. 
Left to his own individual experience, a man's knowl- 
edge would be small, his conception of human rela- 
tions restricted, and his interpretation of them false 
or inadequate. 

The moral " ideas " are high generalisations, and (as 
we now know) we can introduce children effectively 
to generalisations only through the particulars of con- 
duct . We build up the idea through particular thoughts 
and acts. Children are our modern instances of prim- 
itive man. Their minds have to repeat the mental 



i.] Ethical Ideas as the Real of Life. 203 

history of the past, in their conceptions of duty as 
well as in their knowledge of things. 

How do we proceed with a view to put them in pos- 
session of their inheritance? 

First, We take care to instruct them in so much of 
the accumulated materials of knowledge — knowledge 
of things — as will enable them to form right judg- 
ments, and give fulness to life by multiplying inter- 
ests. The subjects we select and the method of giving 
instruction in them, with a view to the attainment of 
our ultimate ethical purpose, constitute that part of 
educational theory and method which has to do with 
the intellect primarily ; that is to say, the mere under- 
standing of things and their relations. All this we 
have considered in the previous lectures; and as we 
enter on the specific consideration of the ethical, we see 
that a liberal and generous course of instruction is 
necessary, if the circle of thought and interests is to 
be so widened as to give materials for sound ethical 
conclusions. The width, no less than the intensity, 
of a man's intellectual and ethical life is the measure 
of his education. 

Secondly, We regulate the conduct of the young in 
accordance with moral ideas and the sentiment of duty. 

Thirdly, We instruct them in moral ideas themselves, 
and their spiritual significance. 

Our object in these processes is one and the same 
— to produce in each human being an ethical state of 
mind; but this again with a view to expression and 
action, which alone give value to the ethical state : in 
other words, we aim at producing a certain state of 



204 Institutes of Education. [lect. i. 

being, and effective virtue as sole guarantee of the 
reality of that state. 

Now as to the third step, it has to be noted gen- 
erally that no one can get a knowledge of moral or 
spiritual ideas by merely acquiescing in propositions 
regarding them. All moral ideas which can- constitute 
motives of action arise primarily out of feelings — 
"inner sense," and, consequently, we get possession 
of them only by feeling them — feeling, and so seeing, 
their truth, and the law that is inherent in them. In 
the same way we da not get a knowledge of anything 
of external sense by reading statements about it, but 
only by feeling it, that is to say, having it present to 
the senses. There is this difference, however, between 
the intellectual and the ethical, that knowledge of sub- 
jects completes itself simply as knowledge (although 
until we can use it, it is not wholly ours), whereas 
ethical ideas do not truly live at all, save in action. 
We never, consequently, can be said even to know 
them (feel them), until we have carried them into 
action ; or, at least, realised them imaginatively, if not 
in our own activity, then in the activity of another. 



LECTURE II. 

BRIEF ANALYSIS OF MIND AS AN ETHICAL ACTIVITY. 

When dealing with the philosophy of mind as an 
intellectual or reason-activity, we first exhibited the 
characteristics of the sensational intelligence of the 
animal ; and we thus gained a clearer comprehension 
of the distinctive characteristics of the intelligence of 
man, who alone is a reason. The same mode of pro- 
cedure will be followed now in the ethical sphere. 

Animal and Infant Ethics. 

The result of our analysis (p. 73) was that the 
simple feelings which are inherent in a fully developed 
animal organism are the following : — 

1. The Feeling of Life- activity. 

2. The natural appetites (impulses, instincts) work- 

ing from within. 

3. Sympathy of being and of natural feelings in 

living creatures. 

4. The feeling of kindness to other living creatures, 

especially among those of a like kind (good- 
will). 

5. The feeling of pleasure in kindness received from 

others (love of approbation). 

205 



206 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

6. The feeling of a superior power (with the con- 

sequent feeling of dependence). 

7. The feeling of resistance to anything which may 

hurt (animal courage). 

8. The feeling of fear, or of evasion, of anything 

which may hurt (animal cowardice). 

9. The feeling of rivalry. 

All these insist on manifesting themselves as occa- 
sion arises. 

Man shares all these feelings, as instincts, desires, 
impulses, with animals; and they form the basis of 
his ethical nature. As basis of his nature, they are 
in evidence from the first ; indeed they constitute the 
whole ethical apparatus of the infant. There is no 
harm in them; but, on the contrary, good: and the 
young must be allowed to pursue their desires and 
exercise their activities in every direction. We grad- 
ually mould these to law, but we must not be in too 
great haste. 

In man, reason (as Will) enters for the purpose of 
rationalising all these impulses and directing them to 
ends, which ends are, in their ultimate form, ethical 
ideas ; and these, taken together, constitute the ideal 
of conduct for each man. 

The business of the teacher and parent is to 
train and discipline this Will and to build up this 
Ideal. 

The animal is a mere victim of the dynamic of feel- 
ing. It yields to that which is strongest or upper- 
most at the moment. Man, on the contrary, directs 
feeling and emotion in certain special lines of activ- 



ii.] Analysis of Mind as an Ethical Activity. 207 

ity, i.e. towards certain specific ends, by virtue of the 
reason in him. These ends are, as I have said, ethical 
ideas, and they constitute motives of action as gen- 
eralised. 

Further, when this Will-reason enters into the 
sphere of feeling, it brings with it new material to 
Consciousness — (1) A consciousness of Will as a 
determining power, energy, or force. (2) A con- 
sciousness of personality or self. (3) A conscious- 
ness of duty to moral law as inherent in the ideas and 
the ideal constituted by Will-reason. 

With education these rational elements of man's 
distinctive ethical nature grow in strength. 

The sum of the ethical ideas of conduct in a man, 
taken along with the perception of law in these ideas, 
and of consequent duty to that law as supreme, con- 
stitute, taken together, what we call Conscience. The 
function of the educator, accordingly, may be said to 
be to build up Conscience in the young: and Con- 
science, I repeat, may be succinctly defined as the 
ideal system of motives, along with the sentiment of 
law and duty to law as inherent in that ideal system. 

As to these Ideas themselves : they are ascertained 
thus : Eeason dealing with the feelings and emotions 
which we have in common with animals (though in 
more ample measure) determines the relations of a 
person to himself and to other persons, and so consti- 
tutes the moral ideas (ends and motives). These ideas 
are all complex. 



208 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

The most common of them are — 

Humanity (which is good- Courage. 

will to others, and love Integrity. 

of goodwill of others). Resoluteness and Perse- 
Justice, verance. 
Truthfulness. Purity. 
Honesty. Eeverence (for that which 
Honour. is greater than our- 
Fidelity. selves). 

Self-control and Self-respect or self-worth. 

The analysis of these complex ideas into their ele- 
ments of emotion and reason must throw light on the 
method of educating the young, so that the ideas shall 
be to them a permanent possession as knowledge. 

I do not attempt this analysis here, but content 
myself with saying that the teacher should always 
have present to himself, as dominating aim, the cul- 
tivation in the pupil of self-control and self-respect, 
and of those more generic and supreme ethical ideas 
which comprehend others, viz. the idea of Humanity, 
which expands and enriches the soul, while at the 
same time determining conduct, and the spiritual idea 
of God as universal Father, which at once humbles 
and exalts the personality, and Whose best service is 
the service of mankind. The pupil should early know 
that a continuous struggle is appointed for man, not 
only with his animal nature and material interests, 
but with the very self-conscious ego, which, just 
because it lifts him above nature, is too apt to rest 
content with self -worship. 



ii.] Analysis of Mind as an Ethical Activity. 209 

I have spoken elsewhere, in detail, of specific Kelig- 
ious teaching. 1 Accordingly, I would confine myself 
here to saying that where there is a breach between 
ethical and religious teaching, we have neither the 
one nor the other in its fulness of significance. With- 
out religious teaching, the education of a human being 
is (on purely psychological grounds) demonstrably 
incomplete. 

Law and Duty. — I have referred to Law and Duty 
as residing in the ideas. We may put it otherwise 
thus : the abstract sentiment of law and duty inherent 
in the reason of man is a mere empty Form, and has 
to be filled with the substance of real or ethical ideas 
which are to regulate life and conduct. This senti- 
ment of law, implying reverence for, and duty to, law, 
accompanies all our training and instruction, and is 
taken for granted as an ever-present inner fact dis- 
tinguishing the man-child from the animal. Through 
this sentiment of law and duty, in truth, we must 
mainly work, although we do not always make our 
procedure apparent to the child. 

The educator may be assured that the child is ever 
in search of law. Were there no ideal and law for 
man there could be no morality; one act would be as 
good as another. 

The discipline of duty to law is essentially a calling 
forth of effort to will the good and right in the face of 
difficulties. 

1 Occasional Addresses and Teachers' Guild Addresses. 



210 Institutes of Education. [lect, ii. 

In this connection, again, the recognition of God as 
source of law, and of the world as a moral order, is to 
be continually fostered (by being assumed rather than 
inculcated), until it reaches that clearness of vision, 
possible only to the maturing or matured mind, which 
contemplates God as not only the true and ever- 
abiding life of the spirit of man, but the ever-during 
law of that spirit. 



LECTURE III. 

UNITY OF THE INTELLECTUAL AND ETHICAL IN 
EDUCATION. 

Nutrition and Discipline : Real and Formal. 

Will in so far as, in its reason-process, it affirms 
or posits real ethical ends or ideas as also abstract law, 
is, as we now may see, the Formal element in ethics. 
In other words, Will, engaging itself with abstract 
duty to law, and acting for the sake of duty to law as 
such, is Formal. The ethical ideal, on the other hand, 
which is " constituted law " for us, is the substance or 
matter, in other words, the Real in the ethical act. 

We have spoken in past pages 1 of the unity of 
reason; but we now farther see that the human mind 
as a whole is a rational unity. There is no true 
separation of the intellectual and the ethical. The 
ethical is within the sphere of the rational, not outside 
it or somehow added on to it. The rational affirma- 
tion of end in the sphere of inner feeling and emotion, 
which affirmation determines conduct, is identical in 
its nature with rational affirmation regarding anything 
whatsoever. 

1 Vide also Appendix D. 

211 



212 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

Note. — Within the limits of mere knowledge, the affirma- 
tion has its final issue in knowledge simply ; the moment it 
goes beyond this, and involves the effecting of a particular 
knowledge in the world of action or conduct, the knowledge, 
it will be found, is, ipso facto, instinct with- some feeling or 
emotion, and becomes ethical. The abstract love of pure 
knowledge itself, for its own sake, is, however, ethical, 
because it is the pursuit of an idea and an ideal. This 
involves emotion. 

In the purely intellectual sphere we distinguished 
between the Eeal and the Formal or Abstract in 
instruction. So, in the distinctively Ethical sphere 
— the ethical side of reason — there is a Eeal and a 
Formal or Abstract. 

Accordingly, just as we found Will in the conscious 
subject to be root and nerve of reason in man, we now 
find the same Will to be root and nerve of all ethical 
life and activity. The ethical end, — always an idea 
of reason, — which is affirmed as right and law, is car- 
ried, by the sustained energy of the same Will that 
affirmed it, into action; and thus we become ethical 
beings, and not knowing beings only. 

It will be at once seen that this analysis of the 
essential nature of mind not only gives to us, as stu- 
dents of philosophy, a unity of view, but as students 
of education a unity of theory and system. For in 
the education of both the rational and ethical nature, 
Will is the distinguishing characteristic of man — 
that whereby he is man; and it is this, conse- 
quently, that we have specially to train and disci- 
pline, viz. Will as at once a rational and an ethical 
energy. 



in.] Unity of the Intellectual and Ethical. 213 

But, inasmuch as rational mind, as pure Will and 
its Keason-process (or, as I prefer to call it, Will- 
reason), is merely formal, we have to provide food, 
reality, nutrition for the moral, just as we do for the 
intellectual, nature. This material is, we now know, 
ethical ideas. We must never, however, lose sight of 
the fact that it is the command which Will has over 
its materials, and the ends for which it uses them, 
that are alone of value in life. A purpose of Duty 
is demanded of us. This, indeed, is what we mean 
when we say that the end of education, as of life, is 
ethical. 

Intellectual discipline, we found, involves a self- 
initiated energy of W T ill in the face of difficulties 
under a sense of Law — that is to say, the fulfilment 
of law as imposed by another or oneself with a view 
to the fulfilment of a purpose : Ethical discipline also 
may be defined in the same terms. Thus, intellectual 
discipline is, in truth, a moral discipline. 

The above remarks justify the traditionary attitude 
of the classical humanists to discipline of intellect as 
of supreme importance; but it also shows that they 
have erred in making it all-important. The intellect 
must be fed, and the ethical nature must be fed. So 
essential is this, that we might also justify the real- 
istic attitude of mind to education as of supreme 
importance. 

The true conclusion is that to which we formerly 
came. Will-reason can be trained and disciplined only 
in and' through the Eeal: and the Eeal can be effec- 
tively taught only when it is so taught as to be a 



214 Institutes of Education. [lect. hi. 

training and discipline of the Formal in mind. How? 
To this scientific methodology is the answer; and 
as regards intellect we have nothing more to say. 
But methodology is equally potent in the ethical 
sphere. 



PART VI. 

APPLIED METHODOLOGY AS ART OF 
ETHICAL EDUCATION. 



LECTURE I. 

THE REAL AND THE FORMAL. 

* Instruction, Training, and Discipline generally. 

Ethical Education, I have just said, comprises (like 
intellectual education) two elements, the Real and the 
Formal — nutrition and training with discipline. 

I pointed out (p. 41) the distinction between the 
" training " and " discipline " of the intelligence. Dis- 
cipline, we found, could not be distinguished from 
training except in this, that it was dependent on spon- 
taneous, unaided, and self-directed effort on the part 
of the pupil, with a view to the effecting of a self- 
conscious purpose ; while training was the carrying of 
the pupil through certain intellectual processes by a 
stronger will — his master's. Hence we found that 
formal or abstract studies were in themselves more 
disciplinary, if rightly taught, than realistic studies, 
because they involved greater initial energy and more 
sustained application of that Will which, as a power 
and process, is the distinguishing differentia of man. 
The same distinction is apparent in ethical education. 
In the case of very young children we train to right 
action, i.e. we guide, lead, and help them to do the 

217 



218 Institutes of Education. [lect. i. 

right, in obedience to their teacher as a moral in- 
structor : we do not appeal to abstract law, or lay a 
burden on their wills. We rely on imitation and on 
their affection for us. As they grow older, however, 
we call upon them to do the right of themselves in the 
face of temptation, in obedience to the moral law in 
them, and as an act of self-directing will in the service 
of bare duty: this is formal discipline. 

Thus far, the method of intellectual and the method 
of moral education run on parallel lines. In both 
alike training is the guidance and helping of the 
unformed will in the fulfilment of ends, and discipline 
is the spontaneous, free energising of that will in the 
fulfilment of self-conscious ends, to which, as law, it 
owes Duty. 



LECTURE II. 

METHOD OF ETHICAL EDUCATION IN THE REAL — 
INSTRUCTION. 

The ethical differs from the intellectual as regards 
the method of instruction only in so far as we are now 
instructing in the emotions and ideas which constitute 
the inner substance or matter of our ethical life. The 
difference is caused by this : in the sphere of intellec- 
tual education we have to do with presentation and 
acquisition, whereas in the sphere of ethical education 
we have directly to do with action or conduct ; for, as 
we pointed out, an emotion is not ours till it is felt, 
and an ethical idea is not truly ours till it is used. 
An ethical emotion or idea truly lives only in action, 
and, accordingly, can be realised as a fact of conscious- 
ness by the child, and so truly known, only as an act. 

The distinction is, fundamentally, the distinction 
between outer sense and inner feeling respectively as 
yielding materials for knowledge. 

Consequently, we instruct in the real of ethics chiefly 
by training. 

That is to say, (a) we do not bring the ethical before 
the child's mind as" a series of perceptive facts or 
reasoned conclusions, but let the child contemplate 
ethical emotions and ideas in action in ourselves or in 

219 



220 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

others (either actually or in narratives). Perception 
is here perception of a feeling in activity, (b) Above 
all, we lead him to imitate and do the good instead of 
the bad by letting him feel its inherent attractiveness, 
which he does instinctively ; and, further, by associat- 
ing the good with his regard for us. 

Hence it is, that while the principle of method — 
" present a good model " — is of general application 
in the instruction of the intelligence, it is absolutely 
indispensable in ethical instruction. In fact, it may 
be said that abstract instruction in emotions or in 
moral ideas or precepts is to the young nothing but 
words — verba sine rebus. The res in this sphere are 
actions resting on emotions and ideals. The process 
of acquisition is the imitative adoption of what the 
child approves in others, especially his Teacher. Only 
then does he truly know the ethical emotion. So with 
himself; he must do that he may know. Logically, it 
is true, the virtuous state of being must always precede 
" effective virtue " ; but, as a matter of fact, the two 
are so indissolubly united in the life of mind, that we 
would seem to bring about the virtuous state of being 
by first securing in the young the doing of the right; 
and so we work backwards. 

These remarks apply also to specifically religious 
instruction. I build up the reverential frame of mind, 
for example, by means of the habitual act of prayer 
and the exhibition in my own conduct of a conscious- 
ness of the Divine presence. This is sympathetically 
adopted by the child, and he knows it in the moment 
of doing it and seeing me do it. 



ii.] Ethical Education in the Real. 221 

The feelings, again, which lie at the root of minor 
morals (which Locke calls good breeding) are all taught 
by imitation and a training in acts. Far too little 
importance, I would here point out, is attached by 
teachers to minor morals in their reactive influence on 
character in its deeper sense. No verbal instruction 
is here of much avail. Good breeding, acquired after 
a youth is grown up, is always alien to him. His 
manners and "form " are self-conscious. He is wear- 
ing somebody else's clothes, and they never quite fit. 

The general conclusion is that ethical instruction, 
is through training, i.e. by evoking in the child the 
sympathetic approval and imitation of good acts. 
Coercion would defeat our purpose. The child has to 
adopt our point of view through imitation, and imita- 
tion rests, as we have seen, psychologically on sym- 
pathy : how can there be sympathy with that which a 
child fears? It would be a contradiction in terms. 

At the same time, I do not admit that cold precept 
is always out of place with the young. It sums up 
the character of actions, and has a function in the 
sphere of the emotions similar to formulated state- 
ments in the sphere of knowledge. Still less is it to 
be held that the poetic or other eloquent expression of 
moral sentiment is ever out of place. On the contrary, 
so long as a poem or rhetorical prose expresses ethical 
sentiments or ideas which are fairly well understood, 
they are poweriul agents in building up the ethical 
ideal at every stage of education ; especially when, as 
in the case of poetry, the words are allied with music 



222 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

in the school. For, all that has to do with the expres- 
sion of the ideal, in words or in beautiful forms, is 
moralising, simply because it is ideal. 

Precepts and dogmas, however, are generalisations, 
and no generalisation, as I have so often said, has any- 
meaning except in so far as it sums up particular 
experiences. In the intellectual sphere, particular 
experiences are percepts and concepts (individual) of 
things; in the ethical sphere they are the acts of the 
learner himself, or of his teacher and companions, or 
the imaginative realising of the acts of others as 
narrated in prose or poetry. 

If this distinction be clearly understood, it will be 
found that, as regards all else, ethical instruction is 
subject to the same Principles of method as intellec- 
tual instruction, and we do not require to start in 
search of a specific ethical methodology. To show this 
in detail would encumber this book, but the mere quot- 
ing of a few of the Principles will show what I mean. 

Present to Sense : — that is to say, evoke the moral 
feeling or emotion so that it shall be clearly present 
to consciousness. No preaching will do this any more 
than preaching about a banana will convey to con- 
sciousness the sense-concept of a banana. Emotions, 
etc., must be presented to inner sense as acts. 

Present a good model 

Evoke the Will. 

Turn to Use : i.e. Help the child in his daily acts to 
put into practice what he has seen and approved in 
your acts and the acts of others. Without supervision, 
moral training is impossible; but the supervision 
should be sympathetic and easy. 



ii.] Ethical Education in the Real. 223 

Let the instruction be analytico- synthetic : that is to 
say, in historical and biographical readings, and in 
poetical reading, the complex of conduct exhibited has 
to be analysed, and its elements, moral and immoral, 
to be brought into light with a view to a correct syn- 
thesis of the whole. Only so is the lesson of any use 
at all. But do not overdo this. If you are to pro- 
duce a flame easily with Bryant & May's matches, 
attend to the direction on the box, "Bub lightly." 

Associate ethical teachings : — that is to say, not only 
so as to exhibit their unity in Will, etc., but associate 
them also with pleasant surroundings; above all, a 
pleasant countenance. 

The other principles and rules of Method I leave 
you to apply for yourselves. 

But in leaving this subject I cannot forego one 
remark suggested by the master principle, " Evoke the 
Will." The child must do the work of his own moral 
education under your guidance simply, just as he does 
the work of instruction under your guidance. Do not 
emphasise and drive home moral teachings too much 
as if the child were an unwilling recipient of them. 
Assume that the young mind is ready for them, nay, 
eager for them; and while you handle moral and 
spiritual things gravely, let all austerity be absent. 



LECTURE III. 

METHOD OF ETHICAL EDUCATION IN THE FORMAL — 
DISCIPLINE. 

By the formal or abstract in ethics we mean Law, 
and Duty to Law as such; and here the principles 
"Evoke the Will" and "Turn to Use" are specially 
applicable. 

The ethical ideas which constitute the real or sub- 
stance of morality cannot be trusted to determine 
a man's conduct, still less a boy's, save in ordinary 
cases. Outside the ordinary and usual, the sense of 
duty to abstract Law, and that as Law of God, is 
indispensable. 

It is the Law in ethical ideas, consequently, and 
obedience to that Law, which we must constantly keep 
before the young if we are to educate them so as to 
give them power over their own actions — capacity for 
free self -regulation as they grow in years. This evok- 
ing of moral energy in the face of difficulties, is what 
is meant by moral discipline. Our aim is a "Habit 
of good action under a sense of Duty." 

Will, as reason, knows and realises in consciousness 
the ethical idea; and it is the same Will which real- 
ises the knowledge in action. The continued suprem- 
224 



leot. in.] Ethical Education in the Formal. 225 

acy of this Will, as serving moral Law, is the Habit 
of Virtue. 

But the child knows nothing of inner Law, and the 
boy knows little. It is abstract, and in germ only as 
yet. The young are concrete beings of sense and feel- 
ing. The educator (parent, teacher, the state) is to 
them Law — Law in its concrete and visible form. 
This is their Conscience, as yet external to them, and 
preceding, evoking, and guiding the natural growth 
of inner Law in them. 

For the securing of the habitual recognition of Law 
as Law, and as an end in itself for the free energy of 
Will (the essential characteristic of man as a good 
citizen and as a person), a great deal depends on the 
behaviour of this external Conscience — viz. Authority 
or Law as embodied in the parent, the state, and the 
teacher. The method of Moral Discipline, then, is 
through Authority. 

It might be asked at this point, What Right has a 
schoolmaster thus to impose himself, as Law, on the 
young ? The answer is, The right of the mature mind 
to direct the immature mind, the right conferred by a 
man's being the holder of the tradition of Law which 
is accumulated wisdom, and the right inherent in the 
parent and the State, — all which are embodied in the 
Teacher for the time being. 

This is his Right. Right may ultimately have to 
be supported by Might. But Might, in so far as it is 
not used in the service of Right, has no right, and is 



226 Institutes of Education. [lect. hi. 

immoral; consequently, ineffective and demoralising. 
Nay, even in the service of Eight, it is ineffective and 
demoralising when employed without absolute neces- 
sity. For Might as such (mere physical force) can 
never moralise. Through sympathy alone the child 
imitatively adopts the Law in you and from you. 
Doubtless, Might can deter from certain external acts 
and protect law-abiding citizens from their internal 
enemies ; and, consequently, in a State it is indispen- 
sable as a protective police. In the school, too, Might 
can deter; but inasmuch as the purpose of the school 
is education, it is an ethical purpose — the attainment 
of certain positive ethical results in the pupils of self- 
directing wills — and the merely deterrent, conse- 
quently, cannot educate. In truth, we might almost 
go so far as to say that, except in so far as the young 
acquiesce in the law of their elders, the effect of law 
is demoralising. You cannot form character outside 
the will of the child. It is a miserable result of edu- 
cation, which can be identified with the merely nega- 
tive result of a State police. 

We conclude that the Authority which demands and 
commands obedience to Law, in the family and school, 
is Moral Authority, not Coercive Might. The 
whole subject of Discipline to Law and Duty, then, 
centres round this question of moral authority. 



LECTURE IV. 

MORAL AUTHORITY AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS. 

The immature mind is not capable of apprehending 
the conception of abstract Law and Duty, as I have 
already said. This conception is there in germ and 
becomes explicit gradually through the discipline of 
young minds, which by nature are seeking for Law and 
going out to meet it. Discipline, it might be said, is 
attained when we have formed the habit of obedience 
to the external Law — the Moral Authority of the 
teacher. Not so : the habit must be so formed as to 
be a habit of free obedience to inner Law, and a per- 
petual recognition of its majesty. It is a slow proc- 
ess, and the teacher must pursue his aim deliberately, 
calmly, and persistently. If the young were capable 
of realising the abstract conception of formal law, we 
should content ourselves with saying that sympathy 
with the teacher and imitation of him and of other good 
examples would suffice, as is the case of instruction. 
But they are not capable. The abstract has here, as 
everywhere, to be learned through the concrete. The 
teacher is the concrete. Now, since the teacher 
embodies moral authority for the purpose of regulat- 
ing the acts of the pupil and so disciplining him in 

227 



228 Institutes of Education. [lect. iv. 

duty to law, lie himself must make sure that he is a 
true and worthy moral authority. So far as he is this, 
he will succeed : so far as he is not this, he will fail. 
We must now, therefore, consider those character- 
istics and elements of a true moral authority which 
must be found in the teacher, if the young are to be 
so disciplined by it as to grow up willing servants of 
the inner Law, and ultimately identify it with their 
own personalities as free personalities. 



LECTURE V. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXERCISE OF MORAL 
AUTHORITY. 

The characteristics of a true Authority make them- 
selves known in the exercise of authority from day to 
day and hour to hour. It is assumed that the master 
always maintains the aspect and bearing of authority. 
This is quite compatible with kindliness and sym- 
pathy, and is always self -controlled. 1 

Summary of characteristics : — 

1. The commands of the master are always in accord- 
ance with right reason. They are rational. 

This does not mean that he is to convince, or try to 
convince, his pupils that his commands are rational; 
but only that in quiet moments he should be able to 
justify his commands to himself, or to other adults, 
on rational grounds. His commands must thus never 
be arbitrary, if they are to exhibit true authority. In 
other words, they must never be an utterance of his 
own wilful will, but have a rational justification. 

2. The same commands are given in all similar cir- 
cumstances. They are sure, steady, and consistent 

1 For an Essay on Authority in the Schoolmaster, see my book, 
The Training of Teachers, and other Educational Papers. 

229 



230 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

with themselves. The pupil always knows where to 
find the master, so to speak. 

The master must not, therefore, allow his commands 
to be influenced — 

(a) By regard for personal ease, or by indolence 

(selfishness). 
(6) By variations of moods or temper (caprice). 

(c) By personal likes or dislikes (passion). 

(d) By indifference or frivolity — showing that 

he himself does not, at the bottom of his 
heart, much respect the law. 

(e) By self-esteem or pride — showing that he 

places himself and his own personality 
above the law as more worthy than it. 
(/) By love of popularity. 

3. The master's commands are always instinct with 
a moral purpose. 

This means that they would be found, if examined, 
to have a moral aim. 

4. Great liberty of thought and action is consistent 
with the observance of law ; and all things are right 
which do not conflict with the law. 

Therefore — 

The master's commands do not hover round every 
part of the boy's life; they do not harass him; they 
are few but strong, strong but few. Liberty of action, 
freedom of thought and life, are carefully protected 
within certain easily understood and well-marked 
limits. 

5. The master's commands and requirements are 
clear and unmistakable. 



v.] Exercise of Moral Authority. 231 

6. The Moral Law does not require of us the 
impossible. The master who is a true moral author- 
ity gives no commands and imposes no tasks which 
cannot, with a moderate effort, be fulfilled. 

By excessive exactions you justify disobedience. 
"Fathers, provoke not your children to wrath." 

7. The Moral Law is not equally imperative in 
respect of all rules of conduct. The master, there- 
fore, lets it appear that there is a distinction, and a 
difference of degree, in his commands ; that some are 
truly Laws of imperative force, others mere rules or 
orders of expediency. There are the " bye-laws, " so 
to speak, of the family or school. 

It is well sometimes even to suspend (by way of 
reward) rules of expediency, when they restrict the 
freedom of the pupil. The very suspension enforces 
the distinction between the Good and the merely Ex- 
pedient ; and so far from weakening the sense of Law 
in the boy and the school, tends to strengthen it. 

8. The commands and demands of the master are 
just. 

The young are exceedingly sensitive on the subject of 
justice. If you are just, you strengthen the inner Law 
by the outward manifestation of its own all-pervading 
characteristics. There is much that might be said on 
this question of Justice, but I shall make only three 
remarks — 

(a) The teacher's commands must apply to all 
equally. This does not preclude relaxa- 
tions in the case of children of native 
weakness or sensitiveness, provided that 



232 Institutes of Education. [lect. 

the other pupils recognise the existence of 
the reasons for exemption, which they are 
sure to do. 
(6) Make very sure of your facts before you 
approve or disapprove. If there be any 
doubt, always give the pupil the benefit 
of it. 
(c) Never remember a fault against a boy when 
it has been atoned for. Start afresh every 
morning with a clean sheet. A new day, 
a new life. Let each day be a day of 
regeneration. 
9. The master makes use of the feeling of awe and 
reverence, which is native to every human soul, and 
which finds its supreme object in the absolute all- 
pervading thought of God, to strengthen the authority 
of moral law; but only in grave cases. 

If the teacher consistently exhibit the above charac- 
teristics of Moral Authority, his own personal author- 
ity, as the external conscience of the pupil, is then 
justified in him : and it will be found that the pupil 
will gain such trust and confidence that, should the 
teacher at any time demand or command the ap- 
parently capricious or unreasonable, the pupil will 
accept the command without question, as capable of 
explanation and as right, simply because the teacher 
requires it. 

What ground have we for selecting these charac- 
teristics of the external moral authority? This, that 
they are the characteristics of the internal moral 
authority. It is only when Moral Law thus clothes 



v.] Exercise of Moral Authority. 233 

itself that it wears trie purple, and commands the 
reverence of a rational being as over all supreme. 

As the boy grows in years, you relax the pressure 
of authority as an external agency. You take him 
into moral partnership, so to speak. 



LECTURE VI. 

THE MORAL SANCTIONS OF AUTHORITY. 

These may be summed as the Approbation and Dis- 
approbation of the educator. They are moral in their 
character and effect, because they appeal to native 
emotions of a moral, and not of a material and conse- 
quential kind. 

There is so much to be said here on Disapprobation 
that I prefer to say nothing save to repeat the words 
of Herbart, that we must never so censure as to cause 
a boy to lose all self-respect. It is clear that blame 
is not felt at all unless there is self-respect to lose. 
The great task of the Church with the hopelessly fallen 
may be said to be to restore their self-respect. Appro- 
bation, again, is to be frank and generous, but with a 
certain reserve. You should not approve as if you 
were agreeably surprised that the boy should do right. 
234 



LECTURE VII. 

THE MATEEIAL SANCTIONS OF AUTHORITY, OR THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF AUTHORITY. 

These sanctions are Rewards which emphasise Ap- 
probation, and Punishments which emphasise Disap- 
probation. The moment we carry material rewards 
and punishments farther than is necessary to empha- 
sise the moral sanctions, we pass into the sphere of 
the non-moral — the purely coercive. School disci- 
pline, in its vulgar sense, always appeals to material 
or bodily considerations alone, and as deterrent is 
non-moral, if not also demoralising. 

As to Rewards. — These are almost wholly unneces- 
sary. 

Punishments. — These may be classified thus : — 

(1) Positive punishments: (a) bodily castigation, 
(b) impositions, (c) confinement, (d) expulsion. 

(2) Negative or privative punishments. 

A question to be considered here is the gradation of 
punishments. Never punish if you can attain your 
end without it. When you do punish, let the punish- 
ment be the minimum which will attain your end. 
The precise psychological effect of material punish- 
ments, such as flogging, confinement, etc., is an inter- 
esting question for the Analyst. 

235 



LECTURE VIII. 

NATURAL AUXILIARIES OF AUTHORITY. 

The skilled teacher gets these on his side. Woe to 
the Headmaster who finds them against him. 

They are so potent that the teacher is generally to 
blame when he has to resort to physical cast igat ion. 
The natural auxiliaries may be summed under the 
following heads — (1) Sympathy of members of the 
school with each other ; (2) Esprit de coips ; (3) Emu- 
lation. But the chief auxiliary, without which all the 
ethical work of the teacher would be wholly vain, is 
this, that reason is always in search of law, and rejoices 
in it. Attention to the ordinary fixed rules of the 
family and the school, though trivial in themselves, 
yet promote the general habit of recognising Law. 



The result of instruction in ends or ideas, and of 
discipline of Will, is, that at the end of the secondary 
school-period the youth is (speaking generally) a Will 
which has been fashioned by those set over him, and 
with tendencies in a definite and traditional direction. 
He cannot, however, be as yet said to act under a 
system of self -constituted ideals, i.e. a conscience of 
his own making. But he has been so wisely trained 
236 



lect. viii.] Natural Auxiliaries of Authority. 237 

that he has acquiesced willingly in ethical ideas, in 
the reasonableness of law and the obligation of duty, 
and has acquired certain moral and religious convic- 
tions. Inasmuch as there has been intelligent acquies- 
cence, his conscience cannot be said to be imposed from 
without, but to be free. The effort, now weak, now 
strong, after conduct in harmony with his acquired 
ideal, continues for life. 

In the case of the thinking few, however, all moral 
convictions and ends are, during the period of adoles- 
cence, subjected to a new and self- initiated analysis. 
This stage of mental growth corresponds to the uni- 
versity period of a man's education. Beginning with 
doubts and negation, it is resolved, ere long, into a 
self-convinced and self-directed affirmation of ethical 
truth, which, though it may not wholly harmonise 
with the tradition in which the youth has been edu- 
cated, will not very far depart from it. The best work 
a university can do is to afford guidance to this philo- 
sophic movement of mind. 

It may be said that those youths, who do not think, 
often go astray at this period of their lives, however 
well educated they may have been. But this straying 
from the right path is merely a lapse in conduct owing 
to the powerful impulses of nature which emerge into 
a feverish activity during adolescence, and not to any 
weakening of personal conviction as to law and duty. 
Allowing for certain exceptions, their recovery and 
restoration may be safely calculated on. There is 
much truth in the old Calvinistic doctrine of the 
"perseverance of the saints." 



238 Institutes of Education. [lbct.yiu. 

In conclusion, let me say that the sum of the matter 
is this: As the aim of intellectual instruction and 
discipline is to form a free rational self -activity which 
seeks Knowledge as Truth; so, the aim of ethical 
instruction and discipline is to form a free rational 
self -directing activity which seeks the Good as Law. 
These two together (and they cannot be separated) 
constitute the aim of Education; and if they are 
accompanied and sustained by a comprehension of the 
spiritual significance of the Truth and the Law, the 
Ethical End is achieved. 



PART VII. 



SCHOOL-MANA GEMENT. 



SCHOOL-MANAGEMENT. 

Questions for Consideration and Discussion. 

We have throughout assumed, in the preceding 
Course, that we have been speaking of the education 
of the human mind in general. But the advantages 
and disadvantages of congregating boys and girls 
for purposes of instruction and education demand 
special consideration. The questions to be considered 
are — 

1. To what extent are the ends, subjects, and 
methods of education modified when there are large 
numbers to deal with? 

2. What is the maximum number which should be 
placed under one Headmaster? 

3. How many can be taught together in one 
class? 

4. How is the difficulty of large numbers to be 
overcome when the pupils are of different ages and 
various stages of progress ? The general answer, of 
course, is — By Organisation. What do we mean by 
this? We mean — 

(1.) The Organisation of the Instruction. The In- 
struction-scheme is presumed to have fixed regard to 
the educational aim of the School. It must be devised 

241 



242 Institutes of Education. 

with a view to the work, not only of successive years, 
but of successive terms, and even of successive weeks. 
Length and difficulty of daily lessons have to receive 
careful attention ; they must be adapted to the average 
pupil. 

The curriculum of instruction to be laid down for 
different kinds of schools has to be discussed with 
reference to the general scope and purpose of all 
education. 

It may appear impossible to give such instruction 
in all the subjects enumerated under the head of Mate- 
rials (p. 35) as to give an exact basis for further 
progress and, above all, intellectual interest in making 
further progress. But it is quite possible to do so, if 
we begin betimes and build up gradually from the 
foundation, falling back at every stage on previous 
stages and connecting the earlier with the later. We 
have always to think of quality rather than quantity. 
The actual amount to be acquired is, in truth, not 
great. 

The difficulty which meets us in carrying out an 
ideal Instruction-plan is the Time-table. 

The Instruction-plan compels us to consider the 
respective claims of the Eeal-naturalistic and Eeal- 
humanistic in a school curriculum. The latter is the 
centre round which all education must revolve. 

This does not to any extent affect the position taken 
up in dealing with the materials of education 1 — viz. 
that the Eeal-naturalistic should run through the 

1 In the Class Lectures. 



School-Management. 243 

whole curriculum of instruction from infancy to man- 
hood, being especially prominent up to the fifteenth 
year. 

Encyclopsedism — its advantages and disadvantages. 
Education is an extensive as well as intensive process. 
Breadth of basis. Specialisation in Schools : is this 
permissible? or, is it a characteristic of the Univer- 
sity alone? 

As a guide in the arrangement of the succession of 
lessons daily, Bacon's words may be adapted to the 
school, viz.: "Interchange of contraries with a ten- 
dency to the more benign extreme." Formal and Eeal 
subjects should be interchanged with a tendency 
towards the " more benign " Real. 

(2.) The Organisation of the Pupils, i.e. the fitting 
them into the Instruction-scheme; in other words, 
Classification. In connection with Organisation of 
pupils, Examinations, written and oral, Removes, 
Leaving Certificates, etc. etc., have to be discussed. 

In this connection, too, Class Manipulation, Place- 
taking, Prizes, Expedients and Devices in Teaching, as 
distinguished from Methods, demand consideration. 

Thereafter, School-Rooms, School Furniture, Light 
and Ventilation, Apparatus for teaching, Text -Books, 
Manual Work in Schools. 

In every question the Ethical End must always be 
present to us, as governing all practical questions of 
detail. 



244 Institutes of Education. 

Organisation of a State School System. 

Relation of the State to the School. 

The different grades of Schools are to be determined 
by the periods of Mental Development. They are — 

From 3rd till 6th year, Kindergarten Schools, or Infant 
Asylums. 
" 6th " 8th " Infant Schools. 
" 8th " 15th " Primary Schools (Lower-Primary 
to 12th, Upper-Primary to 15th 
year 1 ). 
From 15th till 18th year, Secondary or High Schools. 
Above 18th year, Universities. 

Note. — These might be all under one roof; but in that case 
the line of demarcation between each would have to be strongly 
drawn, because each has its own idea by which its work must be 
governed. 

Technical Schools are schools intended to prepare 
for some specific industrial function, as opposed to 
schools whose end is purely the education of the man. 
The place of Technical Schools in an industrial nation. 
To what extent they can be so moulded as to give 
education as well as instruction. 

Girls' Schools. — The question, "To what extent 
difference of sex affects the education of Girls," has 
to be discussed. Mixed Schools. Teaching by Women, 
etc. 

1 The Upper-Primary may belong to the Secondary Schools, and 
usually does, 



School- Management. 245 



Continuation and Evening Schools. 



The Teacher. 

Is he an Educator or a mere retailer of so much, 
knowledge for so much money? His true vocation, 
and its precise social significance as an ethical func- 
tion. Intellectual and moral qualifications. 

Professional training. The general education of the 
Teacher should, like that of other Professions, be in 
the line of the higher education of the country, but 
demands more breadth. His professional training is 
a matter to be determined in its details by time, place, 
and circumstance. (Training Colleges and Normal 
Schools. The Universities as Schools of Education.) 

The Headmaster's relation to his Assistants, Powers 
and position of Assistants, etc. etc. Kelation of Head- 
masters to Governing Bodies. 



HISTORY OF EDUCATION. 

The History of education in various countries is 
part of the philosophy of History ; for, to understand 
the education of a country, we must first understand 
its characteristics, its social system, and its ideal of 
human life. We thereby ascertain the standard of 
attainment which it places before itself, and are only 
then prepared intelligently to contemplate its educa- 
tional machinery and methods. The History of edu- 
cation, adequately treated, thus contains much of those 
materials of culture which belong to the philosophic 
study of history. A day spent in an Athenian school 
would give us more archaeological light than all the 
tombs. 

As regards education, in its narrower sense as the 
education of the school, the History of education is 
rather to be called Comparative Education, and is very 
instructive. To go over the whole of so rich a field 
in one university course is impossible. Those por- 
tions are to be specially selected which best exhibit 
the progress of educational ideas, and national ideals, 
and also those which extend our practical acquaintance 
with methods of instruction and school-keeping, e.g. 
Chinese Education, Hellenic Education, Soman Edu- 
246 



History of Education. 247 

cation, Church Education, and among Writers, Quin- 
tilian, Ascham, Conienius, Milton, Locke, Rousseau, 
Pestalozzi. 

The Contents of a Course. 

I. Education in China: — The home of the 
Chinese and its physical characteristics. 
The characteristics of their social system. 
Their inner life as that may be ascertained 
from their philosophy, sacred books, and 
other literature. Their educational aims 
and machinery. Their methods. The re- 
sults of their system, morally and intellec- 
tually. Criticism of the Chinese educational 
ideas and methods, and lessons to be drawn 
for ourselves. 

II. Following the same method we proceed to 
consider briefly the Education of the 
Ancient Egyptians. 

III. The Education of the Hindus. 

IV. The Education of the Ancient Persians 

— its general aim and methods in connec- 
tion with their life and character in so far 
- as we have records. 

V. History of Education among the Semitic Races 
of the Mesopotamia Basin. 



248 Institutes of Education. 

VI. Education among the Hellenic Eaces : — 
This is to be treated in full detail. The 
educational views of Plato, Xenophon, Aris- 
totle, and Plutarch in this connection. 

VII. Education among the Eomans. Hellenic 
influence; Cato; Cicero de Oratore. 

VIII. Detailed analysis and exposition of the Insti- 
tutions of Quintilian. 

IX. Survey of the History of Education from 
Quintilian to the time of the Eeformation. 
Monastery and Cathedral Schools. Eise of 
Universities. 

X. The Eenaissance and Humanism, as repre- 
sented by the literary and theological re- 
vival. Erasmus and Colet, Luther and 
Melanchthon. Eabelais and Montaigne. 
Eoger As chant, and John Sturm of Stras- 
burg. Mulcaster, 

[Jesuit Education.'] 

XI. Bacon and the Inductive study of Nature : — 
The rise of Eealism and Utilitarianism in 
Education as opposed to Humanism and 
Culture. In connection with this, the advo- 
cacy of " natural " methods. 

XII. Analysis and exposition of the Baconians, 
Eatichius and Comenius. 



History of Education. 249 

XIII. Milton's Educational views. 

XIY. Exposition of John Locke's "Thoughts on 
Education," and the relevant parts of the 
"Essay on the Conduct of the Under- 
standing. " 

XV. Bousseau, Basedow, and Canipe. 

XVI. Exposition of Pestalozzi and his school. 

XVII. Jacotot. 

XVIII. Dr. Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster. 

XIX. Jean Paul Bichter. 

XX. More recent opinion, as represented by Frobel, 
Diesterweg, Dr. Arnold, Herbert Spencer, 
and Professor Bain (contemporary Kealisni, 
so called). 



APPENDIX 

ON 

CERTAIN PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS SUG- 
GESTED BY THE PRECEDING PAGES. 

A. — Psychological Basis. 

B. — Dualism, Materialism (Cerebration, etc.). 

C. — Brief Synthetic Statement. 

D. — Unity of Reason. 



May be omitted by the Student of Education. 

251 



A— PSYCHOLOGICAL BASTS. 

When I say in the text that the human mind is a one 
self-conscious entity, I am far from meaning that it is a 
mere x of departure for a series of phenomena. I mean that 
in man, as in all else, Being-universal individuates itself. 
This is effected in man, not only as a specific form of or- 
ganic Life, but, further, of a living consciousness (or potency 
of consciousness) of existences which are not itself; and 
this consciousness, as a self-consciousness, contains in it cer- 
tain activities and ends for its own fulfilment as a being or 
entity. 

This individuated being or conscious entity is, I say, 
" one : " it is not made up of parts any more than " life " 
in the plant or animal is made up of parts. 

Though the peculiar sensibility and activity which we 
call consciousness is specially allied with a specific part of 
body as its instrument, viz. the brain, it itself is not to be 
confounded with the physical conditions of its manifesta- 
tion, any more than life in a plant is to be confounded with 
certain molecular movements in the matter of the plant. 

Mind and matter act and react on each other : they are 
mutually involved. But matter is not mind, and mind is 
not matter. I stand by this dualism. To attempt to local- 
ise mind is to materialise it. It is a diffused and interfused 
" somewhat," whose characteristics we may feel and know ; 
it is, as the schoolmen said, "all in the whole and all in 
every part." 

Through ^/-consciousness I become more intimately 
aware of the mind-entity than I can ever be of matter. 

253 



254 Appendix on Philosophical Questions. 

Matter presents itself to consciousness as ultimately reduci- 
ble into Space plus Motion. The ultimate affirmation of the 
monistic materialist is that Space plus motion in certain 
complexities of relation is mind. This is manifestly a con- 
tradiction in terms, unless we first insinuate into matter 
what, by our own showing, is not in its concept or notion. 
[What has been called Mind-stuff is matter, so far as I can 
see.] 

Men become too much enamoured of inquiries into what 
they can see and weigh and measure. There is a kind of 
stability and certitude about such investigations. True, 
they find in many of the objects which yield their secrets 
(so far) to physical inquiries, an alien and disturbing factor. 
Life, feeling, consciousness, rational activity, purpose, voli- 
tion, are all admittedly there before them, as certainly as 
the sun and moon (to say the least). Can these facts of 
consciousness, as sensory and active, not be reduced to sim- 
ple matter-terms ? If it were possible (which it is not until 
We alter our concept of matter), we should still feel and 
think and will, but we, i.e. that which feels and thinks and 
wills, and the feelings and thinkings and willings, would all 
alike be matter and its motions ; and, thus, the morbid 
desire for a monistic view of experience would be gratified. 
If such phenomena were only matter and its motions, it is 
manifest that they would then be subject to the laws, and 
characterised by the behaviour, of matter. These laws are 
(speaking generally) dynamical : stone and iron are knocked 
about by them, so to speak, without knowing why or 
whither; and "minds" would be in the same predicament, 
with this difference, that, to begin with, they, at first, think 
that they are not knocked about ; but after being " scientifi- 
cally " instructed, they know that they are verily knocked 
about. Matter, it would appear, has taken, at a certain 
stage of evolution, the disease of questioning itself and 
affirming that it is not matter, and even inventing the word 
" mind." It thinks it thinks ; it suffers in its most perfect 
evolution from illusions as to its own being : it even fancies 



Psychological Basis. 255 

it is an Ego that wills. I hope I do not state the case too 
crudely. 

It is admitted that the " mind " phenomena, even as simple 
states of consciousness, are different from the other known 
phenomena called matter. But this seems to present no 
difficulty to the " scientific " mind (I should say, complex of 
matter). Quantity plus quality plus motion, feel and think 
themselves ! The atom, as the ultimate of the physical, feels 
and thinks, or, at least, it can, after a certain evolution, feel 
and think; and, consequently, feeling and thinking must 
always be implicitly in the atom itself. But it is always 
only matter : that is to say, it is always quantity plus motion, 
or, let us say, energy. We should then (accepting this view) 
have to say that man's mind is a combination of matter and 
motion, such that it feels and thinks all less complex com- 
binations, and also itself. Such a combination must, of 
course, have locality (for it must have all the conditions of 
matter), and thus we should have mind defined as a separate 
or individualised one material organic complex, with a certain 
relation of feeling and knowing to other atomic and organic 
combinations, which are like itself in all respects save in the 
manner of their combination. Can it be said that our 
presupposition, that mind is a " one feeling entity " (not- 
matter), demands more from the "scientific" mind than 
such a conclusion does ? 

Accordingly, I feel that I have a good title to say that 
there is, within certain organic beings, a one, self-identical 
potency of consciousness with inner determinations, and a 
specific activity — an entity not matter nor caused by matter. 
Note, I say there is. It is or be's; consequently, it is a 
being, i.e., entity. When I say " you are a conscious entity," 
I merely say " you are a conscious being : " do you doubt it ? 
Why so coy? When I say you are "one," do you really 
think you are two or twenty ? Any difficulty in the appre- 
hension of a one conscious entity arises from the illegitimate 
extension of the concept of matter into being and mind, 
even to the extent of asking, Where is mind localised ? 



256 Appendix on Philosophical Questions. 

All such questions can be met by another, Where is the 
" life " of a plant localised — the principium vitce, as it used 
to be called? Did you ever see it? There is, assuredly, 
such a phenomenal difference between a stone and a tree, 
that you find yourself in presence of a new fact — life. 
You can trace the material conditions of life; but what 
about life itself? So also a new fact is presented to you in 
the phenomenon, a conscious subject, which fact we call 
mind. Where is this metaphysical fiction (as some would 
call it) ? Precisely where the life-fiction is. Again, the 
most intimate of all consciousnesses is Being. Can you 
make an image of it ? And yet, Does Being not be ? If 
not, then what be's ? The prime condition of philosophical 
capacity is, it seems to me, annihilation of the material 
imagination, except for illustrative purposes. 

Further, the conscious one entity we call the human 
mind is not only a self-identity, but a permanent self-identity 
or self-sameness — two questions constantly confounded. 
Were there only a single flash of consciousness, and then 
darkness and the inane, the moment of that flash would 
be a moment of self-identity. This self-sameness remains 
through all the experiences of a mind. I do not understand 
that this consciousness of the permanent sameness of the 
Subject (whatever the subject may be or not be) is ques- 
tioned in these days. Fresh attempts are, doubtless, made 
to explain it — attempts which, I believe, will be for ever 
hopeless. The mind of a man is " for-itself," not by any 
sudden freak or saltus of nature, but just as every atom and 
every organic thing is "for-itself." Its peculiarity is that 
it is mind, that is to say, a potency of receiving and reflecting 
the rest of the world, first as a feeling-syn thesis or collocation 
(synopsis), and, thereafter, as a rational or self-regulated 
synthesis, — containing certain determinations within itself 
which constitute it as a complex one. 

The most recent attempt to explain the permanent iden- 
tity of the conscious entity is that of Professor James. 
Unfortunately his argument is involved in some confusion, 



Psychological Basis. 257 

because of his confining himself to se(/*-consciousness, so that 
the term used by him for manifestation of mind is "thought." 
This complicates things. Hume, in using "ideas," used a 
better, because more generic, word. Professor James regards 
the life of consciousness under the metaphor of a "stream." 
The mind is composed of «, b, c, d, etc., in succession, or 
collected. If this were all there could be no identity, much 
less permanent identity, as Professor James sees clearly 
enough. But he says : when there is a consciousness of 
the presentation a, there is with it a consciousness of the 
Ego (which I would prefer to call in this connection the 
"conscious subject"). Consequently, he does not redargue 
Hume, but simply affirms self-identity in this form. JSTo 
one, I imagine, will care to question Professor James's way 
of putting the bare fact of self-identity in each successive 
consciousness. But this conscious subject has next to be 
carried on from one consciousness to another, as always a 
permanent same subject in the midst of incessant change, 
and it is here that Professor James contributes a view of 
his own. 

The successive consciousnesses b, c, d, etc., also contain ego 
or conscious subject just as a did, and we are aware of ego 
in b, c, d as the same subject which appeared in a, because 
a passes on itself with its. implicit conscious subject to b, and 
c, and d, which, one after the other, inherit a as well as its 
other predecessors ; and so make up a stream which is a 
continuous stream. There are two things to be considered 
here : there is a, the " state " of consciousness, and there is 
the " conscious subject." Let us separate them. The state 
b inherits and appropriates the state a, and consequently has 
memory of it. How is this possible ? As a graphic way of 
talking, there can be no objection to this inheritance and 
appropriation ; but it affords no explanation. The state b, 
as such, can have no possible connection with the state 
a other than that of atomistic succession. I cannot pass 
on a to & in such a way as to constitute ab by simply draw- 
ing up a will in &'s favour. There is no bridging of the 



258 Appendix on Philosophical Questions. 

bottomless gulf, the infinite inane, between a and b which 
would make the memory of a possible. The " common 
sense" position that the same one subject receives, holds, 
and synthesises the experiences a, b, c, d, etc., is certainly 
an explanation ; James's inheritance and appropriation of 
a by b, etc., is simply a figurative way of talking. 

This is not all, however; for in b there is "conscious 
subject " just as there was in a, according to James. How, 
now, do I feel it to be the same conscious subject as was in 
a ? Thus : a has executed a will, so to speak, in favour of 
b, and made b sole legatee of all his worldly goods, including, 
consequently, the " conscious subject " in a which conscious 
subject possesses these goods. Where, I would ask, does the 
consciousness of continuity come in — the continuity of sub- 
ject in a with subject in b, c, d, etc. ? It is not in a, and it 
is not in b as such, as I have shown : does it lie between a 
and b then ? It passes on, says James, from a to b. Is this 
not simply another way of saying that what was in a con- 
tinues in b — the common doctrine? Why, then, all this 
pother? Must we be "scientific" at all hazards? If there 
is any true interval between a and b, it certainly is a chasm 
deep enough to engulf all knowledge, and the doubt would 
for ever remain, whether the process whereby the dying a 
bequeathed his possessions to b (including in these posses- 
sions the ego which possessed a!) would hold good in the 
courts, and be held to be an effective transference. The 
ego in b might, after all, be an illegitimate descendant of 
the ego in a. The father of the bastard might be — who or 
what? If, on the other hand, the ego or subject in a hands 
itself on without break, what is this but the perduring con- 
tinuity of ego or subject, as "common sense" holds it? 
This "stream" of consciousness should rather be called a 
corduroy road. 

James either grants the continuum, and his argument is 
mere ingenious metaphor ; superfluous as it is unsound even 
as a metaphor, for it may mislead the unwary. It seems to 
induce him even to dispense with a " thinker " in the inter- 



Psychological Basis. 259 

ests of " thought," just as America might be said to have 
been discovered without a discoverer. Under the influence 
of this point of view, he seems to regard the " state " a as 
playing the chief role, and as handing on the subject or ego 
as in it. Why should it not be the other way round if there 
is to be handing on at all ? Why should not the subject or 
ego in a hand on itseli with a on its shoulders. Or is it a 
that generates the ego ? I presume Professor James prefers 
a as the chief actor in the drama, because he wishes to 
escape from that fearful thing a metaphysical entity. Is he 
not here making friends with the mammon of unrighteous- 
ness — the physical investigator who cannot apprehend an 
entity which has not a shape at least as solid as a vortex 
ring ? Certainly a metaphysical entity is a ghost. But why 
this superstitious dread of ghosts in so illuminated an age — 
the age of spooks? And does he not see that all that meta- 
physicians mean by entity is conceded when he admits 
" I " ? Hume knew better what he was about than to admit 
so much. 

I shall conclude by quoting, from the sober philosopher of 
Common Sense, a sentence which expresses a "scientific" 
phenomenal truth of more certitude than the existence of 
the sun as an objective reality : " I am not thought, I am 
not action, I am not feeling ; I am something ' that thinks 
and acts and feels.' The self or I is permanent, and has 
the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, acts, and 
feelings which I call mine." 1 

In fine, there is an interplay between the physical and 
metaphysical in man and his brain. Consciousness affects 
and effects physical conditions, and vice versa. But if con- 
sciousness be not the physical, nor a product of the physical, 
then mind may correctly be called an entity and identity in 
whatever way it may be implicated in the physical, whether 
by pre-established parallelism (concomitance) or by a double 
action and reaction. In short, my Ego is not my body, 

1 Reicl's IntelL Poioers, iv. 



260 Appendix on Philosophical Questions. 

though Ego and body are mutually conditioned and condi- 
tioning. 

Let me add : 

I hold it for true, that if man be not a one self -identical 
conscious entity, having within it certain capacities, desires, 
emotions, and faculties (which it is the business of psychol- 
ogy to explain), in the fulfilment and harmonious regulation 
of which the Ego finds the purpose of its existence, there is 
not even " matter " for Ethics, much less Ethics. The only 
alternative seems to me to be that man is simply a cunningly 
devised material organism of a peculiarly sagacious kind, 
living for the conservation of itself and the species to which 
it belongs : Appetite, more or less disguised, sums him up ; 
and spiritual ideas and ideals are only painted fictions which 
colour, while they conceal, gross material aims. 



B. — DUALISM, THE UNCONSCIOUS, AND 
CEREBRATION. 

Grant the dualism of Mind and Matter, with their 
mutual implications, it follows, from what we know of the 
former by personal experience, that we must posit mind as 
the prius, and matter as its vehicle or expression. 

The two being in combination, must act and react on 
each other : if a molecular change is produced in the cere- 
brum, it must affect mind ; and if mind, when it has once 
emerged, works out its own activities by means of nerve, 
these mind-originated activities, again, must make their 
record in the cerebrum. This being so, we should not be 
surprised to learn that a change might be made in the 
cerebrum by an outer or inner stimulus which did not then 
and there emerge as a consciousness, because consciousness 
as a one whole was too busy with some other occupation to 
admit of the nerve-stimulus fulfilling itself in mind. But if 
the scar (so to call it) in the nerve-tissue remains, there is 
no reason why it should not take other opportunities of 
forcing itself to the front when the original stimulus had 
spent itself and was withdrawn. If it be, as we opine, then 
we should have mere dynamical cerebration, which can be 
arrested at the threshold of consciousness and stand there 
waiting for an open door. This would be "unconscious 
cerebration," and can be conceived as going on ceaselessly 
in our brains as a merely dynamical process. But if any 
one asks us to believe in "unconscious consciousness" we 
decline, just as as we should decline believing in "Yes-No." 

Accept, however, two planes of mind — the conscious 
(animal) and the self-conscious (man), and we can readily 

261 



262 Appendix on Philosophical Questions. 

admit that much may be in a man's consciousness of which 
he is not at all se//-conscious ; that is to say, self-consciousness 
(which also has its degrees like everything else) is at so low 
a potency {e.g. in reverie) that we may call such experiences 
unself-conscious consciousness, or rather sub-self-conscious- 
ness. In fact, is not the greater part of each man's mental 
life of this sub-self-conscious kind ? Is it desirable that we 
should be for ever sifting out and binding down our vague 
experiences and interrupting the beneficent inflow of gracious 
nature? Knowledge may be too much with us. " The time 
of life is short ; " better to live at once, then, than to spend 
all our time in learning what life may be, and how to live. 

In the conscious or attuitional stage the nerve-dynamical 
(cerebration) and the mind-dynamical would seem to be in 
counterpoise ; in the self-conscious stage the tables are 
turned by the emergence of Will; and while the nerve- 
dynamical and the mind-dynamical still, of course, remain 
inter-active, they are now overpowered and regulated by the 
Ego as self-conscious subject, which Ego has itself been 
effected by the free functioning of the new phenomenon — 
Will — determining all to ends and to law. 

It does not follow from this that mind ever operates, even 
in its highest self-conscious activities, independently of a 
physical vehicle, and, therefore, of physical conditions. The 
world seems to be constructed on this plan — Mind using 
matter and at the same time being restricted by matter. 
This is Dualism. 

When, however, we accept the involvement of every state 
of consciousness with brain (as of all mind with all matter 
in the universe), we are not therefore committed to a theory 
that every state of consciousness even in an animal, is pro- 
duced by an antecedent molecular movement of matter. 
That such molecular movement gives rise to states of con- 
sciousness is patent enough ; but, vice versa, we may hold 
that states of consciousness are the antecedent causes of 
certain molecular movements of brain. When a fox sees or 



Dualism, the Unconscious, and Cerebration. 263 

smells a hound, a consciousness of a certain specific kind is 
set up in him by means of certain physical processes, and 
the running to cover for concealment is also effected through 
certain physical processes ; but the latter were set in operation 
by the consciousness of fear. When we come to Man giving 
external effect after deliberation to a formed purpose under 
the domination of an idea, we have a series of movements or 
processes each one of which may be admitted to involve 
physical or molecular nerve-movement or disturbance; but 
the successive units of the process, viz. consciousness, and 
purpose, and will are not caused by these molecular move- 
ments. It is not denied that when any particular conscious- 
ness arises, it involves the nerve-tissue ; and it may further 
be admitted, I think, that the molecular movements in the 
cells have a purely material relation to past activities in other 
cells and revive these activities, thus forcing a fresh con- 
sciousness on us to which we assign its proper place in the 
complex which constitutes mental life and action. But, I 
repeat, it does not at all follow that a consciousness as such 
does not also antecede a molecular movement and set it 
up, and also give rise by association or otherwise to other 
consciousnesses as such. 

If the Dualistic conception is incorrect, monistic material- 
ism holds the field, then Mind is nothing real ; it is at best 
a mere glow on the surface of the material organism suffering 
a series of necessary mechanical movements : these mechani- 
cal movements constitute the sole reality. This position 
seems to me to be so unscientific in the face of the actual 
phenomena, as to be scarcely worth arguing against. If it 
were true, every conscious thing would find its apotheosis 
in being a stone in order that the purely mechanical, being 
in that event undisturbed by the intrusion of consciousness, 
the conscious thing might be safely and finally put to sleep, 
and rid of all illusions. 

The whole question lies deeper down, and the mind of 
man is only a single "case." Does matter (which is only 
space plus motion) think itself, and produce the illusion of 



264 Appendix on Philosophical Questions. 

its antithesis, mind? In the cosmic whole is Mind, Thought, 
Reason, first or second? I do not mean first or second in 
time ; for we have present to us matter and mind in a syn- 
thesis from the first, and always. But, given the dualism of 
the synthesis, is Mind logically and necessarily the prius of 
Space plus motion, or is it the other way about? If matter 
be first in the scheme of things, then not only is it first in 
what is called the human mind, but mind itself is non-exist- 
ent, save as a series of matter-negating phenomena following 
in the wake of the fatalistic series of matter-phenomena. 
From beginning to end all things and minds are merely 
dynamical and automatic; and the term " mind " demands 
a new definition. 

P.S. — "Impressions." — There are some who object to 
the use of the words " impressions " and " reflexive " in con- 
nection with the conscious subject as such ; but these words, 
like all words used to denote spiritual facts, are figurative. 
We are told also that a reflexive activity in response to 
impressions must impart to these impressions or recepts the 
"nature" of the reacting subject, and that even to this 
extent that they are constituted by the reacting subject. 
Which amounts ultimately to this, that certain pin-pricks, 
coming from Heaven alone knows where, give to the subject 
an impulse reflexively to create the object. At the same 
time it would not be denied that these pin-pricks give 
the cue to the subject, and so tell it when it is to constitute 
a cabbage and when a dog. This ultra-Kantism is to be 
justified, it would seem, by the fact that all our knowledge 
of the external of sense goes on "within the skull"! It 
does not seem to occur to these writers that the conscious- 
ness of hunger and thirst, of love and hate, of the beautiful, 
and of the right and the wrong, also all go on " within the 
skull"; and consequently all things we feel and desire and 
think and know must be constituted by the nature of the 
reacting subject. The argument, with many at least, rests 
on the vast number of physical processes that go on in the 



Dualism, the Unconscious, and Cerebration. 265 

brain before we can be conscious of anything, as if the 
external "somewhat" could not tell its true tale to the sub- 
ject because of this intervention ! It would then follow that 
the reader of this sentence could not by possibility receive 
what it truly contained as it left me. Before it reaches the 
page there is an infinite series of physical processes ; it has 
then to be printed and be locked in the arms of a further 
series of physical laws and processes before the reader begins 
to be the theatre of another infinite series which result in — 
What? — constituting a meaning for himself which is not 
my meaning. 

Perhaps it is unnecessary to continue the consideration of 
this subject ; but I would put this question to these writers, 
Does it not occur to you that these physical and physiological 
processes (brain and all) must themselves, when you come 
to be aware of them, also be, on your own showing, consti- 
tuted by the reacting subject? If so, is it not just possible 
that the resultant consciousness is a true reflex of the pin- 
pricks (for you begin with a pin-pricking outer), inasmuch 
as the subject constitutes for itself all the processes as well as 
their resultant, and so probably knows what it is about? 
The universe after all may be found not to be an infinite 
chaos of potential pin-pricks, or, to put it otherwise, a con- 
fused jelly poured into tin moulds called minds. 



C — BRIEF SYNTHETIC STATEMENT. 

Mind-universal externalises itself as matter — the (to 
us) phenomena of recipience generally. This, however, would, 
if it went no farther, be an inadequate expression of Mind- 
universal. For Mind would have still to externalise itself 
as life and finally as finite minds; always, however, under 
conditions of extern alisation, and, therefore, necessarily ma- 
terialised, i.e. in Space, Motion, and Time, which are the 
fundamental forms of all externalisation — which, in short, 
is what externalisation means. 

All is by infinitely small degrees ; and, accordingly, to fix 
definitely the point at which any manifestation of the Uni- 
versal differentiates itself into another is for ever impossible ; 
and this by the very nature of sense and of the act of finite 
reason, as I have shown elsewhere. None the less is each 
thing (or movement, if you please so to call it) different 
from another — that which precedes from that which follows. 
It is only at a certain stage, that is to say, after a certain 
accumulation of subtle and silent differences, that finite 
mind, under conditions of space and time, can become aware 
of distinct and differentiated presentations. These are then 
and there received as complex totals in their complex totality, 
as "things." An egg is an egg and a chicken is a chicken, 
but at every stage of the process from egg to chicken there 
is a " thing " self -identical — a total complex in the universe 
of things. 

It will be said that if all is mind-universal externalising 

itself, the very primordial atom contains mind, — is mind. 

And it is so. It is monad, not atom. By which I plo not 

mean that mind is attached to atom, but that the being and 

266 



Brief Synthetic Statement. 267 

the determination of the material externalisation is mind 
dwelling in and with the atom, as it dwells in and with the 
universe. The dynamical, how T ever, at this stage of the 
cosmic synthesis, and for long, seems to play the leading 
role (how we know not) until we reach the thing called 
conscious entity, where there is an equal reciprocation ; and 
this reciprocity becomes, at the moment of the emergence 
of Will and self-consciousness, supremacy over the matter- 
form. 

Difficult as it is to affirm the point of differentiation, we 
may yet venture to say that the moment at which a mate- 
rialised thing feels is also the moment of primordial mind as 
a specific mind entity. 

From mere vague feeling, which is a state of indifference 
in which subject and object are lost in each other, the indi- 
vidual mind rises to sensation in which subject and object, 
i.e. the feeling-thing and that which stimulates feeling in 
the thing, are separated, and the object reflexly placed out- 
side. There is now repeated in the individual as a conscious- 
ness the duality which already constitutes the universe. 
What follows in the evolution of finite mind is sufficiently 
indicated in the preceding book. 

Just as Sense finds the a posteriori categories in mere 
reflex sensation, so Reason finds all a priori categories in 
and through its own pure activity : the two together consti- 
tute the universe for the subject-self. 

Matter can have no reality by itself : its reality is Mind, 
the sole Substance. And yet it is externality. If we part 
from this Dualism, we are driven into the arms of Monism 
— materialistic or spiritualistic. The rose of Monism smells 
sweeter under the latter name ; but that is all. If All is 
Mind, then the dynamics of what we call " matter " and the 
dynamics of cerebration are the dynamics of Mind, and not 
merely of the externalised expression or vehicle of Mind ; 



268 Appendix on Philosophical Questions. 

for there is no externalised expression — no matter. If 
matter, again, is Mind, and all is Matter, then this is simply 
to say that Mind is matter. There is nothing to choose 
between the two positions. 

In reply to the dualistic position that the universal object 
exists so, that is to say, as beent and inreasoned matter, 
because we necessarily take it up so in sense and reason, it 
may be said that it may not after all be so. To which the 
rejoinder is, How else, since that is how we know it? We 
cannot know it otherwise. It is as futile to suggest that it 
is not so as to raise the question whether the thing I call a 
poker be not truly after all a cat. To use knowledge as a 
knife to cut the throat of knowledge is a kind of suicide by 
anticipation, a self-contradiction, which cannot effect itself. 
To say that we do not and cannot know save in part, is, on 
the other hand, tenable and true ; but this does not affect 
the validity of what we do know. But we must make sure 
that this last is in very truth knowledge. 



D. — UNITY OF REASON. 

When the conscious subject functions Will for purposes 
of knowledge and consequent conduct, it asks of the thing 
before it, and of all things in their relations, what they pre- 
cisely are. The answer must ultimately be the purified 
record of the sensate plus the satisfaction of the dialectic 
form of the reason-movement in its specific reference to that 
sensate. It is this end towards which Will-reason is always 
striving; and to accomplish it, it has to take successive 
steps. It stands face to face with a synthesis given, and it 
has to understand that synthesis, to categorise it : and then 
only does it fulfil its purpose, which is knowledge. The 
rudimentary act of Percipience contains in itself the mode 
of procedure, for it is a separating of a one complex from 
other complexes, and synthesising it with the conscious 
subject. This process of taking things, and then the ele- 
ments of things, apart, and then synthesising them, thus 
converting sense-synthesis or synopsis into rational synthesis, 
is always going on. We can imagine a rational being so 
endowed as to analyse and synthesise in a single flash of 
intuition ; but if it did so, it would still have to go through 
the necessary steps (with whatever celerity) whereby the 
rational synthesis was attained. These steps are all con- 
tained in the final complex act, which alone is true knowing ; 
but when we separate this final complex act into its con- 
stituents, the logical order of these steps becomes also a 
time-order ; because all is in Time. As separated we call 
them Attuition, Discrimination, Perception, Comparison, 
Conception of the individual, General Conception, Reasoned 
or Causal ground; and these movements, with their auxiliary 

269 



270 Appendix on Philosophical Questions. 

conditions in sense, e.g. Imagination, Memory, and Associa- 
tion, constitute the substance of Rational Psychology. But 
the various steps are all elements in or moments of the final 
complex act of Reason in knowing : Reason or the rational 
act is to be regarded as a One in many moments. 

Not only is the unity of Reason, as a one Will-movement 
in many moments towards an end, thus vindicated, but it is 
seen that the idea and the ideal themselves emerge out of 
reason as so conceived. What we have to render an account 
of are complexes, and finally the one total complex, the uni- 
verse of things. Will being, by virtue of its essential nature 
a free activity, is for ever restless and for ever pushing on, 
even to the transcending of the limits of Time and Space. 
It is the total individual thing which it has to explain in its 
whole notion, and also in the idea within the notion, this 
idea being the true differentiation of the thing — at once its 
essence, cause, and tc'Aos relatively to itself. It thus insists 
on pushing on till it grasps this true isness of the thing, to 
which, however, it can never attain even in a physical sense ; 
and which, if attained, would still leave for our solution the 
true "isness" of that ultimate physical "isness." This true 
" isness " is the idea and the " one " which explains the parts. 
The ideal, again, as distinguished from the idea, is of the 
complex ; it is the perfected complex : and it is Will, as a 
necessary pursuer of ends, which makes the ideal (no less 
than the idea) a possible fact of consciousness, both in the 
sphere of knowledge, of ethics, of aesthetics, and of educa- 
tion. 

It would be out of place to prosecute this subject further 
here. All I wish to do is to emphasise the unity of Reason 
and the Reason-movement as that is brought to light by 
regarding Will as root of reason and nerve of reason from 
first to last ; the various steps in the process which psychology 
lays bare being only the logical moments of a one act, though 
presenting themselves to us in a time-order, because we 
exist in Time. 

Further, the reason act is not only a one act in several 



Unity of Reason. 271 

moments according to a certain logical order, but in each 
separate moment the whole reason-/orm is present, and is 
repeating itself. In Percipience I discriminate and isolate 
a, and synthesise it with itself in consciousness ; in Concipi- 
ence I isolate the parts in the conceived thing, and synthe- 
sise them as a one thing (in many) ; in the general concept 
I isolate like characters in a plurality of objects, and synthe- 
sise them in a one rational thing or entity ; and this process 
is also the process of inductive reasoning (many in one). 
In deductive reasoning, again, as when I say, " That beast 
is ferocious ; because it is a tiger ; and all tigers are fero- 
cious," I have isolated the beast before me from other objects, 
and synthesised it with the general concept "tiger," and all 
that is implicit in "tiger." In affirming the cause of an 
effect, I isolate particular antecedent and sequent, and syn- 
thesise them in a causal unity : the one always contains the 
other. The simple act of percipience of the single, with 
which we began, becomes, it is true, more complex as expe- 
rience presses plurality more and more upon me and demands 
rationalisation ; but that is all. Thus the central Will, 
whose "end" is the causal rationalisation of all experience 
as an ultimate one in many and many in one, behaves itself 
always in the same way. Each step is rationally grounded, 
from the dialectic process in simple percipience upwards ; 
and each step is also a synthesis or judgment. [Judgment 
and thought-affirmation are the same: the judgment-/orm 
exists only when articulated into subject and predicate : 
when expressed in words it is a proposition.] 

Even the Attuit in the animal mind is, as being a result- 
ant synopsis, an anticipation of judgment — a judgment 
within the domain of Sensation pure and simple, which, 
with the advent of Reason, is transformed into a synthesis. 

If we wish to generalise in one word the way or form of the 
reason-movement, it is to be called the Analytico-synthetic 
way — the search for identity in difference. The ultimate 
result is that Will-reason, in its necessary dialectic, insists 



272 Appendix on Philosophical Questions. 

on grasping the cosmic whole of identity in difference as a 
synthesis of Phenomenon and primal perduring One Reason. 
As a system of Reason, however, the world is outside, 
and remote from, mere feeling in the individual subject, 
even in its highest attuitional form. It is only when the 
conscious or feeling subject evolves itself as Will moving as 
a dialectic process, that it becomes aware of the universe as a 
reasoned system. That reasoned system, or system of rea- 
son, is outside there all the while ; but until / have reason, 
how can I see the reason in it? It is not my reason that 
reveals the reason of the universe to that universe ; the 
function of my reason is to make explicit the reason in the 
universe of sensation to me, a self-conscious subject. Prior 
to the emergence of reason in Man, the universal Reason is 
there in things and in man's sensation of things. The man 
born blind cannot see light; the conscious subject cannot 
see Reason-universal until it grows within itself the eye of 
reason. And when it grows, it does not say, " Light is there 
because I have an eye," but rather, "I having an eye can 
now see the light which all the while was there." I cannot, 
as a matter of fact, know the universe except as a reasoned 
system ; the seeming chaos of sensation, from the initial 
to the final act of the self-conscious subject, is necessarily 
gripped as a reasoned world. Finite reason itself might be 
briefly defined as a conscious being freely moving to the 
reduction of all to itself in the form of Causality ; which is 
the Form of the initial act of Percipience and of the last act 
of completed knowledge. 



THE INSTITUTES OF EDUCATION: 

COMPRISING A 

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BY 

S. S. LAURIE, LL.D.,F.R.S.E., 

Professor of the Institutes and History of Education, University 

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